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Preamble
In August of 1998 the Collaborative Agent Design Research Center (CADRC) of the California
Polytechnic State University in San Luis Obispo (Cal Poly), approached the Office of Naval
Research (ONR) with the proposal for an annual workshop focusing on emerging concepts in
decision-support systems for military applications. The proposal was considered timely by the
ONR Logistics Program Office for at least two reasons. First, rapid advances in information
systems technology over the past decade had produced distributed, collaborative computerassistance capabilities with profound potential for providing meaningful support to military decision
makers. Indeed, some systems based on these new capabilities such as the Integrated Marine MultiAgent Command and Control System (IMMACCS) and the Integrated Computerized Deployment
System (ICODES) had already reached the field testing and final product stages, respectively.
Second, over the past two decades the US Navy and Marine Corps have been increasingly
challenged by missions demanding the rapid deployment of forces into hostile or devastated
territories with minimum or non-existent indigenous support capabilities. Under these conditions
Marine Corps forces have to rely mostly, if not entirely, on sea-based support and sustainment
operations. Operational strategies such as Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS) and
Ship To Objective Maneuver (STOM) are very much in need of intelligent, real-time and adaptive
decision-support tools to assist military commanders and their staff under conditions of rapid
change and overwhelming data loads.
In the light of these developments, Dr. Phillip Abraham of the Logistics Program Office of ONR
considered it timely to provide an annual forum for the interchange of ideas, needs and concepts
that would address the decision-support requirements and opportunities in combined Navy and
Marine Corps sea-based warfare and humanitarian relief operations. The first ONR Workshop
(Collaborative Decision Making Tools) was held April 20-22, 1999 and focused on advances in
technology with particular emphasis on an emerging family of powerful computer-based tools. The
workshop concluded that the most able members of this family of tools appear to be computerbased agents that are capable of communicating within a virtual environment of objects and
relationships representing the real world of sea-based operations. Keynote speakers included:
VAdm Jerry Tuttle (USN Ret.); LtGen Paul Van Riper (USMC Ret.); RAdm Leland Kollmorgen
(USN Ret.); and, Dr. Gary Klein (Chairman, Klein Assoc.).
The second Workshop (The Human-Computer Partnership in Decision-Support) held May 2
4, 2000, was structured in two parts: a relatively small number of selected formal presentations (i.e.,
technical papers) followed each afternoon by four concurrent open forum discussion seminars.
Keynote speakers included: Dr. Ronald DeMarco (Assoc. Technical Director, ONR); RAdm
Charles Munns (USN); Col Robert Schmidle (USMC); and, Col Ray Cole (USMC Ret., Program
Manager ELB ACTD, ONR).
The third Workshop (Continuing the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)) held June 5-7,
2001, is the subject of these Proceedings. Copies of the proceedings of past Workshops are
available free of charge from:
Collaborative Agent Design Research Center (CADRC)
Cal Poly (Bdg. 117T)
San Luis Obispo, CA 93407
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Opening Remarks
rd

as a Foreword to the 3 Annual Office of Naval Research Workshop
Good Morning! I would like to welcome you all to this third annual Collaborative Decision
Support Workshop sponsored by the Logistics Program Office of the Office of Naval Research. I
am Jens Pohl, Executive Director of the Collaborative Agent Design Research Center at Cal Poly
University in San Luis Obispo, California. Our Center, and Cal Poly, has had the honor of hosting
this Workshop since 1999, and I am very gratified to see such a large attendance this year.
One might well ask: Why should we have a Workshop on Collaborative Decision Support?; and:
Why chose this year’s topic Continuing the Revolution in Military Affairs? The answers to
both of these questions are in fact quite logical. Certainly, nobody would argue that the Information
Age has brought far reaching changes.
• Technology is advancing at an unprecedented rate.
• We appear to be inundated by the shear volume of information. However, we
need to examine our words carefully here, are we really talking about
information or is it just data?
• Global connectivity has not only increased accessibility, but it has also
greatly increased the complexity of most of our undertakings.
• Our expectations of what we believe that we, as individuals, are capable of
achieving have greatly increased.
• And, it has become quite apparent that the value of each individual person
has appreciated enormously in recent years.
It is to be expected that these changes will also have a profound impact on the way the military will
conduct its business over the next decade. Not only will these changes be reflected in the weapons
that will be used and the warfighting strategies that will be employed, but also, the kind of
capabilities the military will require from its decision-support systems. It is therefore by no means
an overstatement to say that we are in the middle of a Revolution in Military Affairs.
When we established our Center at Cal Poly more than 15 years ago we had a vision: We thought
that it should be possible to utilize computers for more than just data-processing and
visualization; - as an intelligent, collaborative assistant. Today, after much work by many
centers and groups around the world, this vision is rapidly becoming a practical reality. In this
regard I would, in particular, like to recognize Dr. Phillip Abraham of the Office of Naval Research
(ONR), who also shared this vision and saw the need to establish an Annual ONR Workshop
Series on Collaborative Decision Support in 1999. He saw a compelling need to explore several
questions that could have profound impact on military affairs:
• Could computers be more than dumb data-processors?
• Should the difference between data and information be re-examined?
• Could computers be intelligent tools collaborating with human users?
• Were new concepts, notions, and approaches required?
• Should existing entrenched schools of thought be challenged?
He established this Workshop Series as a means of accelerating the transition from a data-centric
to an information-centric decision-support systems environment. Thank you Phil, for your
foresight and support.
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I believe that we can look forward to a most exciting and inspiring three days. The presentations
and discussions will explore several important topics:
• The essential need for, and purpose of, experimentation.
•

Practical innovations by some of our active and retired military commanders.

•

Technical innovations leading to information-centric interoperability. In this
regard, during the last session this afternoon, we will be presenting a live
demonstration of interoperability in which seven multi-agent systems will
collaborate in a typical expeditionary warfare scenario.

•

And, what we need to do to clear some of the obstacles on the road ahead.

Now I would like to ask my colleague and friend, Col Tony Wood (USMC Ret.), to introduce our
distinguished keynote speaker, Mr. Andrew Marshall, Head of the Office of Net Assessment, US
Department of Defense.

Jens Pohl
Collaborative Agent Design Research Center, Cal Poly (San Luis Obispo)
Quantico, June 5, 2001
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"Continuing the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)"
Theme A:
Theme B:
Theme C:

The Changing Role of the Military
The Future of Decision Support
The Transitional Period

Tuesday, June 5: The Changing Role of the Military (Theme A)
Time

Activity

7:30

Check-in and Registration Begins
Registration Desk open from 7:30 AM to 4:30 PM

8:30 - 8:45

Opening Remarks and Welcome by Dr. Jens Pohl, Executive Director,
Collaborative Agent Design Research Center, California Polytechnic State
University (Cal Poly), San Luis Obispo, CA.

8:45 - 9:45

Keynote Address by Mr. Andrew W. Marshall, Head, The Office of Net
Assessment, The Pentagon.

9:45 - 10:00

Break

10:00 - 10:45

"Military Experimentation: Considerations and Applications"
Col. Anthony Wood (USMC Ret.), Director of Applied Research, Collaborative
Agent Design Research Center, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo.

10:45 - 11:30

"Applying the Lessons of Hunter Warrior during Recent Operations in the
Persian Gulf"
CDR Christopher Noble, US Navy.

11:30 - 1:00

Lunch
Collaborative Agent Design Research Center
California Polytechnic State University
San Luis Obispo, CA 93407
www.cadrc.calpoly.edu
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Tuesday, June 5 ~ continued
Time

Activity

1:00 - 1:30

"Experimentation as a Compass for the Future"
Col. James Lasswell (USMC Ret.), Senior Advisor, Marine Corps Warfighting
Laboratory.

1:30 - 2:00

"Experimentation: Staying Ahead of Today's Threats"
Col. Ray Cole (USMC Ret.), Demonstration/Program Manager, Extending the
Littoral Battlespace ACTD.

2:00 - 2:30

"Insights into Optimum TTPs/SOPs for Battalion, Regimental, and Brigade
Command and Control"
Jim Murphy, Dynamics Research Corporation.

2:30 - 2:45

Break
Concurrent Sessions (by rotation)
Session A

2:45 - 3:30
and
3:30 - 4:15

Demonstration (CADRC):
"Interoperability at the
Information Level"

4:15

End of Day 1

Session B
Dr. Jens Pohl (CADRC):
"Information-Centric
Decision-Support Systems"

Wednesday, June 6: The Future of Decision Support (Theme B)
Time

Activity

8:15 - 8:45

Introductory Remarks by Dr. Phillip Abraham, Logistics Program Office,
Office of Naval Research (ONR).

8:45 - 9:45

Keynote Address by RAdm. Jay M. Cohen, Chief of Naval Research, Office of
Naval Research (ONR).

9:45 - 10:00

Break

10:00 - 10:45

"Transformation and Joint Experimentation"
Dr. Theodore S. Gold, Director, Joint Advanced Warfighting Program.

10.45 - 11:30

"Situation Awareness (SA) in a Knowledge-Centric C2 Application
Environment"
Lt Col. Robert Morris, Col.Sel., US Army.
x

Wednesday, June 6 ~ continued
Time

Activity

11:30 - 1:00

Lunch

1:00 - 1:30

"Perspective Filters as a Means for Interoperability Among InformationCentric Decision-Support Systems"
Kym Jason Pohl, Senior Software Engineer, Collaborative Agent Design
Research Center, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo.

1:30 - 2:00

"The Architecture of a Case-Based Reasoning Application"
Michael Zang, Senior Software Engineer, Collaborative Agent Design Research
Center, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo.

2:00 - 2:30

"A Clustering Approach for Analyzing Complex Knowledge Bases"
Mala Mehrotra, President, Pragati Synergetic Research Inc.

2:30 - 2:45

Break

2:45 - 3:30

"SEAWAY Supply Mission Scheduling Using Computational Intelligence"
Dr. Russell Eberhart , Associate Dean for Research, Purdue School of
Engineering and Technology, Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis
(IUPUI).

3:30 - 4:15

"Project Albert + Rolf 2010 = RED ORM: A US-Sweden Decision-Support
Collaboration"
Dr. Alfred Brandstein, Chief Scientist, USMC MCCDC.

4:15

End of Day 2

Thursday, June 7: The Transitional Period (Theme C)
Time

Activity

8:30 - 9:15

"Designing Communications Software for Tactical Wireless Networks"
Dr. Thomas McVittie, Principal Software Engineer, Mission Software Systems,
Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology.

9:15 - 10:00

"Will We Ever Get to a Network-Centric Navy? DoD Aquisition System
Adjustments and Reforms Necessary to Bring About the Successful
Migration"
Capt. Scot Miller, US Navy, Naval War College.

xi

Thursday, June 7 ~ continued
Time

Activity

10:00 - 10:45

"The Value of Decision-Support Tools in the Aquisition Process"
Christopher Neff, CINCPACFLT Logistics Office.

10:45 - 11:00

Closing Remarks by Dr. Phillip Abraham, Logistics Program Office,
Office of Naval Research (ONR).

11:00

End of Day 3

Address:

POC:

The Clubs at Quantico
Quantico Marine Base
3017 Russell Road
Quantico, VA 22134

Mrs. Phyllis Whitlock
CDM Technologies, Inc.
Tel: (805)541-3750 Ext.235
Fax: (805)541-1221
E-Mail: Phyllis@cdmtech.com
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About the Speakers

Logistics Program Office
Office of Naval Research

interplanetary magnetic field. The results of the
theoretical work matched quite well with experimental
results obtained from high-altitude balloon flights.

Dr. Abraham is a Scientific Officer at the Office of Naval
Research (ONR). For the past seven years he has
managed the ONR S&T Logistics Program. During the
previous five years he was in charge of the ONR 6.1
Structural Acoustics Program, the goal of which was
minimizing emission/scattering of sound by submarines.

Dr. Abraham was awarded the Ph.D. in Physics by the
University of Maryland in 1966. His thesis topic was in
Solid State Physics, and it dealt with generating exactly
solvable models of crystal lattices, which were used
subsequently to check perturbation methods employed
in the treatment of actual crystals.

Dr. Phillip Abraham

From 1982 until 1989 he was a member of the Naval
Research Laboratory where he did research on fluidstructure interactions, and on wave propagation
phenomena. He studied the propagation of acoustic
waves in inhomogeneous and random media, and
showed how to obtain results, to all orders, for both weak
and strong perturbations. This work and work on
reflection tomography were motivated by the need to
detect passively or actively targets in the ocean.

Dr. Alfred Brandstein
Chief Scientist (SES-IV)
USMC MCCDC
Dr. Alfred George Brandstein holds a Bachelor of
Science degree from Brooklyn College, with majors in
Physics, Mathematics, and Astronomy, and a Ph.D. in
Mathematics from Brown University. The topic of his
doctoral dissertation was Function Spaces Related to
hypo-Dirichlet Algebras.

Dr. Abraham started working for the Navy in 1974 at the
Underwater Sound Laboratory in New London,
Connecticut. There his research dealt with underwater
acoustics, focusing on detection and localization of
underwater targets. Among other topics he determined
the influence of size on magnetic anomaly detection
(MAD) of ferromagnetic targets. In addition, he and Dr.
H. Moses used inverse scattering theory to generate
new families of potentials for which the Schrodinger
equation has exact solutions. These were useful later
on in determining acoustic wave propagation in the arctic
ice cap.

Dr. Brandstein joined the U.S. Army’s Harry Diamond
Laboratories in 1972 after serving as a professor at
the University of Conneticut. At Harry Diamond Labs,
he engaged in research in the simulation of military
communication systems and nuclear weapons effects.
He transferred to the Analysis Support Branch of the
Marine Corps Development Center in 1980 and served
as Chief of that branch and as Deputy of the Plans
Division. With the formation of the MAGTF Warfighting
Center, Dr. Brandstein became Head of the Assesment
Branch. During Desert Shield/Dessert Storm, he was
Director of the Marine Corps Operations Analysis and
Assessment Group (MCOAAG).

From 1970 until 1974, Dr. Abraham was an Assistant
Professor of Physics at the University of Connecticut,
where he taught and worked on Nonlinear Dynamics
problems related to solitons.

Currently, he is Scientific Advisor/Senior Analyst, a
Senior Level (SES-4 equivalent) position for the Marine
Corps Combat Development Command. While at the
Development Center, he completed the Command and
Staff College Non-Resident Program. Dr. Brandstein,
who has authored several hundred professional
papers, is the recipient of the Darcom Systems Analysis
Award, the Marine Corps Meritorious Civilian Service
Award, and the Superior Civilian Service Award. He is
a former director of the Military Operations Research
Society and a recipient of the Clayton Thomas Award
for technical achievement. He has served on numerous
national and international panels and boards in such
diverse areas as directed energy, acoustics,
seismology, lasers, and mathematics.

During 1968-1970, Dr. Abraham was employed by
Raytheon Company in New London, Connecticut. There
he worked on acoustic imaging in fluid media using an
exact analytic approach. A concurrent laboratory
experiment yielded a visual image, on a TV screen, of
an insonified submerged object. At that time, it was the
first such image generated with acoustic waves.
From 1966 until 1968, Dr. Abraham was granted a
Postdoctoral Research Associateship by the National
Research Council. Located at NASA’s Goddard Space
Flight Center, he worked on propagation of charged
particles, originating from solar flares, through the
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Following command, Rear Admiral Cohen served on the
staff of Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Fleet, as senior
member of the Nuclear Propulsion Examining Board,
and the staff of the Director of Naval Intelligence at the
Pentagon as Director of Operational Support.

RADM Jay M. Cohen
Chief of Naval Research
Rear Admiral Jay M. Cohen became the 20th Chief of
Naval Research, commanding the Office of Naval
Research (ONR), on June 7, 2000. As the Chief of Naval
Research, RADM Cohen manages the science and
technology programs of the Navy and Marine Corps
from basic research through manufacturing
technologies.

Rear Admiral Cohen commanded USS L.Y. SPEAR (AS
36) and her crew of 800 men and 400 women from March
1991 to April 1993. During his tour, SPEAR was awarded
the Submarine Force Atlantic Fleet Battle Efficiency “E”
Award and conducted an unscheduled five-month
deployment to the Persian Gulf in support of Operation
DESERT STORM that included repairs to over 48 US
and allied ships, recovery of an F/A-18 Hornet sitting in
190 feet of water off the coast of Iran, and humanitarian
projects in Kuwait City. SPEAR received a Meritorious
Unit Commendation for the deployment, which was the
ship’s first in eleven years. Additionally, SPEAR was the
CINCLANTFLT 1991 Secretary of Defense Maintenance
Award nominee and the only Atlantic Fleet tender
recognized in two consecutive Golden Anchor
competitions.

In addition to his position as Chief of Naval Research,
RADM Cohen also assumed the duties of Director, Test
and Evaluation and Technology Requirements in the
office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and Assistant
Deputy Commandant (Science and Technology),
Headquarters, US Marine Corps.
Rear Admiral Jay M. Cohen received his commission
as an Ensign upon graduation from the United States
Naval Academy in 1968, where he was a Trident
Scholar. After graduation, he qualified as a Navy diver
with the SEALAB Group in San Diego, CA. Following
training at Submarine School, New London, CT, he
reported to USS DIODON (SS 349) in San Diego for
duty as Supply and Weapons Officer during an extended
WESTPAC deployment. He next studied at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institution under the Navy’s Burke
Scholarship Program. He received a joint Ocean
Engineering degree and Master of Science in Marine
Engineering and Naval Architecture from MIT. Following
Nuclear Power Training, he was assigned to the
Engineering Department aboard USS NATHANAEL
GREENE (SSBN 636) (BLUE) in New London. He was
next ordered to duty as Engineer Officer aboard USS
NATHAN HALE (SSBN 623) (BLUE) in overhaul at
Bremerton, WA, subsequently changing homeport to
Charleston, SC. Upon completion of that tour, he served
on the staff of the Commander Submarine Force, US
Atlantic Fleet, from which he reported to USS GEORGE
WASHINGTON CARVER (SSBN 656) (GOLD) in New
London as Executive Officer.

In April 1993, Rear Admiral Cohen reported to SECNAV
staff for duty as Deputy Chief of Navy Legislative Affairs.
In October 1997, he was promoted to the rank of Rear
Admiral and reported to the Joint Staff for duty as Deputy
Director for Operations. In June 1999, he assumed
duties as Director Navy Y2K Project Office. In May 2000,
he was ordered to duty as Chief of Naval Research.
Rear Admiral Cohen is authorized to wear the Defense
Superior Service Medal and multiple awards of the
Legion of Merit and Meritorious Service Medal. He is
submarine and surface warfare qualified.

Col. Raymond Cole
USMC Ret.
Demonstration/Program Manager
Extending the Littoral Battlespace ACTD
Raymond Cole was born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
He enlisted in the Marine Corps and was commissioned
in November 1971 after graduating with a Bachelor of
Arts Degree in Economics from Virginia Polytechnic
Institute and State University in Blacksburg, Virginia.

Rear Admiral Cohen commanded USS HYMAN G.
RICKOVER (SSN 709) from January 1985 to January
1988. Under his command, RICKOVER completed a
Post New Construction Shakedown availability in New
London, changed homeport to Norfolk, VA, and
completed three deployments. RICKOVER was
awarded a Navy Unit Commendation, a Meritorious
Unit Commendation, the SIXTHFLT “Hook’em” Award
for ASW excellence, CINCLANTFLT Golden Anchor
Award for retention excellence, the COMSUBRON 8
Battle Efficiency “E” Award, and was designated the
best Atlantic Fleet Attack Submarine for the
BATTENBURG CUP.

Mr. Cole served in a variety of command and staff
positions with the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions for almost
eleven years. Subsequent tours included: Executive
Officer, Marine Detachment, USS Saratoga, Instructor
Amphibious Warfare School, and Executive Officer of
Basic School Classes 5-79 and 3-80.
From July 1980 to July 1983, Mr. Cole served with the
2nd Marine Division, initially with 2nd Battalion, 8th
xiv

Marines as a Rifle Company Commander and Battalion
Operations Officer, and then, as the Regimental
Operations Officer, 8th Marines. He twice deployed to
the Mediterranean and participated in operations to
evacuate the Palestine Liberation Organization from
Lebanon and in the subsequent peacekeeping mission.

Dr. Russell C. Eberhart
Associate Dean for Research, Purdue School of
Engineering and Technology, Indiana University
Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI)
Russell C. Eberhart is the Associate Dean for Research
at the Purdue School of Engineering and Technology,
Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis
(IUPUI). He is also Director of the Biomedical Research
and Development Center and Professor of Electrical and
Computer Engineering. He received his Ph.D. from
Kansas State University in electrical engineering. In
addition, he is co-editor of a book on neural networks,
now in its fifth printing and co-author of Computational
Intelligence PC Tools, published in 1996 by Academic
Press. His recent book with Jim Kennedy and Yuhui
Shi entitled, Swarm Intelligence, was published by
Morgan Kaufmann/Academic Press in October 2000.
Furthermore, he is Associate Editor of the IEEE
Transactions on Evolutionary Computation and was
recently awarded the IEEE Third Millenium Medal.

Mr. Cole served as a Ground Combat Analyst at
Headquarters Marine Corps from July 1984 to July 1987.
He transferred to the Basic school in July 1987 and
served as the Tactics Group Chief until July 1989.
In August 1990, Mr. Cole began his second tour with the
1st Marine Division, serving as the Division Operations
Officer during Operations Desert Shield and Storm. After
the war, he commanded the 1st Light Armored Infantry
Battalion and served as a Battalion Commander in Los
Angeles during the 1992 Riots. He assumed duties as
the Division G-3 in 1992 and deployed to Somalia in
December 1992 in support of Operation Restore Hope.
Then, Colonel Cole commanded 1st Marine Regiment
from July 1993 until January 1995 when he assumed
interim duties as the Chief of Staff, I Marine Expeditionary
Force.

Dr. Theodore S. Gold
Director, Joint Advanced Warfighting Program,
Institute for Defense Analyses

Mr. Cole returned to Washington DC in June of 1995
and served as the Chief, Land and Littoral Warfare Joint
Warfighting Capabilities Assessment Division, J-8, the
Joint Staff. During this tour, Mr. Cole served as the CoExecutive Secretary for the 1996 Defense Science Board
and the Modernization Panel Chief for the 1996
Quadrennial Defense Review.

Dr. Gold’s career has concentrated on the applications of
technology to national security. He has conducted and
managed R&D at a National Laboratory, served in
government in the Department of Defense, provided
technical services and strategic planning advice to
government and industry clients, and led many end-to
end systems and architectural efforts.

During his active service, Mr. Cole attended the Marine
Corps’ Amphibious Warfare School and Command and
Staff College and the National War College at Fort
McNair during the academic year 1989-1990. Mr. Cole
received personal decorations that include the Defense
Superior Service Award, Legion of Merit with Gold Star
and Combat Distinguishing Device, Meritorious Service
Medal with Gold Star, Navy Commendation Medal, Navy
Achievement Medal, and Combat Action Ribbon. In
1991, Mr. Cole was awarded the Navy League’s “Holland
M. Smith Award” for Operational Competence.

Dr. Gold is currently Director of the Joint Advanced
Warfighting Programs at the Institute for Defense
Analyses, IDA. This new activity was established by the
DoD to help develop and experiment with new joint
operational concepts and capabilities.
Dr. Gold is a member of DoD’s Threat Reduction Advisory
Committee, the Defense Science Board, and for a fouryear term, was Chairman of DoD’s Ballistic Missile
Defense Advisory Committee. His recent Defense
Science Board activities include chairing studies of
coalition warfare, rapid force projection, modeling &
simulation, the transnational chemical and biological
warfare threat, and cruise and ballistic missile defenses.

Mr. Cole retired from the Marine Corps in 1997 and joined
Booz Allen & Hamilton where he worked as a Consultant
to both the ELB ACTD and the Urban Warrior AWE. In
June 1999, Mr. Cole assumed his present responsibilities
as the Program/Demonstration Manager for the ELB
ACTD. Mr. Cole serves in his present position as an
IPA from the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.

Prior to moving to his current position at IDA in March
1998, Dr. Gold had been President of Hicks & Associates,
Inc. (H&AI). Before joining H&AI in 1987, Dr. Gold had
established and managed a National Security Studies
Group at Booz-Allen and Hamilton.

Mr. Cole is married to the former Dianne Casteel of
Virginia Beach, Virginia. They have one daughter,
Adrian, and three sons: Brian, Adam, and Mark.
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In the early 1980s, Dr. Gold served as Deputy Assistant
to the Secretary of Defense responsible for chemical
warfare deterrence and biological warfare defense
programs. He was the first occupant of this position
and worked closely with the military to improve the
posture of our forces, while guiding DoD’s research,
development, and procurement activities in these areas.
He was also a major participant in the nation’s chemical
arms control initiatives.

to professional journals on future technology and
conceptual issues.

Andrew W. Marshall
Head, The Office of Net Assessment
The Pentagon
Andrew W. Marshall is the Advisor to the Secretary of
Defense for Net Assessment. Mr. Marshall founded
the Office of Net Assessment, which provides
Secretaries of Defense, other managers, and military
commanders with assessments of military balancing,
major geographic theatres, and mission areas. These
assessments are designed to highlight existing or
emerging problem areas or important opportunities that
deserve top-level management’s attention to improve
the future US position in the continuing military
economic-political competition. Major asymmetries in
the capabilities, organizations, operational concepts,
and strategies of the US and all major actors relevant
to the continuing competition in specific balance areas
are addressed.

Before his government service, Dr. Gold held a variety
of technical and management positions during a twentyyear career at Sandia National Laboratories. Much of
his efforts at Sandia were directed toward helping ensure
the safety, security, reliability, and control of nuclear
weapons. He also designed weapon survivability, safing,
and fuzing systems; led many system analysis efforts;
conducted research in weapon effects; managed a large
scale computing and programming center; and,
developed energy technologies.
Dr. Gold received a BSEE degree from Renssalaer
Polytechnic Institute, an M.S. degree in Electrical
Engineering from the University of New Mexico, and a
Ph.D. in Engineering from the University of California,
Davis.

While working in the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Mr. Marshall has conducted discussions with groups
in other countries performing similar or related
assessments, including major, continuing interchanges
with the governments of Australia, France, Germany,
Israel, Japan, and Sweden. Mr. Marshall has
encouraged and participated in the development of
strategic planning, in particular, the competitive
strategies initiative. From 1986-1988, he was the co
chairman of the Future Security Environment Working
Group on the President’s Commission on Integrated
Long-Term Strategy. In addition, he was Chairman of
the Nuclear Strategy Development Group from 1984
1985.

He is married to Dr. Sydell Gold. The Golds reside in
McLean, VA and have three grown children: a daughter
and two sons.

Col. James Lasswell
USMC Ret.
Senior Advisor
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory
James A. Lasswell has been the senior analyst for GAMA
Corporation since June 1998. In this capacity, he has
been responsible for a series of advanced concept
wargaming as well as supporting the development of
the Collin’s Combat Decision Range under contract for
the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL).

Between April 1972 and October 1973, Mr. Marshall
was a member of the National Security Council Staff
where he established and directed the NSC Net
Assessment Group. This group provided staff support
of the National Security Council Intelligence Committee.
During this period, he monitored the implementation
of the November 1971 reorganization of the Intelligence
Community ordered by President Nixon.

A retired US Marine Corps Colonel, he was the Head
of Experimental Operations at MCWL and served as
Experiment Control for the seminal Hunter Warrior
Advanced Warfighting Experiment during March 1997.
In addition, he has over 10 years military experience
in political, military, and strategic plans positions
including serving as the Head of the Commandant’s
Staff Group, as well as additional duties that included
serving as Co-chairman of two Office of the Secretary
of Defense sponsored Revolution in Military Affairs Task
Forces. Mr. Lasswell was the Marine Corps author for
the Naval Services’ strategic concept document titled,
Forward... From the Sea, and is a frequent contributor

Mr. Marshall was at RAND Corp. from 1949 until 1972.
While at RAND, his major areas of research included:
nuclear targeting; strategic warning; Monte Carlo
simulation methods; analysis of Soviet military
programs; application of organizational behavior theory
to military analysis; and, the development of strategic
planning concepts, including strategy for long-term USSoviet political-military competition.
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into meaningful units for the purpose of software
engineering them. She has been the recipient of several
SBIR awards from NASA, NSF, and AF, relating to the
development and application of the MVP-CA tool. Her
presentation will describe salient aspects of her
technology as well as her experiences in analyzing
IMMACCS, a multi-agent system for command and
control developed by the CADRC.

Mr. Marshall holds an A.M. in Economics from the
University of Chicago (1949) and attended the
University of Detroit (1940-41) and Wayne University
(1943-1945).

Dr. Thomas McVittie
Principal Software Engineer
Mission Software Systems
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
California Institute of Technology

Capt. Scot A. Miller
United States Navy
Naval War College

Thomas McVittie is a principal software engineer at
NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory. His research interests
include highly reliable object-based distributed systems
and fault tolerant system architectures.

Ensign Miller entered the Navy from the US Naval
Academy in 1978 and was designated a Naval Aviator in
December 1979. His first operational unit was Patrol
Squadron FORTY at NAS Moffett Field, CA, flying the
P-3C Orion. He deployed three times to Misawa, Japan,
with detachments to Cubi Point, RP, and Diego Garcia,
BIOT.

McVittie has a Ph.D. in Electrical and Computer
Engineering from the University of California at Santa
Barbara. He is the systems architect for the Defense
Information Infrastructure (DII) Common Operating
Environment (COE) Kernel and the principal designer
of the Shared Net, which is an object-based information
sharing system designed for the USMC.

From 1983-1986, LT Miller served as a flight instructor
at Training Squadron THREE, flying the T-34C. In 1985,
he was named squadron Instructor of the Year. In 1986,
LT Miller reported aboard the USS CARL VINSON (CVN
70) in Alameda, CA as an aircraft launch and recovery
officer. He also qualified and stood regular watches as
a Tactical Action Officer. LT Miller deployed twice to the
Indian Ocean and North Arabian Sea. From 1988-1989,
LCDR Miller served as Aide and Flag Lieutenant to the
Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force in
Norfolk, VA.

Mala Mehrotra
President
Pragati Synergetic Research Inc.
Mala Mehrotra is the founder and President of Pragati
Synergetic Research, Inc, a small business located in
Cupertino, CA. The company has recently relocated from
VA to the Silicon Valley. Since its inception eight years
ago in VA, Pragati Inc. has been performing high-end
artificial intelligence research for mainly government
contracts. Its clients have been DARPA, Air Force, Navy,
NSF, DOT (Department of Transportation), and several
others.

After training at the Fleet Replacement Squadron, LCDR
Miller returned to Patrol Squadron FORTY at Moffett
Field, CA. He served as the Administrative, Tactics, and
Maintenance Officer and deployed to Misawa, Japan,
with a detachment to Diego Garcia, BIOT. In 1994, CDR
Miller was assigned as the Modeling and Simulation
Officer at CINCPACFLT in Pearl Harbor, HI. He tested
modeling and simulation capabilities on board naval
ships.

Mala Mehrotra has an M.S. degree with a concentration
in artificial intelligence and parallel computing from the
College of William and Mary in VA. In addition, she has
an M.S. in Nuclear Physics from Delhi University, India.
Her B.S. degree was in Physics (Hons) from Calcutta
University, India.

CDR Miller reported aboard the staff of Commander,
THIRD Fleet on the USS CORONADO, home ported in
San Diego, CA in 1997. He was the first permanently
assigned Director of the Sea Based Battle Laboratory
and coordinated numerous limited objective experiments,
Fleet Battle Experiment ECHO, and a Marine Corps
advanced warfighting experiment. In 1999, CDR Miller
became the first Director of the COMTHIRDFLT Network
Centric Innovation Center. In this role, he worked to
improve fleet use of existing IT infrastructure.

As an on-site contractor at Systems Validation and
Methodology Branch (SVMB), NASA Langley Research
Center in Hampton, VA from 1989-93, Ms. Mehrotra
developed various methodologies for software
engineering of knowledge-based systems. She has
been the principal architect of the prototype MultiViewPoint Clustering Analysis Tool (MVP-CA), that
partitions large and complex knowledge-based systems

Besides a B.S. in Operations Analysis from the United
States Naval Academy (1978), CAPT Miller holds an
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Noriega), Desert Shield/Desert Storm, and several
classified operations.

MBA from the University of West Florida (1986) and an
M.S. in Operations Analysis from the Naval Postgraduate
School (1994). He is married to the former Wendy Barry
of Albemarle, NC. They have one son, Jeffrey.

After the Command and General Staff College, LTC Morris
was assigned to Alaska where he served as the 6th Infantry
Division EDRE/Force Modernization officer responsible
for re-organizing the 6th Infantry Division to the Separate
Infantry Brigade. He also served in Alaska as the 6th
Infantry Division Operations Officer, Battalion Executive
Officer for the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry (Manchus), and
the 1st Brigade, 6th Infantry Division (Light) Executive
Officer. Following his assignment in Alaska, LTC Morris
completed an assignment as Special Project Officer to
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict, where he supported numerous
international humanitarian organizations, programs, and
operations that include the International War Crimes
Tribunal for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. In
addition, he was an author of the United Nations
contingency support package concept. LTC Morris was
selected as the battalion commander for 1st Battalion, 11th
Infantry at Fort Benning, Georgia, and subsequently,
served as the Chief of the Forced Entry Lab, Dismounted
Battle Space Battle Lab, and Fort Benning, Georgia, where
he refined the concept and configuration for Enroute
Mission Planning. Most recently, because of his expertise
in Enroute Mission Planning and Rehearsal, LTC Morris
was personally selected by the Army Vice Chief of Staff
to serve as an Army MEL-1 Fellow with the specific charter
to study the requirements and develop a long-range plan
for a Joint Enroute Mission Planning and Rehearsal
System. In this capacity and in support of this Enroute
Mission Planning research, LTC Morris conducted the first
ever detailed Work Style and Work Style Under Stress
study of Army Rapid deployment forces. LTC Morris also
serves as a Subject Matter Expert for NGO/PVO civilmilitary interoperability for the Army Command and
General Staff College. As a volunteer, he authored and
facilitated the World Food Programs first-ever deliberate
planning course and program.

CAPT Scot Miller is currently a student at the Naval War
College in Newport, RI. Recently, CAPT Miller served as
the first Director of the Network Centric Innovation Center
for COMTHIRDFLT, where his team assisted deploying
battle groups and amphibious ready groups to improve
employment of their new IT infrastructure. Previously,
he was the first director of COMTHIRDFLT’s Sea Based
Battle Laboratory from 1997-1999. His experience as
the Modeling and Simulation Officer at CINCPACFLT from
1994-1997 led to his billets at COMTHIRDFLT. CAPT
Miller coordinated a variety of technology and process
innovations and experiments during this time frame. He
supported several Decision-Support design proposals for
operational commanders and worked closely with several
future information management initiatives. During several
Joint Task Force exercises and Fleet Battle Experiment
ALFA, he introduced operational level modeling and
simulation support to the decision maker at sea. CAPT
Miller is an enthusiast and novice facilitator for Group
Support Systems. CAPT Miller just completed an
Advanced Research Project at Naval War College which
focused on modifications and reforms necessary to
migrate the Navy to a more capable network-centric force.
Upon graduation, CAPT Miller has been ordered to the
Naval Warfare and Space Systems Command in San
Diego.

LTC Robert C. Morris Jr.
Col. Sel.
US Army
Lieutenant Colonel Morris graduated from the Virginia
Military Institute receiving his commission in Infantry in
1979. His initial assignment was with the 1st Battalion,
31st Infantry in Korea where he served as a Rifle Platoon
Leader, Company Executive Officer, and Scout Platoon
Leader. LTC Morris was next assigned to the 2d Battalion
(Ranger), 75th Infantry in Fort Lewis where he served as a
Rifle Platoon Leader, then as Battalion Support Platoon
Leader supporting Operation Urgent Fury. Following the
Infantry Officer Advance Course, LTC Morris was assigned
to the 4th Battalion, 325th Infantry (Airborne) Battalion
Combat Team as the Battalion S-4. He returned with the
unit to the 82d Airborne Division and Fort Bragg as a
Company Commander and later served as the Battalion
S-3. LTC Morris served three years with the Joint Special
Operations Command at Pope Air Force Base, North
Carolina as the Logistics Plans and Procurement Officer
supporting special operations combat missions that
include Just Cause (to include the capture of Manuel

In 1994, LTC Morris founded the non-profit organization,
Partners International Foundation, a 501(C)(3) Public
charity for which he currently serves as president. Partners
International Foundation has no paid employees and
current projects include raising funds to establish a Women
and Children’s wellness center in Rwanda for victims of
the genocide, operating an eye clinic in Zimbabwe, and
providing medical supplies to a women and children’s
hospital in Grenada. Programs in the United States
include Human Rights training for international military
officers and support to homeless shelters, battered
women’s shelters, Native American programs, and the
disabled. The foundation also supports The World Peace
Club, an Internet project run by children to promote
understanding between nationalities. Partners
International has close ties to the Columbus community
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through the Muscogee Rotary, where it supports several
of the club’s overseas programs and is seeking funding
to support its Minds Without Boarders program to train
teachers in special skills to increase the learning level of
poor learners in disadvantaged communities.
(www.partners-international.org)

He had a balanced mix of command and staff experience
while on active duty and was a Joint Specialty Officer. He
is a graduate of the US Military Academy and the US Army
Command and General Staff College. He has a Master
of Military Art and Science (MMAS) degree from CGSC
and an MBA from Hofstra University.

LTC Morris’ decorations include the Legion of Merit, the
Bronze Star, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, five
awards of the Meritorious Service Medal, the Joint Service
Commendation Medal with two bronze oak leaf clusters,
the Army Commendation Medal, the Joint Service
Achievement Medal, the Joint Meritorious Unit Award, the
Army Achievement Medal with five oak leaf clusters, the
Superior Volunteer Service Medal, Southwest Asia Service
Medal with two bronze stars, the Armed Forces
Expeditionary Medal, the Army Service Ribbon, the
Overseas Service Ribbon with two bronze oak leaf
clusters, the Southeast Asia Kuwait Liberation Medal, the
Government of Kuwait Liberation Medal, the National
Defense Service Medal, the Expert Infantryman’s Badge,
Master Parachutist Badge, and Ranger Tab.

Christopher K. Neff
Logistics Program Analyst
CINCPACFLT Logistics Office
US Pacific Fleet
Chris Neff has been serving as the principal logistics
program analyst for the US Pacific Fleet since May 1999.
Prior to this post, he was the principal Base Operating
Support (BOS) program analyst for facilities and base
support services throughout the Pacific Fleet Area of
Responsibility from Nevada to the Indian Ocean.
Mr. Neff enlisted in the US Navy in 1969 and was
subsequently selected for the Navy’s Enlisted Scientific
Education Program (NESEP), where he earned a Bachelor
of Engineering Degree in Computer Science prior to
assuming jobs as an Electronic Material Officer,and Supply
Officer on USS Davidson and USS O’Callahan
respectively. His 21 year career included assignments
as Accounting Officer, Financial Management Officer, a
financial systems project director, Fleet Budget Officer,
and comptroller, on the staffs of the US Surface Force
commander Pacific Fleet, Chief of Naval Operations, Navy
Comptroller, Pacific Fleet Commander, and Commander
Naval Logistics Command, Pacific.

Lieutenant Colonel Morris is married to the former Kim E.
Etzler and they have two children: Katie, 14, and Robert
John, 14 months.

Col. Jim Murphy
USMC Ret.
Analyst
Dynamics Research Corporation
Jim Murphy is a retired Marine colonel who has specialized
in tactical command and control studies since leaving
active duty in 1992. He worked initially as an after-action
review (AAR) exercise analyst in the Eighth Army Battle
Simulation Center in Korea. Subsequently, he assisted
in the exercise design and execution portions of the first
two Army STOW (Strategic Theater of War) experiment:
STOW-Europe in 1994 and Prairie Warrior 95. In 1997,
he became one of a number of persons who can claim to
have written one of the drafts of Marine Corps Warfighting
Publication (MCWP) 5-1, Operational Planning.

He has been a regular lecturer at the Navy’s Postgraduate
school in the area of financial management and has taught
graduate and undergraduate courses in financial and
managerial accounting, as well as strategic management.
He has a Masters Degree in Business Administration.

CDR Christopher D. Noble
Surface Warfare Analyst
US Navy

Joining DRC in October 1997, he served as the military
functional member of an Army Research Laboratory (ARL)
cognitive engineering team developing both process and
cognitive models of the commander’s decision-making
process. In a related project, he was the lead analyst in
developing prototype behaviorally anchored rating scales
(BARS) for 17 commander-staff team proficiencies. He
continues to support the Human Factors analysis team at
ARL. He participates as a field data collector and postexperiment analyst in the continuing series of advanced
warfighting experiments (AWE) supporting the development
of the Army Battle Command System (ABCS).

Commander Noble is the son of Dr. Charles and Anna
Mary Noble. A native of Northeastern Oklahoma, he
received his commission from the Officer Candidate
School, Newport, Rhode Island, in the summer of 1980.
Commander Noble has completed six sea and two
shore tours. He first served as a division officer on USS
BARBEY FF-1088 and USS CHANDLER DDG-996.
Then as a department head, he served tours as
Engineer Officer on USS MCCLUSKY FFG-41 and as
Damage Control Assistant on USS RANGER CV-61.
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Additionally, he was the first Commanding Officer of USS
GLADIATOR MCM-11. He commanded USS
FLETCHER DD-992 from June of 99 until December of
00 completing an Arabian Gulf CVBG deployment.
While at sea, he completed five major deployments that
include Operations Earnest Will, Desert Shield, Desert
Storm, MCM Euro 95, and Operation Southern Watch.

Wales in Sydney, Australia, until the end of 1972 and
then left for the US where he was appointed to the position
of Professor of Architecture at Cal Poly. Following several
years of research and consulting activities in the areas
of building-support services and information systems, Dr.
Pohl’s research focus today lies in the application of
distributed artificial intelligence methodologies to decisionsupport systems in engineering design, logistical
planning, and military command and control.

Ashore, Commander Noble has served in Washington
as a deputy resources and requirements sponsor on
the OPNAV staff in the Expeditionary Warfare
Directorate. He also served as Special Assistant to the
Director of the Commandants Warfighting Laboratory
for the Hunter Warrior Battle experiment. Commander
Noble is now the Surface Warfare Analyst in the
Secretary of the Navy’s Office of Program Appraisal.

Under his direction, the CADRC at Cal Poly has over the
past decade developed and implemented a number of
distributed computing applications in which multiple
computer-based and human agents collaborate in the
solution of complex problems. Foremost among these
are the ICDM (Integrated Cooperative Decision Model)
and TIRAC (Toolkit for Information Representation and
Agent Collaboration) frameworks which have been
applied to engineering design (industry sponsorship:
ICADS - 1986 to 1991), energy conservation (US Dept.
of Energy sponsorship: AEDOT - 1992 to 1993), logistical
planning (US Army (MTMC) sponsorship: ICODES - 1993
to present), military mission planning (US Marine Corps
(MCWL) sponsorship: FEAT, FEAT4, and IMMACCS 
1994 to present), and facility management (US Navy
(ONR) sponsorship: CIAT and SEAWAY- 1996 to present).

Commander Noble’s education includes both traditional
and joint curricula. He holds a B.S. in Biology from the
University of the State of New York and a M.S. in
Weapons Systems from the Naval Postgraduate School
in Monterey. He has completed joint professional
education by attending the US Army’s Senior War
College in Carlisle and the Joint and Combined
Warfighting course at the Armed Forces Staff College
in Norfolk.
Among Commander Noble’s awards are: Meritorious
Service Medal (three awards), Navy Commendation
Medal (two awards), Navy Achievement Medal, Navy
Unit Citation, Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal,
National Defense Medal, and Kuwait Liberation Medal.

The Integrated Marine Multi-Agent Command and
Control System (IMMACCS) was successfully fieldtested as the command and control system of record
during the Urban Warrior Advanced Warfighting Exercise
(AWE) conducted by the Marine Corps Warfighting
Laboratory (MCWL) in Central California (Monterey and
Oakland) during the period March 11 to 18, 1999, and
during a live fire Limited Objectives Exercise (LOE) held
at Twentynine Palms, California, in March 2000. The
Integrated Computerized Deployment System (ICODES)
was designated by the US Department of Defense as
the ‘migration system’ for ship loading in July 1995.
ICODES 3 was released to the US Army in 1997, and
ICODES 5 was released to the US Marine Corps and
US Navy this year (2001).

Commander Noble is married to Dianne, daughter of
Norman and Lene Piper of Sun City, California. They
have three sons, Clint, Barret, and Travis.

Dr. Jens G. Pohl
Executive Director
Collaborative Agent Design Research Center
Professor of Architecture
California Polytechnic State University

Dr. Pohl is the author of two patents (US), several books,
and more than 80 research papers. He is a Fellow of the
International Institute for Advanced Studies in Systems
Research and Cybernetics and was awarded an
honorary doctorate by the Institute in August, 1998,
during the InterSymp-98 conference held in BadenBaden, Germany. Professor Pohl is a Fellow of the Royal
Australian Institute of Architects, a Fellow of the Australian
Institute of Building, a Member of the American Institute
of Constructors, and a member of IEEE. He is a licensed
architect in the states of New South Wales and Victoria,
Australia.

Dr. Jens Pohl holds the positions of Professor of
Architecture, Executive Director of the Collaborative
Agent Design Research Center (CADRC), and PostGraduate Studies Coordinator in the College of
Architecture and Environmental Design, California
Polytechnic State University (Cal Poly), San Luis Obispo,
California, US.
Professor Pohl received his formal education in Australia
with degrees in Architecture and Architectural Science:
B.Arch. (University of Melbourne, 1965) M.Bdg.Sc. and
Ph.D. (University of Sydney 1967 and 1970). He taught
in the School of Building at the University of New South
xx

Senior Software Engineer
Collaborative Agent Design Research Center
California Polytechnic State University

forward positioning three squadrons of specially
configured climate controlled ships. Each of these
squadrons contained prepackaged supplies and
equipment sufficient to support a force of 15,000 Marines
for thirty days.

Kym Pohl is a Senior Software Engineer at the Cal Poly
Collaborative Agent Design Research Center. In addition
to providing technical consultation on a number of
projects, Kym currently provides technical leadership for
the SEAWAY and LOGGY maritime logistics project, the
FCADS Command and Control System, and the ICDM
project. Kym holds Bachelor of Science and Master of
Science degrees in Computer Science and a Master of
Science degree in Architecture. His research interests
are in the application of agent-based decision-support
theory.

While serving as Chief of Staff Marine Forces Pacific,
Colonel Wood was dispatched to Russia in 1993. There,
over a two-week period of negotiations, he successfully
concluded a major tension reduction agreement and multi
year exercise program with the Russian General Staff,
the Commander Russian Pacific Fleet in Vladivostok, and
the Commander Russian Far East Military District in
Kharbovsk. Designed to relax tensions and reduce the
risk of nuclear incidents in the Pacific Theater, the
agreement has since been extended.

Kym J. Pohl

Colonel Wood’s last billet was as founding Director and
Commanding Officer of the Marine Corps Warfighting
Laboratory from 1995-1998. Unique in its concept-based
approach as well as its projection of a very different and
non-traditional post cold war future, the laboratory spear
headed Marine experiments to recast military capabilities
in a mold appropriate to emerging future requirements.

Col. Anthony A. Wood
USMC (Ret.)
Director of Applied Research
Collaborative Agent Design Research Center
California Polytechnic State University
Colonel Anthony A. Wood joined the Collaborative Agent
Design (CAD) Research Center at California Polytechnic
State University in 1998 as Director of Applied Research.
A Marine for over 30 years, including more than two years
of combat duty, Colonel Wood joined the CAD Research
Center following a distinguished career during which he
was twice decorated with the Distinguished Service
Medal, the nation’s second highest, as well as the Legion
of Merit, Bronze Star, and others. In the course of his
service, he has been responsible for a number of unique
conceptual and practical contributions to joint warfare,
naval expeditionary warfare, and our military posture in
the Pacific.

Col. Wood’s decorations include the Distinguished Service
Medal (multiple awards), the Legion of Merit, the Bronze
Star with Combat V, the Meritorious Service Medal, the
Joint Commendation Medal (multiple awards), and the
Combat Action Ribbon (multiple awards). At the time of
his retirement in June 1998, Colonel Wood was the only
Colonel or Captain on active duty in any service to have
been twice awarded the Distinguished Service Medal.

Michael Zang
Senior Software Engineer
Collaborative Agent Design Research Center
California Polytechnic State University

In 1968, he served his first tour in Vietnam as a platoon
commander and then advisor to the Korean Marine Corps
Blue Dragon Brigade. In his second tour in Vietnam in
1974-75, Captain Wood commanded a joint-contingent
executing clandestine mission in Laos, Cambodia, and
Vietnam. In January 1975, Maj General Homer Smith,
USA, the Defense Attache in Saigon, had him transferred
to the Defense Attache Office, where has was directed
to secretly develop a plan for the evacuation of Saigon.
Capt. Wood then executed that plan in April of 1975.
Col. Wood has since served in a succession of infantry
and reconnaisance command billets and several staff
assignments.

Mike Zang is a Senior Software Engineer at the Cal Poly
Collaborative Agent Design Research Center. Mike
currently provides technical leadership for the OTIS and
SILS maritime logistics projects, the CIAT port
management project, and the COACH project for
providing repair assistance, as well as technical
consultation on a number of other projects. Mike holds a
dual Bachelor of Science degree in Electronic Engineering
and Physics. He was a ROTC scholarship recipient and
worked as an officer in the Army Reserves for 8 years.
His research interests are in software system architecture
and applied artificial intelligence.

As the principal author of the US Navy and Marine Corps
“Maritime Prepositioning Concept”, he developed a
detailed concept and then supervised the implementation
of a national strategic response capability based on
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Keynote Address
Mr. Andrew W. Marshall
Head, The Office of Net Assessment
US Department of Defense
Thank you very much for the overly generous introduction. What I wanted to talk with you
about this morning is first, the importance of field experimentation, and second, to say a few
words about the history of past military innovations and what made such efforts successful. I
myself am not an expert in actually running field experiments. A number of you know much
more than I do about actually running such events. So what I have to say is based primarily on
history.
Over the years I have become interested in the history of periods of major change. Over a decade
or so ago, when we first began to examine the possibility that we were living in a period where
major change in warfare is likely or plausible, one of the things I did was to initiate a number of
historical studies to gain some understanding of what actually happens during such periods.
How does the change process occur, how long does it take, and particularly I wanted to gain
some insight into past periods during which there were competing military organizations that
more or less had the same technology and the same opportunities. In short, I wanted to
understand why one organization did better than another.
Let me talk briefly about the period that we are in now. I think that there is a growing belief,
certainly not everyone actually believes it, but a large portion of people do sense that we are
living in a period of really major change. A period in which we are not just dealing with normal
steady progress, but a period in which really disruptive change could take place. In the military
area, we owe our current attention to the idea of revolution in military affairs to the military
theorists in the Soviet Union. They began writing about this idea of periods of military
revolution which the historians of more than forty years ago first raised. Periods, in the broad
sweep of history, where really significant change in warfare takes place. Periods of perhaps a
couple of decades or fifty years. While historians argue about the number of such periods,
ranging from six to twelve since the 15th Century, they appear to be coming closer together,
perhaps because many of these periods (although not all of them) are driven by technological
change. In any case, that we have become self-aware that we may be in such a period of major
change, we owe to the Russian military theatres too.
What is interesting about those periods and particularly some of the more recent ones, like the
1920s and 1930s, is that the more successful military organizations in these periods tend to be
those that find the right operational concepts and create the right military units for experimenting
with the use of the technologies that are available. It would therefore appear to follow that if you
believe that you are in one of these periods of major change, then you are under an obligation to
try to identify the most promising operational concepts and to establish what you think are the
right new units to use in field experiments.
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Because of this, I have come to believe that field experiments are tremendously important. People
can go only so far with war games and conceptual analyses. In the first place the models of
combat that we have are just not good enough. They do not capture the entire nature of the issues
that are being investigated. The most poorly treated aspects of warfare happen to be those where
the technology is currently changing most rapidly, i.e., the information related to technology, etc.
In many cases the issues that need to be explored are very complex. Some of the most successful
cases of major changes that have been looked at in detail (the US Navy’s development of carrier
air operations and the German development of the Panzer Division and armored warfare in the
1920s and 1930s) involved field experiments. Moreover, in the best of these cases the field
experiments fed back important data to related war gaming efforts. They provided better notions
of what the exchange rates will be in combat operations and served as a basis for calibration of the
parameters in the models used in the wargames. In other words, while ideas and concepts come
from the war games, the field experiments allowed the war games to improve. The result is a very
important cycle of concept evaluation and testing that leads to success.
The other aspect that I believe is particularly interesting and important about field experiments is
that they present opportunities for the people involved to learn the special skills that may be
required to operate under new conditions. During periods of major change in the past, the new
military specialists acquired the kind of knowledge that can only be obtained through active
practice and hands-on experience. Furthermore, this knowledge can be passed onto other people
only through working alongside the people who already have mastered those particular skills.
Also, field experiments often generate hardware/or operational inventions that make the concept
possible.
One of the cases that we and others have looked at most thoroughly is the development of naval
air capabilities in the United States in the inter-war years. What we see is an initial emphasis on
war gaming. Out of these came ideas that led to fleet exercises utilizing some ships as surrogates
for aircraft carriers. Then the Langley came into service in December 1924, which allowed
experiments in conducting flight operations. They wanted to change the way flight operations
were being conducted. The British had carriers before the US Navy did and had adopted a
process for operations that was too slow to allow the formation of large strike formations, which
the war games had shown were the key to success. The US Navy changed the take off and
landing process, invented the crash barrier and other things that were necessary to speed up these
operations.
As with most human knowledge, people learn a great deal by doing things, testing new ideas, and
so on. Another possibility for learning, which is not really a field experiment, is learning from
real operations that allow people to try out things they have a requirement for. We would not be
nearly as far along in areas such as communication systems and data systems, without the
lessons learned during real operations. I believe that a specific case in point is the Unmanned
Airborne Vehicle (UAV). We would not be nearly as far along in the use of UAVs if it had not
been for the Bosnia and Kosovo operations which allowed the development of ways of using
xxiv

these devices and linking them together with other sea forces. I think that we often, however, do
not fully use these opportunities for learning and do not capture all of the lessons that people
have in fact learned.
Now let me go back and look at some of these examples to draw lessons as to what history
suggests makes for success. I am talking of success being something like the development of
aircraft carrier operations or the development of the Panzer Division, and all of the operational
skills and everything that went with them. Full success requires not only the adaptation of
devices supplied by available or feasible technology, but also the formulation of new concepts of
operation and a new set of skills that go with the new way of operating. In this arena, the officer
corps is the central player. In both of the previously mentioned examples of successful change
there was a subsection of the officer corps who became convinced that change was necessary and
feasible. They were people who saw some new way of operating, or some new kind of unit, as
being particularly valuable. And they were able to form new units, to conduct experiments and
to coeval equipment, operational practices, organizations and skills.
This process goes far beyond isolated experiments. I do not believe that successful change can
come from isolated experiments, in the way that we have to some extent operated recently.
Historically, it has been far more promising to allow a group of officers to go off and create a new
unit that stays in existence and continuously evolves over a period of three or four years. This
can influence the design of future equipment, the evolution of new concepts of operation, small
incremental inventions like the crash barrier net, and over time potentially still greater changes.
The German case is very instructive in that, in the first design of the Panzer Division they had
about 600 tanks. The final design had only about 225 tanks, because they found in their field
experiments that they could not do what they wanted to do with the larger number of tanks. The
basic goal and concept was one of punching through enemy lines and operating deep in his rear
areas.. They found that to achieve this goal they had to have a lot more infantry, a lot more
transporting fuel and other things in order to achieve this decisive punch into the rear area. The
original design was far too tank heavy, and over the course of the three or four years that they
had before the war, the design evolved very quickly and was greatly improved.
Something similar happened in the aircraft carrier case. This suggests to me that if at all possible
you want to have some small units that continually evolve. Some of them will be failures. In the
German case, when they began to re-arm the army had seven new kinds of units, only four of
which survived. So in some way, and I am not sure what the right word for this is, we should use
a prototype unit that evolves and develops rather than a single experiment. However, in order to
be able to implement this approach to experimentation there needs to emerge within the officer
corps at least a small cluster of people who believe in some idea, some new way of fighting or
some new operational concepts that they wish to pursue. It concerns me that we seldom provide
the opportunity and enough support for such prototypes. Our tendency is to conduct
experiments and then disband the unit. I suppose ideally, the younger officers in all of the
services ought to be allowed to form some prototype units that further the accomplishment of
the key tools of their services. These groups would formulate some competing ideas about new
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kinds of units or new operational approaches, and then some more senior group would select
what they judge to be the two or three best ideas and allow them to proceed.
One of our current problems obviously is that we have a high operational tempo. People are very
busy. One of the wonderful things about the 1920s and 1930s was that none of the military
services had any money, but they had plenty of time. US Navy ships went out to sea a couple
of days a week and there was one large fleet exercise a year, so there was time to experiment and
think. Today we have a military that has almost no leisure time for those kinds of activities.
Another ingredient that I believe makes for success is the existence of some original concept that
underlies the new design and what we do with it. It was certainly true in the case of the Panzer
Division. What made the German efforts more successful was that they had this concept of
punching a hole and getting deep into the rear of the enemy lines. This led to the design of tanks
that were lighter, faster, and had a longer range than had been previously contemplated. Both we
and the French initially went down the line to design the tank to support the infantry. In fact, the
US Congress passed a law at one point that imposed a speed limit on the tank so that it could not
outrun the infantry. In other words, having the right concept is very, very important. In the case
of the aircraft carriers the war games had suggested that what you wanted to do was to get as
many aircraft in the air as you could, at one time. The important American invention in some
sense was to take that notion seriously and to dramatically change the whole way of staging flight
operations so that this objective could be realized. This was one of the features that appealed to
me about the Hunter Warrior experiment undertaken by the Marine Corps Warfighting
Laboratory a few years ago. It was concept-based, and not just an experiment to see whether we
liked some new devices or what computers can do for us. Rather it was a concept where they
improvised some new devices, and the experiment was designed to determine the feasibility of
the concept and the best way of implementing the required operational support.
I do not have very much more to say than that. In summary, I believe that field experiments are
tremendously important. I do not believe that human beings solve problems or effectively
question existing solutions without experimentation. To acquire new skills you have to go out
and do it. History suggests that the best way of doing this is either through some systematic
series of experiments, field experiments, or the establishment of a unit with a concept-based
notion about some new way of operating that stays in existence and evolves over the course of at
least three to five years. The best thing that could happen in our military would be somehow to
move in the direction of more field experimentation, more prototype units evolving over time.
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Military Experimentation: Considerations and Applications
Anthony Wood (Col. USMC Ret.), Director of Applied Research
Collaborative Agent Design Research Center
Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo, California
Good morning! I'm going to follow Mr. Andy Marshall with personal observations collected
over more than 20 years of military experimentation. My view is a composite one: that of a
young officer involved in experimentation; that of a staff officer involved in developing
Maritime Prepositioning through a process of practical experimentation; as the Officer In Charge
of —Hunter Warrior“, the Marine Corps‘ Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE) during the
early Sea Dragon series; and, finally, as the founder and first Commanding Officer of the
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory. As I discuss experimentation as a road to the future, I'll
try to offer frank observations so that others might avoid some of the difficulties we faced.
We have well-developed processes in the United States military for everything except identifying
and dealing with major change. Allow me to relate a short tale of success at implementing
change, and the —rewards“ that followed. In 1982, a group of staff NCOs and officers,
composing the staff of the Sixth Marine Amphibious Brigade, boarded a very rusty old
amphibious assault ship for a three day voyage to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. During the course of
that sail, staff and officers were organized into four syndicates. Each syndicate was responsible
for developing, briefing, and then defending an approach to part of an experimental concept
called Maritime Prepositioning which was then under development by the Navy and Marine
Corps. On reaching the base at Gitmo the combined results of the syndicates would provide the
basis for four days and nights of trial and error leading to a written SOP.
When we docked at Gitmo we had a 30 page paper. It proposed a series of measures and
organizational changes for dramatically cutting the strategic response time for a powerful
brigade. Essentially it laid out a proposal for forward afloat positioning of brigade supplies and
equipment on specially designed ships that would be complemented by a fly echelon and link-up
for combat. Sound like a concept to act as the experimental basis? We had an amphibious ship
and one example of each piece of major equipment in the Marine Corps. Sound like the use of
surrogates for experimentation? We had designed a scenario and command post exercise to be
executed in Cuba. Sound like an experimentation plan? And, we had several TRS-80 Radio
Shack computers sets side-by-side with three men behind them to move the disks and track
equipment and timing in transit after offload evolution at the docks. This of course was an early
primitive effort at documentation and analysis.
The outcome less than three months later was the Maritime Prepositioning Progam SOP, a
document that has undergone remarkably few changes since first drafted. Subsequently, other
findings from the early experiments found their way into special capabilities that would be
reflected in the design of the Prepositioning ships. And a whole set of further —findings“
(—experiments“ today) shaped what has now become a polished Marine Corps capability: the
formation and execution of a task organized fly-in echelon (FIE) which would link up with the
prepositioned supplies and equipment.
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In my opening I stated that I would tell this tale and then mention the —rewards“ that followed.
Shortly after the Secretary of Defense arrived at our base to complement the Brigade on two
years of effort, the Brigade‘s Commanding General, then BGen Robert F. Milligan and his
planner then LtCol Anthony A. Wood were relieved and transferred. Maritime Prepositioning
was regarded as a strategic gem by DoD (US Department of Defense), but the pace of change
was far too fast for digestion by some within the Corps. That would only come with time. The
thought I would leave with you is the importance of carefully preparing the ground for
introducing innovation. If innovations are to be accepted, evolution is preferable to revolution.
My second observation is to deal with reality rather than tilt at windmills. Build a successful
experimentation program that compliments, not competes with the acquisition and program
goliaths that are already in place. Now I‘ll admit this has not always been my attitude, but it has
become my attitude (after a certain amount of soul searching), because I think it is very
important that experimentation proceed. If it is to proceed, we must preserve dreams and observe
practicalities.
With those as introductory framing remarks, my remaining comments address the key
components of the experimental process, the guiding vision, how the vision is used, the men and
women who do experimentation, leading them, the leader‘s responsibilities, and closing
comments on the experimental process itself.
The vision should be a formal document. Regard it as a living document that will change as you
go along. I am certain that I won't say it as well as Andy Marshall did, but the vision must be
derived from an initial analysis of the world that lies ahead. It must reflect the social, political,
economic, and technological frame within which military force will be employed. In a real sense,
the military capabilities that will be required are derivative from this larger frame. I would
suggest to you that the vision document always begins with this careful analysis of what lies
ahead, then looks at the nation, mixes in likely service roles and missions, and then current
service concepts and responsibilities. If we have done a good job, the vision document will
suggest a set of military concepts and capabilities necessary to support the nation‘s future
interests.
With that said, just what roles does the vision play? First of all, it is the compass for
experimentation. It sets the course. Critically, it gives you the basis from which to extract, first
concepts, and then capabilities for experimenting. At once it acts as a —backboard“ against which
to bounce proposals and ideas as well as a —scoreboard“ for assessment. Ideas will flood you in
this business. The question is, do they support and are they consistent with the vision? Resources
are finite. Good ideas also need to be ideas that are appropriate to the experimental mission of
the service.
Vision also gives you one other very important capability. When you go before Congress or go
before other audiences, the vision statement gives you the clear structure with which to trace the
logic and potential contribution of everything you're doing from the experiments in the field to
future war fighting capabilities. In other words, it gives you the logic that is critical to defending
your position and securing further funding.
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This isn't about bumper stickers. Everybody has a vision statement in industry today, and they're
rarely useful as a guide for anyone in the trenches. The vision statement needs to be very
carefully wrought, and it should be uniquely the responsibility of the commander. While he may
draw in other smart people as contributors, the final product is his responsibility. Further, the
drafting isn't a democratic process. While committees are terrific at providing consensus, a good
vision statement almost never will gain consensus. By its very nature it is projecting a set of
capabilities that don't exist but are needed. It's projecting a sense of strategy that may need to be
adopted but has not yet been tested. Consensus is not the goal of the vision document. The
vision document is a guide to experimentation and the future, not a justification for the current
force.
Approving a service vision as a basis for experimenting introduces the first of several frictions
that characterize military experimentation. . There is no pat answer to gaining approval of the
vision. However, I will say that after watching labs in the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and
the Marine Corps, and talking to many men and women involved in the process, we all could
agree on one thing: —The higher the top cover, the better“. Said differently, the more
controversial the program, the more important it is that you have top level approval of the vision
document that guides it.
Mr. Marshall suggested that it would be desirable to have a strong group of younger officers
working as sort of full time "red team". I agree that this could be invaluable. Implementing this
—red team“ proposal requires that the institution itself, or at least a large portion of its top
leadership, provide approval and shield them from the inevitable pressures to conform which will
emerge. Unless this cover is extended, experimentation may become little more than
demonstration or justification of existing capabilities.
Experimental organizations need to combine the ability to generate good ideas with the need for
experience and judgement. Any experimental organization must provide a channel for surfacing
good ideas. The channel must be a clear one because good ideas rarely survive a long journey
through hierarchy (very rarely.) The young guys are unencumbered with tradition or with
position, they often have terrific ideas, and given a conducive atmosphere, they will voice them.
The more senior members of an experimental organization have two things that are also
invaluable: experience; and, judgement. These are important qualities for reviewing and then
selecting good ideas for experimentation. In any case, if at all possible, build the organization by
identifying and recruiting individual talent whether junior or senior. Experimental organizations
are not cast from a standard mold; it is a great mistake to establish a staff and a plant before the
vision and mission are defined.
I have a theory that the size of experimental bureaucracies and the size of their budgets is
inversely proportional to output. The danger, of course, is that we will manage the large and
demanding hierarchy at the expense of momentum and experimental substance. Suddenly,
personnel management and the management of the organization supplant what we're really here
to do. Experiments don't do well in a bureaucratic climate. Rather, they thrive on a sense of
commitment and purpose, a great deal of talent, and a lot of energy. This doesn't mean that
large bureaucracies can't put on experiments. But, to gain the quality that comes as a result of
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the courage to question established views, I believe that you must build teams within a large
bureaucracy and give them the independence to proceed. That word —independence“ is critical œ
and also the top cover that preserves it and allows the teams to exercise it.
Nothing, absolutely nothing, is as important as the selection of the men and women who will
staff the experimental organization. And nothing is more important after their selection than
treating them with the respect which their contributions and their energies deserve. The
acquisition community is not the model. The reason is simple: contracted talent will rarely
suggest the unconventional or the disruptive. Instead we need to draw on the talent of retired
military officers by making far greater use of the IPA route and give them the authority and
independence that will garner results. They are the critical piece that provides discipline and
judgement and a certain independent sense of good ideas. If they are treated with respect and
given a challenge, then we can recruit men and women of excellence who are retiring and move
them into our experimental organizations. There, along side of Marshall‘s young —red teamers“
we can take advantage of the full range of talent at our disposal.
Balance. This is the age old question of enough but not too much. If good ideas are to rise
through the hierarchy, you need to carefully balance creating enough internal freedom to let
them rise and just enough process to inject appropriate resources and discipline. This balance is
critical and it often leads to criticism of the experimental organization. Why? Because freedom
to speak out may foster the notion that the organization is —messy“. Another phrase which is
sometimes used to describe labs is "not very military" and the label you may hear with regard to
outspoken staff officers is "loose cannons." In the military we are a fairly conservative group of
men and women and the label "loose cannon" is a very negative one. Once entered into a fitness
report it is death. The responsibility to strike a balance between a free flow of ideas (perhaps
including some from —loose cannons“) while injecting necessary process rests with the
commander. It is a balance that he will have to continuously adjust œ and doing it well may
involve acceptance of criticism from his peers and his seniors.
I'm going to spend a little while on the functional role of the vision document because, if
carefully crafted, it can lead us from broad concepts to the identification of key enabling
capabilities. These key capabilities can then be further refined to provide the supporting
functions that make up each capability. Once functions have been identified, experiments can be
designed in which functions are grouped to evaluate the potential war fighting contribution of
one or more of the key capabilities. The bad news here is that in my experience one man in five
or six is able to read even a well-crafted vision document and extract from that document the
capabilities that are necessary to make a proposed operational concept reality. This process is
the heart of experimentation. A well-written prescient vision document presents a coherent
description of the future environment and the concepts with which we expect to fight.
Extracting key capabilities from it is the next critical step in order to build the experiments.
Performing this extraction demands a group of men with imagination and a great deal of
experience. This is one of several times senior retired officers make a major contribution. Their
experience enables them to assess the required underpinnings behind the broad concepts, and
imagination and breadth allow them to define these into key capabilities. In my experience,
perhaps three or four out of a staff of 40 or 50 have this unique and vital insight.
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So let's have a quick look at the logic of how we get from concepts in the vision document to
capabilities and finally supporting functions suitable for experiments. I‘m going to post a
statement on the screen that may well appear in a vision document today in any of the services.
—A force that can combine its information superiority with an adaptive command and control
capability will be able to dynamically adjust its decision-to-action loop to stay well ahead of its
opponent‘s.“ My guess is we probably could extract a minimum of six or eight or even 10 key
capabilities from this visionary goal. I have extracted one that you might consider an important
derived capability: —The capability for an adaptive command and control system to continuously
monitor the situation and assist in dynamically re-allocating reconnaissance, surveillance, and
target acquisition assets.“ There‘s a whole bunch of subordinate functions tied up in this broad
capability statement that support achieving useful information superiority (information
superiority means nothing if it isn't useful.) The trick is, further breaking the capability functions
that men and women can examine and incorporate into the design for an experiment.
We've examined a concept in the vision. We have seen how we might derive the 10 or 12 key
capabilities that make up the broad concept, and how each of these can be broken down into
functions. Now the commander and his staff can review the proposed experimental program,
identify a place for the new proposed experiment and move to questions of priority for resources
and implementation. What I've tried to do in this short example is to present the notion of the
key role that the vision document plays in providing a basis for presenting concepts, deriving
capabilities, and identifying the supporting functions composing each capability. Once those
functions have been identified experiments can be designed.
I didn't know Mr. Marshall was going to mention the use of surrogates in experiments, but I‘m
delighted that he did. Surrogates play an important role. Remember my little tale at the start of
the talk concerning the development of Maritime Prepositioning? We certainly didn't call them
surrogates just as we didn't call the research and test period an experiment, but that old
amphibious ship was the —surrogate“ for later development of the TAK maritime prepositioning
ships. History has many examples of the use of surrogates. Prior to WWII, the Germans used old
cars and trucks as surrogates for tanks during early development of Blitzkrieg tactics. They
didn't need actual tanks to explore the concepts (nor did they have them). Instead, to determine
effective formations and tactics, they experimented with the Blitzkrieg concept through use of
surrogates -- cars and trucks in formation running around, linked by primitive communication
means.
Using surrogates has several advantages in contemporary experimentation. First, surrogates can
speed the process of experimentation (don't wait for the real item). Second, they can drastically
reduce the cost. Finally, surrogates can keep you from adopting a particular technology at the
outset. Committing prematurely to a particular technological approach locks experiments into a
single direction. You have to be very, very sensitive to this danger. Many technologies are selffulfilling prophecies. If you select a particular technology at the outset for the experiment, you
may well be dictating the result a priori.
A well-planned and well-executed analysis and data gathering plan is one of the
commander's principal responsibilities. Let me say that again. A well-planned and well-executed
analysis and data gathering plan is one of the commander's principal responsibilities. Why? Isn‘t
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this a technical area best left to —green eye shade“ types? No! In the end, all the effort that his
gone into the experiment comes down to results. Those all-important results are going to be
viewed through the lens of the analysis and data gathering plan. That plan must support the
experimental mission. It must be specifically tailored to identify and evaluate the capabilities
extracted from the vision. It must directly link means and ends in a clear fashion that employs
credible MOE(s). When all is said and done, nothing receives more attention than the analysis.
In my view you cannot be too careful. Demand the best in terms of analysts and establish a long
term relationship that will ensure more analytical talent when it is needed. But, the adequacy of
this plan is one of the commander‘s primary responsibilities.
If the analyst is important, the design of the experiment is equally so. Men who can design
experiments are difficult to find. If you were a division commander, you would be incredibly
careful concerning who was selected as your operations officer. And, if in fact that operations
officer wasn't your pick, you'd make damn sure his assistant was the finest you could find. In
experimentation, the head of experimental design is just that important. The recipe? One very,
very talented guy who can clearly see the purpose of the experiment, relate goals to resources,
understand the concept, evaluate the analysis and data gathering plan (and integrate it in the
design), and then pull it all together with an experimental support and preparation plan. Sound
like a tall order? It is. And then, of course, after you've picked a good guy and after you have
placed your trust in him, check, check, check.
A word on presentation. More often than not experiments can be boring for the outside observer.
I‘ve heard it said that experiments are about as exciting as watching crab grass grow. For this
reason, as well as the fact that they may occur at different sites over an extended period,
experiments have to be presented. Not only are they often boring, an experiment may not even
be understandable without a presentation plan. The presentation plan enables the experimental
staff to explain what is actually going on and why you're doing it. The presentation plan also
contributes to visibility and credibility and thus to securing future resources and support. As an
example, there were nine general officers assigned by the Commandant of the Marine Corps to
observe Hunter Warrior (Am I correct on that one?) -- nine general officers assigned as observers
and evaluators for one experiment. But it was an important experiment. We had to do a very
careful presentation plan. The experiment covered five different sites over a 3300 square mile
battlefield and at sea. The presentation plan included a helicopter transport scheme to move
guests and observers. It required a very carefully constructed information flow just so they
would understand what the experiment was, what was going on, what the concepts under
evaluation were, and how we were proceeding? And, it helped manage the crowd. In short, I
would suggest that credibility requires that you be able to show and explain what you're doing
and, at the same time, keep those who are observing from affecting the experiment. The tool is
the presentation plan.
No one will be more sensitive to the publication of the final experimental results than your own
staff. No one. How you as a commander present these results will surely have a major impact
on every experiment that follows. If, under outside pressure, you tell a victorious experimental
team that the game didn't count, that it‘s been called, you will only have to do it once. You only
have to politically filter the results of an experiment once to convince your staff that it's not
worth it to go out on a limb œ and good experimentation requires that they go out on a limb. I‘m
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aware of the conflicting pressures which tug at the experimental commander when final results
call into question some important aspect of the status quo. However, there is a heavy
responsibility to the parent service, to the experimental mission, and to your staff to accurately
portray your findings. As Mr. Marshall implied earlier, in this business courage really does
count.
At this point I‘d like to briefly comment on exercises and experiments. These two activities are
very different. Resource pressures are pushing us to include experimentation within exercises.
And there may be no way to avoid that entirely. However, we owe it to ourselves to proceed with
a clear understanding of the differences between experiments and exercises.
Critically, the experiment must be structured and conducted in such a fashion that failure is one
possibility. The hypothesis can turn out not to be provable, otherwise why experiment? If this is
not the case, if so-called experiments do not admit of the possibility of failure, then you're
demonstrating or you're justifying, or you're camouflaging, but you're not experimenting.
The second major difference between experiments and exercises is the end purpose of each. The
operating forces go to the field to polish current capabilities and ensure war fighting readiness.
Their responsibility is to defend today. Nothing can get in the way of that, and nothing should.
Furthermore, as Mr. Marshall alluded to earlier, the operating forces are practicing team work
and improvisation. Exercises strengthen and polish the ability to improvise and interoperate.
However this powerful commitment, to accomplish the mission and improvise as necessary to
do it, can convert an experiment into a demonstration with positive results a foregone
conclusions.
So there are several good reasons to be very careful about how we combine exercises and
experiments. I've given up saying you can't do it (which I used to say), because the fact of the
matter is, that resources today probably aren't going to allow us the luxury of separate venues.
Further, there are many small experiments that in spite of their small scale are enormously useful
and can be included under a larger exercise umbrella.
There are other practical considerations that arise when mixing experiments with exercises.
Chief among these are the differing time horizons of each. A few years ago, I was briefing one
of the CINCs and I was watching his face redden and temper rise as we tried to persuade him
that he should support a major experiment. About halfway through the discussion, I suddenly
realized that I was proposing an experiment whose outcomes would impact a time horizon which
was five, six or seven years out. At the same time he was concerned with the capabilities which
would be available to his forces across a huge theater for the next 24 months. The lesson is clear
œ keep a close eye on time horizons. Be careful when asking men whose responsibility is now
to combine experiments whose impacts may be seven years out. Or if you are going to have to
do it, tie it back to their responsibilities today.
The horizon issue also applies to mixing experiments and exercises within our divisions, wings,
and fleets. As stated the responsibility of these commanders is the employment of the operating
forces now. If we're going to ask them to host experimentation, then we should ask them to host
experimentation that is appropriate, that fits into their exercises, and that in fact is likely to
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complement their capabilities in the fairly short term. And there will be periods during which
experimentation will be focused on very short term enhancements. It's like a pendulum.
Sometimes experimentation will have aggressive periods where we'll tackle very controversial
future concepts and capabilities, and those will frequently be followed by more conservative
periods during which we will focus on much more near term enhancements. It differs, service by
service. But the fact is, both periods can contribute to identifying and refining war fighting
capabilities.
At any rate, when we talk about experimenting within an exercise we are going to have to be
careful that we don't drink our own bath water. It's very easy to do. Clearly, if well planned,
experiments can be carried out within a large exercise without being negatively influenced.
However, while our commitment to accomplishing the mission and improvising as necessary is a
huge plus in maintaining current readiness, it can be just as big a detractor and unduly bend the
results of experiments. Finally, remember that experiments fail. When was the last time you
heard a senior commander announce failure?
Leading experimental organizations is tough. On one hand there is a responsibility to support
and protect your staff and shield them from the pressures of acquisition, from service
controversy, and from the knee-jerk reactions of those blindly committed to preserving the status
quo. Equally, the experimental commander must retain the trust and support of the senior
leadership or the program will be terminated. It's the commander‘s job to achieve balance, and it
may not always be career enhancing. Coming to grips with this issue and having the services
accept this will depend on very high level recognition of the importance of military
experimentation. It will also depend on establishing a tradition that the general officers placed in
charge of experimentation are in fact —between two worlds“ and that their primary responsibility
is to explore the capabilities we may need for the future. We should also strive to establish a
widespread understanding that these experimental leaders are reasonable and very wise men as
they direct this exploration. Believe me, they're going to have to be very wise men because as
Mr. Marshall remarked, innovators have not traditionally been rewarded.
I'll close these personal remarks on experimentation, experimenters, and their processes with the
comment that they are just that œ personal remarks based on experience stretching back over
more than 20 years of military experimentation. I hope my thoughts have complemented what
Andy Marshall had to say, and I hope that they will prove useful to those engaged in military
experimentation today.
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EXPERIMENTATION AS A COMPASS FOR THE FUTURE
By Colonel James A. Lasswell, USMC (Ret.)
Divining the future is hard. There are no reliable crystal balls in the Pentagon any more than
there are on Wall Street. The military attempts to chart its future course through the use of such
vehicles as White Paper vision statements and future concepts of how they perceived the military
should respond to the future threat in order to carry out the National Security Strategy. In some
cases, these future concepts are simply product improvements of current military objectives.
However, at other times, the vision of the future requires a major change of direction œ a
transformation œ that require a major departure from current legacy capabilities in order to either
meet new challenges or to take advantage of new technological opportunities.
Experimenting with future systems present a major challenge because future technologies are by
definition beyond the current state-of-the-art for current equipment. The situation is made harder
if the new technologies offer the opportunity to implement new organizations, tactics, techniques
and procedures œ or even the development of personnel with different skill sets to operate œ than
current operational forces. In these cases, the only option may be to first wargame the concept
and then when the capabilities are adequately defined attempt to conduct concept-based
experimentation using surrogate technologies that approximate the future technologies
sufficiently to permit operational assessment of the new concept.
This process has been used for over a century in the U.S. Naval Service. Wargaming at the
Naval War College predates the turn of the century and was particularly influential during the
interwar years in the development of fleet tactics for carrier and amphibious operations.
Wargames can lead to experiments with surrogate technologies such as the landings on the Island
of Culebra during the 1920s using small boats to simulate more advanced landing craft as an
example. By the first World War II
amphibious assault against Tarawa in
Wargaming/
1943, the launches had given way to
Capability
Identification
the Higgins boat, tracked assault
amphibian vehicles, and a Fleet
Marine Force organized and equipped
to conduct amphibious assaults.
Fleet
Experiment
Early
Concept

In the case of the amphibious assault,
the capability took over 20 years from
initial wargaming through initial
Warfighting
experimentation in fleet exercises
From Concept to Capability
Capability
using surrogate systems, to the
refinement of the concept into an
actual warfighting capability. Arguably, one of the most difficult stages in this development is
the transition of a concept into viable and meaningful concept-based experimentation using first
surrogates and then candidate prototype technologies.
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Even thought the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory is only about five years old, there have
already been three examples of how a revolutionary concept has progressed from idea, to a
wargamed capability, to a concept-based experiment with a surrogate, to more comprehensive
experimentation with a prototype until they are now sufficiently defined that it can be evaluated
for acquisition. Each in its own way provides an example of a different use of a surrogate
technology in concept-based experimentation to establish the direction for future warfighting
capabilities.
Concept Exploration œ Defining the Potential of a Digital Battlefield
The initial experiment of the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory was the Hunter Warrior
Experiment conducted during March 1997. This seminal Marine Corps experiment into the
potential impact of technology generally associated with Joint Vision 2010 when applied to the
capabilities of a typical naval task force comprised of a future Carrier Battle Group and
Amphibious Ready Group with embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit.
The centerpiece of the experiment was the use of a surrogate communications architecture that
approximated the kind of digital network envisioned in the future supporting a form of Common
Tactical Picture available in near real time at any location on the battlefield. The hub of the
architecture was the Experimental Command
and Control Center (ECOC).
The concept was based on a
vision of the
future battlefield in which information is
digitally shared throughout the battlespace.
Commanders at all levels could draw
information from shared information data
bases œ similar in concept to the Joint Forces
Command concept of a Common Relevant
Operational Picture -- as required to provide
situational awareness and to support their
command and coordination requirements.
Information would neither funnel up nor down
a chain of command focused on filtering and interpreting information.
Instead, information would be available near simultaneously to all
echelons of command both on and off the battlefield.
The Hunter Warrior ECOC was intended to explore the implications
of such a system on both staff organization and the types of decisionmaking systems that would permit distributing command and control
functions within the battlespace. Most notably, the ECOC was
intended to integrate the functions of the Landing Force Operations
Center (LFOC) and the Tactical Logistics Group (TacLog) with Navy
command and control functions such as the Supporting Arms
Coordination Center (SACC) and Tactical Air Operations Center
(TACC).
Located at Camp Pendleton œ as a surrogate for an
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amphibious command ship œ the ECOC was connected by landlines and tower relays to tactical
units on the ground at 29 Palms California over 150 miles away.
The landlines and towers were a key part of a surrogate communications architecture
approximating future envisioned over-the-horizon, wide band wireless communications. At the
other end of the architecture were Marine squads equipped with Apple Newton palm-top
computers with embedded Trimble GPS cards that automatically established the location of the
sending unit whenever it transmitted.The Hunter Warrior ECOC was originally intended to be a
shipboard node of a network centric approach to organizing the future littoral battlefield around
digital information. It was to be one of multiple nodes œ not the hub œ for decision making
within the naval task force during littoral operations. In the concept, similar ECOCs would be
located on the various ships of the Amphibious Ready Group and the supporting Carrier Battle
Group, and ashore in mobile operations centers of the landing force
The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory developed a concept for a cellular staff organization
to use the ECOC. The Staff was organized around functions. Fighting the current battle was the
Engagement Coordination Cell (or section) that inherently combined all aspects of engagement œ
lethal fires, non-lethal fires, maneuver, psychological operations, etc. œ into a single staff
function.
The
concept
of
the
Engagement Coordination Cell
was not dissimilar to that of
the Effects Based Operations
Cell currently under review by
Joint Forces Command.
Supporting the Engagement
Coordination Cell was a
Planning and Shaping Cell œ
similar to a Future Operations
and Future Plans organization
in function œ and a Combat
Information Cell that
performed an information
management
function.
Notably, there was no
intelligence fusion function.
The experimental concept assumed that information technology would permit distribution of
operationally critical intelligence information throughout the staff simultaneously to those
individuals who needed it. A nascent intelligence fusion function was performed within the
combat information cell and by a red team that provided an independent interpretation of the
battle to the battle captain based on the perceived effects of events upon the enemy.
However, time and resources limited the development of the Hunter Warrior C2 architecture to a
single ECOC and the concept for experimentation during the AWE to that of funneling all
available information to a single centralized decision making node within the ECOC. Although
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spectacularly successful in some aspects, centralization during the experiment led to a focus in
subsequent ECOC development into improving the decision-making capability of the ECOC
rather than the exploration of the impact of shared information within a network centric
approach.
The Hunter Warrior ECOC demonstrated the value of electronic displays of information within
an ECOC. However, the Hunter Warrior ECOC did not have an integrated C2 system. Instead,
it was a collection of stand-alone legacy systems that were used in the Advanced Warfighting
Experiment with various prototype systems such as xBAIT and the 3-Dimensional Workbench
(for visually displaying information) and FEAT4 (for intelligent agent manipulation of data
bases) that were on display but not actually used in the conduct of the experiment.
The Hunter Warrior ECOC demonstrated how dramatically more capable a future command
element might be able to command and coordinate forces on a widely dispersed future battlefield
provided it developed the ability to automate the dissemination and display of the data pouring
into the ECOC through the use of computer assisted decision support systems. In the Hunter
Warrior ECOC all information was essentially distributed in near real time to every station
within the staff due as text messages. Only the electronic map was updated automatically to
show new position reports of both friendly units and enemy sightings. In spite of these
limitations, the amount of information
available within the staff and the lack of a
vertical chain of command for the
dissemination of information, led to
significant reassessments as to the
significance of automated decision support
systems to help manage the information that
an all- digital communications architecture
can potentially provide.
The Urban Warrior ECOC developed for the
Urban Warrior experiment in March of 1999,
was a dramatic product improvement over that of the Hunter Warrior ECOC. The Urban
Warrior ECOC was a dramatic change from that of the previous experiment in that it
incorporated intelligent computer agent driven decision support systems. It was built around a
prototype Integrated Marine Multi-Agent Command and Control System that was designed to
employ computer agents in a variety of roles to aid in near-real time decision making. Agent
functionality provided similar racking and stacking of information capabilities that currently
requires a host Marines with pen and paper œ and grease pencils on overlays -- to accomplish.
The approach was to use intelligent agents to make information more usable by decision makers
rather than as a substitute for a Marine in the decision making loop. Agents provided limited
support to distribution of information throughout the network œ down to the squad level in some
cases using a computer end user terminal œ but fundamentally remained focused on providing
decision support to the ECOC staff.
During the June 2001 Kernal Blitz (Experimental), the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory
and the Extended Littoral Battlespace Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstration Program
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Office conducted the third major experiment involving the ECOC. For this experiment, the
ECOC is a state-of-the-shelf, high technology command center built from the bottom-up within
an old magazine of the USS Coronado. Instead of surrogate terrestrial communications
architecture, the ELB ACTD employed prototype systems that could eventually be employed in
UAVs to serve as airborne relays for wideband secure wireless communications.
This new ECOC is several technical generations and a considerable conceptual departure
from the original idea of an ECOC that was developed prior to the Hunter Warrior Advanced
Warfighting Experiment Often lost in the focus on the information technology of the ECOC is
its original operational concept.
The Capable Warrior ECOC used
during Kernal Blitz (Experimental)
is a product improved Urban
Warrior ECOC that progressed
primarily in its ability to
incorporate legacy C2 systems
with a wide band communications
system. However, there was
significant improvement within its
ability to support distributed
decision making and collaborative
planning through the use of
intelligent agents and shared
information
protocols.
Experiments were conducted with
distributed C2. For example, during one live fire experiment at 29 Palms fires were coordinated
and then controlled using a network centric approach by individual company Fire Support Teams
using the same agent functionality available within the ECOC.
With the completion of Capable Warrior , the ECOC had progressed from a crude, surrogate
command and control system that was so fragile that it could not be located at sea, through a
more advanced stage in Urban Warrior that not only was capable of emplacement within the
secure network of a Navy combatant but also employed intelligent agent decision support
systems within the Marine Corps, to a mature prototype demonstrated by the ELB ACTD and the
Lab during Capable Warrior. Through this experimentation process the potential feasibility of
future wide band wireless over-the-horizon communications were demonstrated while the
Marine Corps acquired its first real test of tactical computers to share situational awareness and
the use of intelligent agents to support decision support systems.
Breaking Paradigms œ Ubiquitous Tactical Unmanned Air Vehicles flown by Non-Aviators
Whereas the surrogate information systems of Hunter Warrior were used to explore the
ramifications of a new concept empowered by emerging technologies, the use of the Dragon
Drone during Hunter Warrior was intended to change the way Marines perceived unmanned
aircraft œ UAVs œ in the future. Historically, things-that-fly œ and systems that are intended to
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shoot down things-that-fly -- are controlled by the aviation units. Current Marine Pioneer UAVs
are flown and controlled by the VMU squadrons of the Marine
Aircraft Wings.
The Dragon Drone was flown by the
Marine Corps Warfighting
Laboratory as an all-purpose UAV
testbed for any possible future use of
a UAV. In fact one of the first
limited objective experiments
conducted by the Lab was the use of
the Dragon Drone to drop pepper
spray non-lethal agents from the air
as a means of dispersing crowds and
riots before they massed within the
immediate proximity of Marines.
Other uses included tests at
Dugway, Utah, proving grounds of
the drone‘s ability to deliver special
sensors in an effort to detect and
identify the existence of small traces
aerosol of either chemical or
biological agents within the
atmosphere and the delivery of
scatter able micro sensors.
However, the drone became a true paradigm breaker when it was used during Hunter Warrior as
a surrogate small unit level tactical UAV to conduct reconnaissance beyond the next hill or to
track fleeting targets beyond visual range. Although the drone was launched and recovered from
rear areas, it was capable of having its camera controlled and the video feed drawn down directly
to a tactical ground unit. The ground unit could also control it. Once that ground unit was done
with the UAV, it could be released to continue on its GPS controlled track until it returned to its
designated recovery zone.

By Urban Warrior, the drone had progressed even further such that it was considerably easier to
control, had been given a new heavy fuel engine so that it could be deployed aboard Navy ships
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with Marine Expeditionary Units as a semi-disposable tactical UAV asset, and had been operated
by artillery units, light armored reconnaissance units, combat service support units, and by
infantry units down to the platoon and squad level. Just as significant, experience with the
drone was leading to an easing of air space management concerns involving simultaneous
employment of manned aircraft.
As a result of the success of the Dragon Drone, the Lab has developed the Dragon Eye tactical
UAV that is reduced in size from the 80 pounds of Dragon Drone to less than 8 pounds in the
composite winged Dragon Eye. Also GPS guided, the Dragon Eye is intended to be an
inexpensive, almost disposable tactical UAV that can be operated by a wide range of ground
combat units. With its small weight and a GPS-controlled top ceiling of 500 feet it is exempt
from formal air space management and truly a ground element item of equipment that can be
employed in support of the squad, platoon, and company reconnaissance, surveillance, and target
acquisition requirements.
During FY02, over 40 of these UAVs will be fielded by the Lab for operational testing by the
ground operating forces as a prototype tactical UAV.
Alternative Concept Demonstrators œ The Expeditionary Fire Support System
As the Hunter Warrior experimental concept was under development, it became clear there was a
need for a highly mobile fire support system that could be readily deployed internally within
helicopters œ or the MV-22 œ and employed upon arrival either automatically or with a minimum
crew to provide immediately responsive fire support to small units in contact. Long range
precision naval gunfire was projected to have a time of flight of up to eight minutes from launch.
Aircraft were sometimes unavailable due to weather or interruptions in flight schedules.
Accordingly, small units on the future battlefield needed an alternative system.
Almost as an afterthought for Hunter Warrior, a
conceptual expeditionary fire support system
modeled on a state-of-the-art French 120mm
rifled mortar was included in the force list for the
experiment. Since no such system then existed,
three wooden boxes filled with sand were used
as representational surrogate systems during the
experiment and the ECOC computers were used
to adjudicate its usage.
Within 17 months of the development of the
concept of such a system, the Lab had acquired a
French rifled 120mm Mortar and built a portable
chassis through Pickatinny Arsenal. Named the
Dragon Fire, this operational prototype firing
system was used as a concept demonstrator against the current program of towed artillery
systems. In effect, it provided a visible and functional alternative to howitzers or rockets for the

15

expeditionary fire support role requiring a firing system with an identical mobility profile of the
ground combat element that it is supporting.
During Urban Warrior gaming and modeling, the mortar demonstrated its superior potential for
use in the urban canyons of the city, providing plunging fire to isolate building objectives,
breakup counter offensives in dead space behind building complexes, and even as a direct fire
system if altered to be breach loading vice muzzle loading. In addition, the Lab‘s Dragon Fire
was joined in several experiments by a French, LAV-mounted rifled 120mm Mortar.
Subsequently, the concept for the Dragon Fire‘s employment was expanded to include a potential
third deployment means, loaded internally within the cargo bay of a LAV25 or a LAV logistics
variant. Potentially, the Dragon Fire could be deployed in either of three ways œ towed by a
HUMMWV or LAV, internally within a CH-53E or MV-22 tilt rotor aircraft, or internally within
a LAV. Significantly, if internally loaded in a LAV, the capability could be developed to
potentially fire the mortar on the move.
As an alternative concept prototype, the
Dragon Fire has been a huge success. It has
been embraced by three consecutive
commanders at the Lab and is currently
under consideration both as a future
alternative to the Light Weight 155mm
Howitzer as a direct support artillery system
for the infantry under some operational
concepts as well as a potential replacement
or augmenting infantry mortar system to the
81mm Mortar. Its existence has forced the
Marine Corps to consider alternatives to
current firing systems and operational
concepts.
In each of the three cases described above, surrogates were the means that the Marine Corps
Warfighting Laboratory used to explore, demonstrate, or challenge future concepts before stateof-the-art technology was available to provide the capability in a fully useable prototype system.
As Yogi Berra put it, —the future ain‘t what it used to be.“ Using surrogates as the compass to
chart the correct direction into the future has already proven its worth.
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Experimentation: Staying Ahead of Today's Threats
Raymond Cole (Col. USMC Ret.)
Demonstration/Program Manager
Extending the Littoral Battlespace ACTD
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Demonstration: Interoperability at the Information Level
Anthony Wood (Col. USMC Ret.)
Director of Applied Research
Collaborative Agent Design Research Center, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo (CA)
The decided advantages of an information-centric computer environment, presented at the third
annual Office of Naval Research (ONR) sponsored Workshop on Collaborative Decision-Sup
port (Quantico, VA, June 5, 2001), are highlighted herein. Of particular significance is the ability
of software agents to reason about events, collaborate intelligently with each other and users, and
transmit alerts across multiple application domains.
For the past 20 years the military services have suffered under the limitations of stove-piped com
puter software applications that function as discrete entities within a fragmented data-processing
environment. Lack of interoperability has been identified by numerous think tanks, advisory boards,
and studies, as the primary information systems problem (e.g., Army Science Board 2000, Air Force
SAB 2000 Command and Control Study, and NSB Network-Centric Naval Forces 2000). Yet, de
spite this level of attention, all attempts to achieve interoperability within the current data-centric
information systems environment have proven to be expensive, unreliable, and generally unsuccess
ful.
Why is this so? The expectations of true interoperability are threefold. First, interoperable appli
cations should be able to integrate related functional sequences in a seamless and user transparent
manner. Second, this level of integration assumes the sharing of information from one applica
tion to another, so that the results of the functional sequence are automatically available and simi
larly interpreted by the other application. And third, any of the applications should be able to enter
or exit the integrated interoperable environment without jeopardizing the continued operation of
the other applications. These conditions simply cannot be achieved by computer software that
processes numbers and meaningless text with predetermined algorithmic solutions through hardcoded dumb data links.
Past approaches to interoperability have basically fallen into three categories. Attempts to create
common architectures have largely failed because this approach essentially requires existing sys
tems to be re-implemented in the common (i.e., new) architecture. Attempts to create bridges
between applications within a confederation of linked systems have been faced with three major
obstacles. First, the large number of bridges required (i.e., the square of the number of applica
tions). Second, the fragility associated with hard-coded inter-system data linkages. Third, the cost
of maintaining such linkages in a continuously evolving information systems environment. The
third category of approaches has focused on achieving interoperability at the interface boundary.
For anything other than limited presentation and visualization capabilities, this approach cannot
accommodate dynamic data flows, let alone constant changes at the more useful information level.
__________________
(Editor’s note: This is the text of a brochure that was provided to Workshop participants as back
ground information for the live demonstration, which was narrated by Col. Wood.)
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These obstacles to interoperability and integration are largely overcome in an information-centric
software systems environment by embedding in the software some understanding of the informa
tion being processed. How is this possible? Surely computers cannot be expected to understand
anything. Aren’t they just dumb electronic machines that simply execute programmed instruc
tions without any regard to what either the instructions, or the information to which the instruc
tions apply, mean? The answer is no, it is all a matter of representation (i.e., how the information
is structured in the computer).
As shown in the centerfold diagram, the integration and interoperability capabilities of an infor
mation-centric software system allow agents in one application to notify agents in other appli
cations of events occurring in multiple domains. For example, the Engagement Agent in the
tactical Integrated Marine Multi-Agent Command and Control System (IMMACCS) is able to
advise appropriate agents in the logistical SEAWAY application whenever a Supply Point ashore
is threatened by enemy activity. This may result in the timely rescheduling or redirection of a
planned re-supply mission. The agents are able to communicate across multiple applications at
the information level through the common language of the ontological framework. Similarly,
the SEAWAY application is able to rely on the Integrated Computerized Deployment System
(ICODES) to maintain in-transit cargo visibility, down to the location of a supply item in a con
tainer on-board a MTMC (Military Traffic Management Command, USTRANSCOM) ship enroute to an Intermediate Staging and Embarkation Port (ISEP). This kind of interoperability can
not be achieved in a data-centric systems environment, where computer-based reasoning cannot
take place and linkages between applications are limited to the transmission of data messages that
depend entirely on human interpretation.
The term information-centric refers to the representation of information in the computer, not to
the way it is actually stored in a digital machine. This distinction between representation and
storage is important, and relevant far beyond the realm of computers. When we write a note with
a pencil on a sheet of paper, the content (i.e., meaning) of the note is unrelated to the storage
device. A sheet of paper is designed to be a very efficient storage medium that can be easily
stacked in sets of hundreds, filed in folders, folded, bound into volumes, and so on. However, all
of this is unrelated to the content of the written note on the paper. This content represents the
meaning of the sheet of paper. It constitutes the purpose of the paper and governs what we do with
the sheet of paper (i.e., its use). In other words, the nature and efficiency of the storage medium is
more often than not unrelated to the content or representation that is stored in the medium.
In the same sense the way in which we store bits (i.e., 0s and 1s) in a digital computer is unrelated to
the meaning of what we have stored. When computers first became available they were exploited for
their fast, repetitive computational capabilities and their enormous storage capacity. Application
software development progressed rapidly in a data-centric environment. Content was stored as data
that were fed into algorithms to produce solutions to predefined problems in a static problem solving
context. It is surprising that such a simplistic and artificially contrived problem solving environment
was found to be acceptable for several decades of intensive computer technology development.
When we established the Collaborative Agent Design Research Center at Cal Poly in 1986, we had
a vision. We envisioned that users should be able to sit down at a computer terminal and solve
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problems collaboratively with the computer. The computer should be able to continuously assist
and advise the user during the decision making process. Moreover, we postulated that one should
be able to develop software modules that could spontaneously react in near real-time to changing
events in the problem situation, analyze the impact of the events, propose alternative courses of
action, and evaluate the merits of such proposals. What we soon discovered, as we naively set out
to develop an intelligent decision-support system, is that we could not make much headway with
data in a dynamically changing problem environment.
Initially focusing on engineering design, we had no difficulties at all developing a software module
that could calculate the daylight available inside a room, as long as we specified to the computer the
precise location and dimensions of the window, the geometry of the room, and made some assump
tions about external conditions. However, it did not seem possible for the computer to determine on
its own that there was a need for a window and where that window might be best located. The
ability of the computer to make these determinations was paramount to us. We wanted the com
puter to be a useful assistant that we could collaborate with as we explored alternative design
solutions. In short, we wanted the computer to function intelligently in a dynamic environment,
continuously looking for opportunities to assist, suggest, evaluate, and alert us whenever we pur
sued solution alternatives that were essentially not feasible.
We soon realized that to function in this role our software modules had to be able to reason. To be
able to reason the computer needs to have something akin to understanding of the context within
which it is supposed to reason. The human cognitive system builds context from knowledge and
experience using information (i.e., data with attributes and relationships) as its basic building block.
Interestingly enough the storage medium of the information, knowledge and context held by the
human brain is billions of neurons and trillions of connections (i.e., synapses) among these neurons
that are as unrelated to each other as a pencilled note and the sheet of paper on which it is stored.
What gives meaning to the written note is its representation within the framework of a language
(e.g., English) that can be understood by the reader. Similarly, in a computer we can establish the
notion of meaning if the stored data are represented in an ontological framework of objects, their
characteristics, and their interrelationships. How these objects, characteristics and relationships
are actually stored at the lowest level of bits (i.e., 0s and 1s) in the computer is immaterial to the
ability of the computer to undertake reasoning tasks. The conversion of these bits into data and the
transformation of data into information, knowledge and context takes place at higher levels, and is
ultimately made possible by the skillful construction of a network of richly described objects and
their relationships that represent those physical and conceptual aspects of the real world that the
computer is required to reason about.
This is what is meant by an information-centric computer-based decision-support environment. One
can further argue that to refer to the ability of computers to understand and reason about information
is no more or less of a trick of our imagination than to refer to the ability of human beings to under
stand and reason about information. In other words, the countless minuscule charges that are stored in
the neurons of the human nervous system are no closer to the representation of information than the
bits (i.e., 0s and 1s) that are stored in a digital computer. However, whereas the human cognitive
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system automatically converts this collection of charges into information and knowledge, in the com
puter we have to construct the framework and mechanism for this conversion. Such a framework of
objects, attributes and relationships provides a system of integrated software applications with a com
mon language that allows software modules (call them agents if you like) to reason about events,
monitor changes in the problem situation, and collaborate with each other as they actively assist the
user(s) during the decision making process. One can say that this ontological framework is a virtual
representation of the real world problem domain, and that the agents are dynamic tools capable of
pursuing objectives, extracting and applying knowledge, communicating, and collaboratively assist
ing the user(s) in the solution of current and future real world problems.
An increasing number of commercial companies are starting to take advantage of the higher level
collaborative assistance capabilities of computers to improve their competitive edge and overcome
potential customer service difficulties. A good example is the timely detection of the fraudulent use
of telephone credit card numbers. Telephone companies deal with several million calls each day,
far too many for monitoring by human detectives. Instead, they have implemented intelligent
computer software modules that monitor certain information relating to telephone calls and relate
that information to the historical records of individual telephone users. The key to this capability is
that telephone call data such as time-of-day, length of call, origin of call, and destination are stored
in the computer as an information structure containing data objects, relationships, and some at
tributes for each data object. For example, the data “Colombia” may have the attributes interna
tional, South America, uncommon telephone call destination, attached to it. In addition, relation
ships are established dynamically between “Colombia” the telephone number of the caller, the
telephone number being called, the time-of-day of the call, and so on. The result is a network of
objects with attributes and relationships that is very different from the data stored in a typical
commercial data-mart. This network constitutes information (rather than data) and allows hun
dreds of software agents to monitor telephone connections and detect apparent anomalies. What is
particularly attractive about this fairly straightforward application of information-centric technol
ogy, is that the software agents do not have to listen in on the actual telephone conversations to
detect possibly fraudulent activities. However, from the telephone company’s point of view this use
of expert agents saves millions of dollars each year in lost revenues.
The ability to achieve interoperability at the information level eliminates the many obstacles that
plague data-centric confederations of software systems. In particular, it obviates the need for hard
coded data bridges between discrete applications and allows the data-centric requirement for pre
defined solutions to be replaced by a tool kit of powerful agents that can provide useful assistance
in a dynamically changing collaborative decision making environment.
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Information-Centric Decision-Support Systems:
A Blueprint for ‘Interoperability’
Jens Pohl, Ph.D.
Collaborative Agent Design Research Center
Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo, CA, USA
For the past 20 years the US military services have suffered under the limitations of stove-piped
computer software applications that function as discrete entities within a fragmented dataprocessing environment. Lack of interoperability has been identified by numerous think tanks,
advisory boards, and studies, as the primary information systems problem (e.g., Army Science
Board 2000, Air Force SAB 2000 Command and Control Study, and NSB Network-Centric
Naval Forces 2000). Yet, despite this level of attention, all attempts to achieve interoperability
within the current data-centric information systems environment have proven to be expensive,
unreliable, and generally unsuccessful.

The Apparently Elusive Goal of ”Interoperability‘
The expectations of true interoperability are threefold. First, interoperable applications should be
able to integrate related functional sequences in a seamless and user transparent manner.
Second, this level of integration assumes the sharing of information from one application to
another, so that the results of the functional sequence are automatically available and similarly
interpreted by the other application. And third, any of the applications should be able to enter or
exit the integrated interoperable environment without jeopardizing the continued operation of the
other applications. These conditions simply cannot be achieved by computer software that
processes numbers and meaningless text with predetermined algorithmic solutions through hardcoded dumb data links.
Past approaches to interoperability have basically fallen into three categories. Attempts to create
common architectures have largely failed because this approach essentially requires existing
systems to be re-implemented in the common (i.e., new) architecture. Attempts to create bridges
between applications within a confederation of linked systems have been faced with three major
obstacles. First, the large number of bridges required (i.e., the square of the number of
applications). Second, the fragility associated with hard-coded inter-system data linkages. Third,
the cost of maintaining such linkages in a continuously evolving information systems
environment. The third category of approaches has focused on achieving interoperability at the
interface boundary. For anything other than limited presentation and visualization capabilities,
this approach cannot accommodate dynamic data flows, let alone constant changes at the more
useful information level.
These obstacles to interoperability and integration are largely overcome in an information-centric
software systems environment by embedding in the software some understanding of the
information being processed. How is this possible? Surely computers cannot be expected to
understand anything. Aren't they just dumb electronic machines that simply execute programmed
instructions without any regard to what either the instructions, or the information to which the
instructions apply, mean? The answer is no, it is all a matter of representation (i.e., how the
information is structured in the computer).
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The Notion of ‘Information-Centric’
The term information-centric refers to the representation of information in the computer, not to
the way it is actually stored in a digital machine. This distinction between representation and
storage is important, and relevant far beyond the realm of computers. When we write a note
with a pencil on a sheet of paper, the content (i.e., meaning) of the note is unrelated to the
storage device. A sheet of paper is designed to be a very efficient storage medium that can be
easily stacked in sets of hundreds, filed in folders, bound into volumes, folded, and so on.
However, all of this is unrelated to the content of the written note on the paper. This content
represents the meaning of the sheet of paper. It constitutes the purpose of the paper and governs
what we do with the sheet of paper (i.e., its use). In other words, the nature and efficiency of the
storage medium is more often than not unrelated to the content or representation that is stored in
the medium.
In the same sense, the way in which we store bits (i.e., 0s and 1s) in a digital computer is
unrelated to the meaning of what we have stored. When computers first became available they
were exploited for their fast, repetitive computational capabilities and their enormous storage
capacity. Application software development progressed rapidly in a data-centric environment.
Content was stored as data that were fed into algorithms to produce solutions to predefined
problems in a static problem solving context. It is surprising that such a simplistic and
artificially contrived problem solving environment was found to be acceptable for several
decades of intensive computer technology development.
When we established the Collaborative Agent Design Research Center at Cal Poly in 1986, we
had a vision. We envisioned that users should be able to sit down at a computer terminal and
solve problems collaboratively with the computer. The computer should be able to continuously
assist and advise the user during the decision-making process. Moreover, we postulated that one
should be able to develop software modules that could spontaneously react in near real-time to
changing events in the problem situation, analyze the impact of the events, propose alternative
courses of action, and evaluate the merits of such proposals. What we soon discovered, as we
naively set out to develop an intelligent decision-support system, is that we could not make much
headway with data in a dynamically changing problem environment.
Initially focusing on engineering design, we had no difficulties at all developing a software
module that could calculate the daylight available inside a room, as long as we specified to the
computer the precise location and dimensions of the window, the geometry of the room, and
made some assumptions about external conditions. However, it did not seem possible for the
computer to determine on its own that there was a need for a window and where that window
might be best located. The ability of the computer to make these determinations was paramount
to us. We wanted the computer to be a useful assistant that we could collaborate with as we
explored alternative design solutions. In short, we wanted the computer to function intelligently
in a dynamic environment, continuously looking for opportunities to assist, suggest, evaluate,
and, in particular, alert us whenever we pursued solution alternatives that were essentially not
practical or even feasible.
We soon realized that to function in this role our software modules had to be able to reason.
However, to be able to reason the computer needs to have something akin to understanding of
the context within which it is supposed to reason. The human cognitive system builds context
from knowledge and experience using information (i.e., data with attributes and relationships) as
its basic building block. Interestingly enough the storage medium of the information, knowledge
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and context held by the human brain is billions of neurons and trillions of connections (i.e.,
synapses) among these neurons that are as unrelated to each other as a pencilled note and the
sheet of paper on which it is stored.
What gives meaning to the written note is its representation within the framework of a language
(e.g., English) that can be understood by the reader. Similarly, in a computer we can establish
the notion of meaning if the stored data are represented in an ontological framework of objects,
their characteristics, and their interrelationships. How these objects, characteristics and
relationships are actually stored at the lowest level of bits (i.e., 0s and 1s) in the computer is
immaterial to the ability of the computer to undertake reasoning tasks. The conversion of these
bits into data and the transformation of data into information, knowledge and context takes place
at higher levels, and is ultimately made possible by the skillful construction of a network of
richly described objects and their relationships that represent those physical and conceptual
aspects of the real world that the computer is required to reason about.
This is what is meant by an information-centric computer-based decision-support environment.
One can further argue that to refer to the ability of computers to understand and reason about
information is no more or less of a trick of our imagination than to refer to the ability of human
beings to understand and reason about information. In other words, the countless minuscule
charges that are stored in the neurons of the human nervous system are no closer to the
representation of information than the bits (i.e., 0s and 1s) that are stored in a digital computer.
However, whereas the human cognitive system automatically converts this collection of charges
into information and knowledge, in the computer we have to construct the framework and
mechanism for this conversion Such a framework of objects, attributes and relationships
provides a system of integrated software applications with a common language that allows
software modules (now popularly referred to as agents) to reason about events, monitor changes
in the problem situation, and collaborate with each other as they actively assist the user(s) during
the decision-making process. One can say that this ontological framework is a virtual
representation of the real world problem domain, and that the agents are dynamic tools capable
of pursuing objectives, extracting and applying knowledge, communicating, and collaboratively
assisting the user(s) in the solution of current and future real world problems.

Definitions: Data, Information, and Knowledge
It is often lamented that we human beings are suffering from an information overload. This is a
myth, as shown in Fig.1 there is no information overload. Instead we are suffering from a data
overload. The confusion between data and information is not readily apparent and requires
further explanation. Unorganized data are voluminous but of very little value. Over the past 15
years, industry and commerce have made significant efforts to rearrange this unorganized data
into purposeful data, utilizing various kinds of database management systems. However, even in
this organized form, we are still dealing with data and not information.
Data are defined as numbers and words without relationships. In reference to Fig.2, the words
—town“, —dog“, —Tuesday“, —rain“, —inches“, and —min“, have little if any meaning without
relationships. However, linked together in the sentence: "On Tuesday, 8 inches of rain fell in 10
min."; they become information. If we then add the context of a particular geographical region,
pertinent historical climatic records, and some specific hydrological information relating to soil
conditions and behavior, we could perhaps infer that: "Rainfall of such magnitude is likely to
cause flooding and landslides." This becomes knowledge.
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Fig.4: Limited data-processing assistance

Context is normally associated solely with human cognitive capabilities. Prior to the advent of
computers, it was entirely up to the human agent to convert data into information and to infer
knowledge through the addition of context. However, the human cognitive system performs this
function subconsciously (i.e., automatically); therefore, prior to the advent of computers, the
difference between data and information was an academic question that had little practical
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significance in the real world of day-to-day activities. As shown in Fig.3, the intersection of the
data, human agent and context realms provides a segment of immediately relevant knowledge.

The Data-Centric Evolution of Computer Software
When computers entered on the scene, they were first used exclusively for processing data. In
fact, even in the 1980s computer centers were commonly referred to as data-processing centers.
It can be seen in Fig.4 that the context realm remained outside the computer realm. Therefore,
the availability of computers did not change the need for the human agent to interpret data into
information and infer knowledge through the application of context. The relegation of
computers to data-processing tasks is the underlying reason why even today, as we enter the 21st
Century, computers are still utilized in only a very limited decision-support role. As shown in
Fig.5, in this limited computer-assistance environment human decision makers typically
collaborate with each other utilizing all available communication modes (e.g., telephone, FAX,
e-mail, letters, face-to-face meetings). Virtually every human agent utilizes a personal computer
to assist in various computational tasks. While these computers have some data sharing
capabilities in a networked environment, they cannot directly collaborate with each other to
assist the human decision makers in the performance of decision-making tasks. Each computer
is typically limited to providing relatively low-level data-processing assistance to its owner. The
interpretation of data, the inferencing of knowledge, and the collaborative teamwork that is
required in complex decision-making situations remains the exclusive province of the human
agents. In other words, without access to information and at least some limited context, the
computer cannot participate in a distributed collaborative problem-solving arena.
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In this regard, it is of interest to briefly trace the historical influence of evolving computer
capabilities on business processes and organizational structures. When the computer first
became more widely available as an affordable computational device in the late 1960s, it was
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applied immediately to specialized numerical calculation tasks such as interest rate tables and
depreciation tables (Fig.6). During the early 1970s, these computational tasks broadened to
encompass bookkeeping, record storage, and report generation. Tedious business management
functions were taken over by computer-based accounting and payroll applications. By the late
1970s, the focus turned to improving productivity using the computer as an improved automation
tool to increase and monitor operational efficiency.
In the early 1980s (Fig.7), the business world had gained sufficient confidence in the reliability,
persistence, and continued development of computer technology to consider computers to be a
permanent and powerful data-processing tool. Accordingly, businesses were willing to
reorganize their work flow as a consequence of the functional integration of the computer. More
comprehensive office management applications led to the restructuring of the work flow.
By the late 1980s, this had led to a wholesale re-engineering of the organizational structure of
many businesses with the objective of simplifying, streamlining, and downsizing. It became
clear that many functional positions and some entire departments could be eliminated and
replaced by integrated office automation systems. During the early 1990s, the problems
associated with massive unorganized data storage became apparent, and with the availability of
much improved database management systems, data were organized into mostly relational
databases. This marked the beginning of ordered-data archiving and held out the promise of
access to any past or current data and reporting capabilities in whatever form management
desired.
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Fig.8: Evolution of business intelligence (C)

However, by the mid 1990s (Fig.8), the quickening pace of business in the light of greater
competition increased the need for a higher level of data analysis, faster response, and more
accurate pattern detection capabilities. During this period, the concepts of data-warehouses,
data-marts, and On-Line Analytical Processing (OLAP) tools were conceived and rapidly
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implemented (Humphries et al. 1999). Since then, the term ‘business intelligence’ has been
freely used to describe a need for the continuous monitoring of business trends, market share,
and customer preferences.
In the late 1990s, the survival pressure on business increased with the need for real-time
responsiveness in an Internet-based global e-commerce environment. By the end of the 20th
Century, business began to seriously suffer from the limitations of a data-processing
environment. The e-commerce environment presented attractive opportunities for collecting
customer profiles for the implementation of on-line marketing strategies with enormous revenue
potential. However, the expectations for automatically extracting useful information from lowlevel data could not be satisfied by the methods available. These methods ranged from relatively
simple keyword and thematic indexing procedures to more complex language-processing tools
utilizing statistical and heuristic approaches (Denis 2000, Verity 1997).
The major obstacle confronted by all of these information-extraction approaches is the
unavailability of adequate context (Pedersen and Bruce 1998). As shown previously in Fig.4, a
computer-based data-processing environment does not allow for the representation of context.
Therefore, in such an environment, it is left largely to the human user to interpret the data
elements that are processed by the computer.
Methods for representing information and knowledge in a computer have been a subject of
research for the past 40 years, particularly in the field of ‘artificial intelligence’ (Ginsberg 1993).
However, these studies were mostly focussed on narrow application domains and did not
generate wide-spread interest even in computer science circles. For example even today, at the
beginning of the 21st Century, it is difficult to find an undergraduate computer science degree
program in the US that offers a core curriculum class dealing predominantly with the
representation of information in a computer.

The Representation of ‘Context’ in a Computer
Conceptually, to represent information in a computer, it is necessary to move the context circle
in Fig.4 upward into the realm of the computer (Fig.9). This allows data to enter the computer in
a contextual framework, as information. The intersection of the data, context, and human agent
circles provide areas in which information and knowledge are held in the computer. The
prevailing approach for the practical implementation of the conceptual diagram shown in Fig.9 is
briefly outlined below. As discussed earlier (Fig.2), the principal elements of information are
data and relationships. We know how data can be represented in the computer but how can the
relationships be represented? The most useful approach available today is to define an ontology
of the particular application domain in the form of an object model. This requires the
identification of the objects (i.e., elements) that play a role in the domain and the relationships
among these objects (Fig.10). Each object, whether physical (e.g., car, person, building, etc.) or
conceptual (e.g., event, privacy, security, etc.) is first described in terms of its behavioral
characteristics. For example, a car is a kind of land conveyance. As a child object of the land
conveyance object, it automatically inherits all of the characteristics of the former and adds some
more specialized characteristics of its own (Fig.11). Similarly, a land conveyance is a kind of
conveyance and therefore inherits all of the characteristics of the latter. This powerful notion of
inheritance is well supported by object-oriented computer languages such as C++ (Stroustrup
1987) and Java (Horstmann and Cornell 1999) that support the mainstream of applications
software development today.
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Fig.10: Branch of a typical object model

However, even more important than the characteristics of objects and the notion of inheritance
are the relationships that exist between objects. As shown in Fig.12, a car incorporates many
components that are in themselves objects. For example, cars typically have engines, steering
systems, electric power units, and brake systems. They utilize fuel and often have an airconditioning system.
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For several reasons, it is advantageous to treat these components as objects in their own right
rather than as attributes of the car object. First, they may warrant further subdivision into parent
and child objects. For example, there are several kinds of air-conditioning systems, just as there
are several kinds of cars. Second, an air-conditioning system may have associations of its own to
other component systems such as a temperature control unit, a refrigeration unit, an air
distribution system, and so on. Third, by treating these components as separate objects we are
able to describe them in much greater detail than if they were simply attributes of another object.
Finally, any changes in these objects are automatically reflected in any other objects that are
associated with them. For example, during its lifetime, a car may have its air-conditioning
system replaced with another kind of air handling unit. Instead of having to change the attributes
of the car, we simply delete the association to the old unit and add an association to the new unit.
This procedure is particularly convenient when we are dealing with the association of one object
to many objects, such as the wholesale replacement of a cassette tape player with a new compact
disk player model in many cars, and so on.
The way in which the construction of such an ontology leads to the representation of information
(rather than data) in a digital computer is described in Fig.13, as follows. By international
agreement, the American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII) provides a simple
binary (i.e., digital) code for representing numbers, alphabetic characters, and many other
symbols (e.g., +, -, =, ( ), etc.) as a set of 0 and 1 digits. This allows us to represent sets of
characters such as the sentence "Police car crossing bridge at Grand Junction." in the
computer. However, in the absence of an ontology, the computer stores this set of characters as a
meaningless text string (i.e., data). In other words, in the data-centric realm the computer has no
understanding at all of the meaning of this sentence. As discussed previously, this is
unfortunately the state of e-mail today. While e-mail has become a very convenient,
inexpensive, and valuable form of global communication, it depends entirely on the human
interpretation of each e-mail message by both the sender and the receiver.
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Now, if the "Police car crossing bridge at Grand Junction." message had been sent to us as a
set of related objects, as shown at the bottom of Fig.13, then it should be a relatively simple
matter to program computer-based agents to reason about the content of this message and
perform actions on the basis of even this limited level of understanding. How was this
understanding achieved? In reference to Fig.13, the police car is interpreted by the computer as
an instance of a car object which is associated with a civilian organization object of kind police.
The car object automatically inherits all of the attributes of its parent object, land conveyance,
which in turn inherits all of the attributes of its own parent object, conveyance. The car object is
also associated with an instance of the infrastructure object, bridge, which in turn is associated
with a place object, Grand Junction, giving it a geographical location. Even though this
interpretational structure may appear primitive to us human beings, it is adequate to serve as the
basis of useful reasoning and task performance by computer-based agents.

The Popular Notion of ”Intelligent Agents‘
Agents that are capable of reasoning about events, in the kind of ontological framework of
information described above, are little more than software modules that can process objects,
recognize their behavioral characteristics (i.e., attributes of the type shown for the objects in
Fig.11), and trace their relationships to other objects. It follows, that perhaps the most elementary
definition of agents is simply: —Software code that is capable of communicating with other
entities to facilitate some action“. Of course this communication and action capability alone does
not warrant the label of intelligent.
The use of the word intelligent is more confusing than useful. As human beings we tend to judge
most everything in the world around us in our image. And, in particular, we are rather sensitive
about the prospect of ascribing intelligence to anything that is not related to the human species,
let alone an electronic machine. Looking beyond this rather emotional viewpoint, one could
argue that there are levels of intelligence. At the most elementary level, intelligence is the ability
to remember. A much higher level of intelligence is creativity (i.e., the ability to create new
knowledge). In between these two extremes are multiple levels of increasingly intelligent
capabilities. Certainly computers can remember, because they can store an almost unlimited
volume of data and can be programmed to retrieve any part of that data. Whether, computers can
interpret what they remember depends on how the data are represented (i.e., structured) in the
software.
In this regard, the notion of intelligent agents refers to the existence of a common language (i.e.,
the ontological framework of information described earlier) and the ability to reason about the
object characteristics and relationships embodied in the informational structure. Increasing levels
of intelligent behavior can be achieved by software agents if they have access to existing
knowledge, are able to act on their own initiative, collaborate with other agents to accomplish
goals, and use local information to manage local resources.
Such agents may be programmed in many ways to serve different purposes (Fig.14). Mentor
agents may be designed to serve as guardian angels to look after the welfare and represent the
interests of particular objects in the underlying ontology. For example, a mentor agent may
simply monitor the fuel consumption of a car or perform more complex tasks such as helping a
tourist driver to find a particular hotel in an unfamiliar city, or alert a platoon of soldiers to a
hostile intrusion within a specified radius of their current position in the battlefield (Pohl et al.
1999). Service agents may perform expert advisory tasks on the request of human users or other
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agents. For example, a computer-based daylighting consultant can assist an architect during the
design of a building (Pohl et al. 1989) or a Trim and Stability agent may continuously monitor
the trim of a cargo ship while the human cargo specialist develops the load plan of the ship (Pohl
et al. 1997). At the same time, Planning agents can utilize the results of tasks performed by
Service and Mentor agents to devise alternative courses of action or project the likely outcome of
particular strategies. Facilitator agents can monitor the information exchanged among agents
and detect apparent conflicts (Pohl 1996). Once such a Facilitator agent has detected a potential
non-convergence condition involving two or more agents, it can apply one of several relatively
straightforward procedures for promoting consensus, or it may simply notify the user of the
conflict situation and explain the nature of the disagreement.

An Information-Centric Transition Architecture
An information-centric decision-support system typically consists of components (or modules)
that exist as clients to an integrated collection of services. Incorporating such services, the
information-serving collaboration facility (Fig.15) communicates to its clients in terms of the
real world objects and relationships that are represented in the information structure (i.e., the
underlying ontology). The software code of each client includes a version of the ontology,
serving as the common language that allows clients to communicate information rather than
data.

Fig.15: Information-centric interoperability.

Fig.16: Transitioning to an information-centric
architecture.

To reduce the amount of work (i.e., computation) that the computer has to accomplish and to
minimize the volume of information that has to be transmitted within the system, two strategies
can be readily implemented. First, each client can register a standing request with the
collaboration facility for the kind of information that it would like to receive. This is referred to
as a subscription profile, and the client has the ability to change this profile dynamically during
execution if it sees cause to ask for additional or different information. For example, after
receiving certain information through its existing subscription profile, a Mentor agent
representing a squad of Marines may decide to request information relating to engagement
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events in a different sector of the battlefield, henceforth. By allowing information to be
automatically pushed to clients, the subscription service obviates the need for database queries
and thereby greatly reduces the amount of work the computer has to perform. Of course, a
separate query service is also usually provided so that a client can make one-time requests for
information that is not required on a continuous basis.
The second strategy relates directly to the volume of information that is required to be
transmitted within the system. Since the software code of each client includes a version of the
ontology (i.e., common language) only the changes in information need to be communicated. For
example, a Mentor agent that is watching over a squad of Marines may have more than 100
objects included in its subscription profile. One set of these objects represents an enemy unit and
its warfighting capabilities. If this unit changes its position then in reality only one attribute (i.e.,
the location attribute) of one object may have changed. Only the changed value of this single
object needs to be transmitted to the Mentor agent, since as a client to the collaboration facility it
already has all of the information that has not changed.
How does this interoperability between the collaboration facility and its clients translate into a
similar interoperability among multiple software applications (i.e., separate programs dealing
with functional sequences in related domains)? For example, more specifically, how can we
achieve interoperability between a tactical command and control system such as IMMACCS
(Pohl et al. 1999) and a logistical command and control system such as SEAWAY (Wood et al.
2000)?
Since both of these software systems are implemented in an information-centric architecture, the
underlying information representation can be structured in levels (Fig.16). At the highest level
we define notions, concepts and object types in general terms. This overarching common core
ontology sits on top of any number of lower level application specific ontologies that address the
specific bias and level of granularity of the particular application domain. For example, in the
core ontology an ‘aircraft’ may be defined in terms of its physical nature and those capabilities
that are essentially independent of its role in a particular application domain. In the tactical
domain this general description (i.e., representation) of an ‘aircraft’ is further refined and biased
toward a warfighting role. In other words, the IMMACCS application sees an aircraft as an
airborne weapon with certain strike capabilities. SEAWAY, on the other hand, sees an aircraft as
an airborne mobile warehouse capable of transporting supplies from one point to another.
The interoperability capabilities of an information-centric software environment will also allow
agents in one application to notify agents in other applications of events occurring in multiple
domains. For example, the Engagement Agent in the tactical IMMACCS application is able to
advise appropriate agents in the logistical SEAWAY application whenever a Supply Point ashore
is threatened by enemy activity. This may result in the timely rescheduling or redirection of a
planned re-supply mission. The agents are able to communicate across multiple applications at
the information level through the common language of the ontological framework. Similarly, the
SEAWAY application is able to rely on the ICODES (Pohl et al. 1997) ship load planning
application to maintain in-transit cargo visibility, down to the location of a specific supply item
in a particular container on-board a ship en-route to the sea base.
One might argue that this is all very well for newly developed applications that are by design
implemented in an information-centric architecture, but what about the many existing datacentric applications that all perform strategic and indispensable functions? These existing legacy
applications constitute an enormous investment that cannot be discarded overnight, for several
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reasons. First, they perform critical functions. Second, it will take time to cater for these
functions in the new decision-support environment. Third, at least some of these functions will
be substantially modified or eliminated as the information-centric environment evolves.
As shown in Fig.16, data-centric applications can communicate with information-centric systems
through translators. The function of these translators is to map those portions of the low level
data representation of the external application that are important to the decision-making context,
to the ontology of the information-centric system. Conversely, the same translator must be
capable of extracting necessary data items from the information context and feed these back to
the data-centric application. Typically, as in the case of IMMACCS (Pohl et al. 1999), this
translation capability is implemented as a universal translator that can be customized to a
particular external application. The translator itself, exists as a client to the information-serving
collaboration facility (Fig.15) of the information-centric system and therefore includes in its
software code a version of the ontology that describes the common language of that system.

Conclusion
While the capabilities of present day computer-based agent systems are certainly a major
advancement over data-processing systems, we are only at the threshold of a paradigm shift of
major proportions. Over the next several decades, the context circle shown in Fig.17 will
progressively move upward into the computer domain, increasing the sector of "relevant
immediate knowledge" shared at the intersection of the human, computer, data, and context
domains. Returning to the historical evolution of business intelligence described previously in
reference to Figs. 6, 7 and 8, the focus in the early 2000s will be on information management as
opposed to data-processing (Fig.18). Increasingly, businesses will insist on capturing data as
information through the development of business enterprise ontologies and leverage scarce
human resources with multi-agent software capable of performing useful analysis and patterndetection tasks.
An increasing number of commercial companies are starting to take advantage of the higher level
collaborative assistance capabilities of computers to improve their competitive edge and
overcome potential customer service difficulties. A good example is the timely detection of the
fraudulent use of telephone credit card numbers. Telephone companies deal with several million
calls each day, far too many for monitoring by human detectives. Instead, they have
implemented intelligent computer software modules that monitor certain information relating to
telephone calls and relate that information to the historical records of individual telephone users.
The key to this capability is that telephone call data such as time-of-day, length of call, origin of
call, and destination are stored in the computer as an information structure containing data
objects, relationships, and some attributes for each data object. For example, the data
”Columbia‘ may have the attributes international, South America, uncommon telephone call
destination, attached to it. In addition, relationships are established dynamically between
”Columbia‘ the telephone number of the caller, the telephone number being called, the time-ofday of the call, and so on. The result is a network of objects with attributes and relationships that
is very different from the data stored in a typical commercial data-mart. This network constitutes
information (rather than data) and allows hundreds of software agents to monitor telephone
connections and detect apparent anomalies. What is particularly attractive about this fairly
straightforward application of information-centric technology, is that the software agents do not
have to listen in on the actual telephone conversations to detect possibly fraudulent activities.
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However, from the telephone company‘s point of view this use of expert agents saves millions of
dollars each year in lost revenues.
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Fig.17: Evolving human-computer partnership

Fig.18: Evolution of business intelligence (D)

Toward the mid 2000s, we can expect some success in the linking of such ontologies to provide a
virtually boundless knowledge harvesting environment for mobile agents with many kinds of
capabilities. Eventually, it may be possible to achieve virtual equality between the information
representation capabilities of the computer and the human user. This virtual equality is likely to
be achieved not by the emulation of human cognitive capabilities, but rather, through the skillful
combination of the greatly inferior artificial cognitive capabilities of the computer with its vastly
superior computational, pattern-matching and storage facilities.
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INTRODUCTION
It has been stated, possibly by Napoleon, that an army marches on its
belly. Of course, it was understood by everybody that "belly"
signified all that an army needs for a campaign or a mission. And this
is perhaps how the concept of Logistics has entered the military
conciousness. But once entrenched in the military, this concept has
penetrated into the civilian world. This has not necessarily been
beneficial to the understanding of what Logistics is, or should be.
Vulgarization of a concept leads to it becoming a buzz word, and in
many instances with little understanding of the complexities
pertaining to that concept. I believe that this is the case for Logistics.
In this talk I wish to to present an analysis of Logistics that will
emphasize the overarching role that Logistics plays in military affairs.
I want to preface my presentation with an apology to those members
of this audience who are logisticians by profession (or have dealt with
logistics throughout their respective careers). I nevertheless hope
that even these persons will find some fresh insights in my discussion
of what Logistics is all about ( my first topic). My next topic is a
discussion of Decision Support Systems , which includes a description
of their role and actual implementation, in particular the modern
approach to their construction. I continue with a vision of Logistics
for the 21st century. Among other items, this section describes the
various projects that the ONR Logistics Program is actively
supporting at present and some planned projects as well. I conclude
with a general summary.
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Keynote Address
Rear Admiral Jay M. Cohen
Chief of Naval Research
United States Navy

(Editor s Apology: Unfortunately due to equipment failure RAdm Cohen s address could not be
recorded during the Workshop. With his kind permission we have included in these proceedings
a copy of his address to the House Armed Services Committee of the US Congress, delivered on
the 26th of June, 2001.)
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for this
opportunity to discuss the Department of the Navy s Science and Technology Program.

When Admiral Clark assumed the watch from Admiral Jay Johnson last summer, he said that our
people were our first priority.˚ His Marine Corps counterpart, General Jones, is equally
committed to doing everything we can for his few and proud Marines.
One of the most important ways we can keep our people and recruit more like them is to give
them the best working conditions possible.˚ While the bedrock of our Navy and Marine Corps is
good leadership, technology is the foundation that rests on that bedrock.˚ Admiral Clark has
directed me, as Chief of Naval Research, to make science and technology work for our people in
the Fleet.˚ And since I also wear the hat of Assistant Deputy Commandant (Science and
Technology) for the Marine Corps, I answer to the same marching orders from General
Jones make science and technology work for the Marine.˚ So I will couch quite a bit of my
testimony today in terms of what we re doing to deliver capabilities for Sailors and Marines.˚ I
think we have a great record, a sound process, and a terrific future.
As Chief of Naval Research, I want to protect our warfighters from technological surprises,
while giving them the tools to inflict surprises on our adversaries.˚ The business of surprise is
especially important today.˚ The threats we face are too variable to yield to the clear responses
available during the Cold War.˚ I would like to draw out one fundamental lesson from the Cold
War and other more recent situations as uncertainty increases, options increase in value.˚ My
priorities electric warship, missile defense/space, human factors, environment, and
efficiency will offer out of the box capability options; it s my job to give the Secretary, and
the CNO, the Commandant, technology options they can exercise at need.
Our science and technology strategy balances long-term interests with short-term needs. The
health of our science and technology base our ability to discharge our national naval
responsibilities, to remain a smart buyer of science and technology, and to get capabilities into
the hands of the operating forces ultimately depends upon a balanced portfolio from basic
research through advanced technology development and manufacturing technology.
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I especially look forward to incorporating Secretary Gordon England s industry perspective on
maximizing the Department of the Navy s precious technology investments.˚
For the next Navy and Marine Corps, we are concentrating our science and technology
investment into focused programs designed to provide a critical mass of support that will yield
Future Naval Capabilities (FNCs).˚ I recently restructured the program to combine overlapping
efforts, and I added two programs Electric Warship and Combat Vehicles Technology (which
will focus on bringing the advantages of electrical technologies to the naval warfighters), and
Littoral Combat and Force Projection (which includes both combat and expeditionary logistics
capabilities), which will focus on Marine Corps requirements in projecting power from the beach
in-land.˚ The other ten FNCs (in no priority order) are:
Autonomous Operations will focus on dramatically increasing the performance and
affordability of Naval organic unmanned vehicle systems;
Capable Manpower will focus on selection and training to provide fully prepared Sailors
and Marines through human-centered hardware and systems;
Knowledge Superiority and Assurance will focus on issues of connectivity and knowledge
superiority for distributed Naval forces to ensure common situation understanding, increased
speed of command, interoperability, and dynamic distributed mission planning and execution
across all echelons;
Littoral Antisubmarine Warfare will provide effective capability to detect, track, classify
and neutralize anti-access threats imposed by enemy submarines, in support of power projection
ashore;
Missile Defense will focus S&T necessary to detect, control, & engage projected theater
ballistic & cruise missiles as well as enemy aircraft threats;
Organic Mine Countermeasures will focus on an organic MCM capability to shorten the
MCM tactical timeline and eliminate the need for manned operations in a minefield;
Platform Protection strives to win or avoid engagements with evolving threats either instride or while engaged in projecting power from the sea;
Time Critical Strike will focus S&T that provides a substantial reduction in the engagement
timeline against time critical mobile targets, theatre ballistic missiles, weapons of mass
destruction, C4I centers and armored vehicles;
Total Ownership Cost Reduction seeks to significantly decrease costs associated with
acquisition, operation and support and to develop methods to accurately predict costs and assess
return on investment; and,
Warfighter Protection will focus on protecting Warfighters to reduce casualties in the
emerging Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare battlespace.
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I have directed my people to get close to the Fleet and the Force, to be alert to their needs and
swift to respond to them.˚ We are working to enhance their quality of service.˚ As we connect
better with our customers the operating Fleet and Force we are undertaking some novel
initiatives to reduce the cycle time of our technologies.˚ I have established a program I call
Swamp Works .˚ This takes high-risk, high-payoff technologies, puts the right stakeholders
together, and gets a product into the hands of the operators who need it.˚ Swamp Works efforts
are intended to be technically risky I anticipate a 90% failure rate because leap-ahead work is
always technically risky.˚
Force protection crosses all technologies.˚ New materials for hull protection, advanced sensors,
next generation decision support systems, autonomous platforms, and, ultimately, directed
energy weapons all of these are technological responses to the asymmetric threats our forces
encounter as they remain forward deployed.
Another priority I mentioned is human factors and quality of service.˚ Our young people will join
and stay with us if we give them meaningful and challenging missions, and if we give them the
means to accomplish those missions.˚ The biggest morale-killers on a ship can be those
repetitious, labor-intensive, dirty maintenance jobs that have to be done.˚ Naval science and
technology offers solutions: coatings that don t have to be scraped and chipped; fault diagnostics
that tell you when a bearing is about to fail; condition-based maintenance that saves time and
resources.˚ And the smart people we have in the Fleet today deserve to work with systems that
are engineered with the human being in mind.˚ Human-centric systems, because the system is
made for the Sailor and Marines not vice-versa.˚ These include embedded training that helps
Sailors and Marines work smarter, stay proficient, and learn new skills.˚ There is also no greater
satisfaction in Sailors and Marines working lives than accomplishing their mission and getting
home to their loved ones.
Additionally, we are working to field hearing protection systems and vaccines to keep our
Sailors and Marines healthy.˚ We are working on more effective firefighting tools and
techniques.˚ We continue to work on environmentally friendly technologies such as the active
noise cancellation program that may help our fighter jets to coexist with the ever-increasing
civilian population around our bases.
Our laboratories are vital for our Nation s development of future, essential warfighting
capabilities.˚ The labs perform a variety of related functions associated with the development of
new war-fighting systems and the insertion of new technology into legacy systems.˚ The Navy is
working with Department of Defense in developing a process to implement the authority for
direct hiring that Congress provided for the labs.˚ I support this authority and believe it will
improve the workforce and the efficiency of our laboratories.˚ I will be happy to report back to
you our progress in this matter.˚ I hope you will visit our world class corporate laboratory, the
Naval Research Laboratory, here in Washington, DC.
With the assistance and support of the Vice Chief of Naval Research, Brigadier General William
Catto, who is with me here today, I focus on the Navy and Marine Corps of today, tomorrow and
after-next (the one that will fight and win battles in 2020 and beyond).˚ I have given examples
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above of initiatives in progress for today and tomorrow.˚ The Navy and Marine Corps after-next
will be based on discoveries just being made today.˚ To ensure we get the technology and
development concepts right, a robust cycle of innovation, validated by experimentation that leads
to transformation, must continue.˚ It is a process without end; new technologies evolve, new
ideas are born, new innovations must be experimented with, resulting in further transformation.˚
It is a process as old as the Navy and Marine Corps, and as relevant as the need for a strong
national defense today, tomorrow and always.˚
The United States has a Navy and Marine Corps second to none in the world, thanks to
America s investment in science and technology.˚ I have committed to a science and technology
program that ensures our technological superiority continues in this new century and a program
that has the Sailor and Marine at its center.
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Insights into Optimum TTPs/SOPs for Battalion, Regimental, and Brigade
Command and Control 1
Jim Murphy
Analyst
Dynamics Research Corporation

Themes
Military operations are examined from many perspectives, and few are as challenging to capture
adequately as decision-making. This effort may fall short as well, but it will not be for lack of
having a conceptual framework within which to present basic issue—the absence of detailed
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to support decision-making during the execution phase
of operations. To make the case for the publication of detailed, generic TTPs for command post
operations to be developed at the Service level, it is necessary to describe the decision-making
process the TTPs are intended to support. Important supporting themes along the way include:
Doctrine – to include tactics, techniques, and procedures
Command Posts and Operations Centers
Tactical Information
Commander-Staff Teamwork
Technical, Tactical, and Digital Proficiencies
Decision-making revolves around a flow of information that commences with a requirement to
conduct military operations. At the brigade, regimental, and battalion levels, the requirement
from higher headquarters (HHQ) to conduct operations initiates the . . .
1

Orders from HHQ that include the HHQ commander’s intent, concept of operations, and
the tasks assigned to the subordinate and supporting units, which generates . . .
2 The unit’s own restated mission, commander’s intent, concept of operations, tasks to
subordinate and supporting units, an operations order, and . . .
3 Once the unit begins to execute the order, a torrent of situational information.
Situational information now becomes the grist of decision-making related to the current
operations order and to the successive orders. The challenge, even in the brave new Network
Centric world, is how to get the right information to the decision-maker in sufficient time for him
or her to make effective decisions. This challenge is described in five sections: (1) the Doctrine
Gap, (2) the Current Situation, (3) Decision Models, (4) Tactical Information, and (5) A
Strawman TTP Development Process.

1 ~ The Doctrine & TTP Gap
In a sense, decision-making is relatively simpler at the team, squad, platoon, and company levels
that at echelons commanded by colonels and generals. The small unit leader is able to monitor
and assess the situation almost entirely through his own senses. He sees, hears, smells, feels, and
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even tastes the information upon which he will decide to press on with his current plan or modify
it. Even in sensory contact with his surroundings, uncertainty is frequently present, and the
decision is reached applying a “sixth” sense, intuition. Important to note, lacking a staff, the unit
leader builds his plan using the Troop Leading Procedures. In effect, he uses a doctrinal process
to develop his scheme of maneuver and fire support plan. During execution, he uses doctrinal
techniques, rehearsed many times, to take advantage of fleeting opportunities or to react to
problems, e.g., calls for fires, hand and arm signals to change formation, immediate action drills,
etc. Thus, he is equipped by doctrine to plan his five-paragraph order, and to lead the unit during
execution, making adjustments to his plan as necessary.
For lieutenant colonels and above, and their staffs, sensing the battle is more complex.2 Getting
an accurate picture of the battle now requires surrogates and abstractions to supplant the
“senses.” This is true whether the CP is equipped simply with acetate covered maps, FM tactical
radios, and 3M “stickies” or with the increasingly sophisticated C4ISR technologies. Now the
commanders have help. They have a staff and equipment whose propose is to provide the
relevant information necessary for decision-making, in effect, to be the surrogate for his own
senses. Like the small unit leaders, the lieutenant colonels and above develop their plans and
orders within a robust doctrinal framework. But unlike the small unit leaders, the lieutenant
colonels and above do not have a robust, integrated doctrinal framework within which they
acquire information and make decisions during the execution of their plans. More to the point,
their staff members do not have a framework—either conceptual or detailed—to focus their
collective efforts on providing timely relevant information to the decision-maker. They have
pieces of a framework, some at a Service doctrinal level, some at a schools level, and some at a
unit SOP level. But they have nothing that quite equates to small unit immediate action drills
where every man in the team knows his role and the roles of the rest of the men in the element.
In retrospect, the absence of integrated conceptual and detailed doctrine (to include TTP) on
decision-making during the execution phase is surprising, really. Both the Army and the Marine
Corps have gone to impressive lengths to analyze, understand, codify, promulgate, and train to
their doctrines for decision-making during the planning phase of an operation. But not decisionmaking during execution. For years, the efforts of commanders and staffs to become proficient
in decision-making during the execution phase have advanced largely on the strength of oral
tradition and tribal lore. With the exception of unit level standing operating procedures (SOP)
for command post operations (see discussion below), which have always been prepared by the
unit, individuals have had few other materials to study in preparation for command post
exercises (CPX) or field training exercises (FTX). Thus, when the unit finally begins the CPX,
or FTX, or even the command and control experiment, individual proficiencies pick up where
they left off at the end of the last exercise and collective proficiencies start at the level of the
least proficient individual—and the cycle of the old brave teaching the young brave commences
again.3 Not only is this inefficient, the ability to train to consistent standards is simply not
possible. The braves carry the tasks, the conditions, and the standards around in their heads.
They aren’t written down, not even on the teepee walls.
Not only is the absence of integrated, conceptual and detailed doctrine for decision-making
during the execution phase not good for training and readiness, it is not good for material
development either. Why? Because the user cannot clearly articulate his requirement, at least
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not on the basis of a documented process that the material is expected to support, speed up, or
possibly even supplant. The person representing the user community can only guess based on
his experience what functions the material should provide.4
Thus two good reasons can be identified to develop conceptual and detailed doctrine for
decision-making during the execution phase. First, the doctrine is necessary for unit readiness
and individual and collective proficiency. Second, it provides a doctrinal framework within
which to articulate material requirements for decision support systems.
As background, an interesting paradox is at work. Each system proposed is designed to facilitate
decision-making at a battlefield functional level. For example, the Advanced Field Artillery
Tactical Data System (AFATDS)—a system common to the Army and the Marine Corps—is
designed to facilitate supporting arms decision-making and fire support coordination. It is a
superb system, and is designed such that in the right circumstances, it could almost be set on
“automatic pilot.” It still has some developmental bugs to be worked out, particularly in the
effort to integrate it fully into the Army Battle Command System (ABCS), but as a stand-alone
system, it is very, very capable. The hardware system is also supported by an excellent system
users manual (SUMs). While most SUMs tend to be written at the operator level, the AFATDS
SUM is written so the roles of the section NCO and officers vis-à-vis the system are clear. But
appropriately, the SUM does not describe the integration of the system’s capabilities into the
overall sequence of actions in a maneuver unit or MAGTF command post. Another document is
necessary for this purpose.
The paradox then, is that even when the stand-alone system is well designed for the battlefield
functional area it supports, the documentation to fully integrate the system—from the operator,
the NCO, and the section officer level—into the command post process for decision-making
during current operations must be accomplished by someone other than the material developer.
Not all systems come from the developer with the roles of the NCOs and section officers as well
defined as the role of the operator. But each system is a MAJOR element within a command
post’s information flow, and the NCO and section officer are integral to that process. A related
reality is that the Service cannot build up from the inputs and outputs of the system to the
commander’s need for information. The Service must to build down from its conceptual
framework for decision-making to determine what the section officer, NCO, and operator in the
fire support coordination center (FSCC) must be doing to support that information flow, in
addition to attending to the purely stovepipe functions of the AFATDS system.

Models and TTPS
In effect, the Services must decide on the conceptual framework for current operations decisionmaking, then build the TTPs/SOPs to provide timely, relevant information to the commander
while concurrently continuing to enter information into the systems and appropriately acting
upon the information produced by the systems. More pointedly, what is needed is (1) a cognitive
model of decision-making at the colonel level that encompasses expectations, information flow,
assessment, and the actual decision, (2) a team process model describing the commander–staff
team interactions throughout the execution phase, (3) clear definition of the commander’s and
staff’s information requirements, and (4) detailed TTP describing the collective tasks within and
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among the staff sections, and the individual tasks of each person with a role in the information
flow.

2 ~ The Situation
Historically, command post SOPs have been the unit commander’s responsibility and
prerogative. The Services have developed basic doctrine for CPs—describing the organization,
manning, principal duties staff members, general operations of the CP (displacement, watch
standing, security, etc.), and material and equipment—but not unit level command post
procedures. Currently, the Army is preparing a draft field manual, FM 6-0.6, TTP for CP
Operations. The draft updates earlier references on CP matters and generally describes the
“theory and nature” of CPs, but it will not include procedural details for the planning,
preparation and execution cycle. The Marine Corps’ Doctrine Division currently has in the field
for review the Coordinating Draft of Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 6-2, MAGTF
Command and Control. The draft is similar to the Army publication, and includes chapters on
Information Management and Command and Control Warfare. The Doctrine Division also has
plans for a MCWP 6-21, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Command Echelons. The
current outline indicates that this document is also intended to be general in nature, and not
prescriptive with respect to internal techniques and procedures.5
At the organizational level, based on a small sample of SOPs from units in the 4th Infantry
Division, unit SOPS have not changed very much in twenty years. They tend to have one
chapter outlining basic procedures within the unit command post. Another chapter may describe
the unit’s adaptation of the Army’s military decision-making process (MDMP), but not the
complexities of decision-making during the execution phase of an operation. As seen in Table 1,

Brigade Combat Team
Chapter 1 - Force Protection
Chapter 2 - Command, Control And
Communications
Chapter 3 - Maneuver
Chapter 5 - Fire Support Coordination
Chapter 4- Intelligence And Electronic
Warfare
Chapter 6 Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability
Chapter 7 - Nbc Operations
Chapter 8 - Air Defense
Chapter 9 - Logistics
Chapter 10 - Personnel Service Support
Chapter 11 - Intelligence Reports
Chapter 12 - Operations Reports
Chapter 13 - Logistics Reports
Chapter 14 - Personnel Reports
Chapter 15 – Religious Support Operations
Chapter 16 – Medical Operations

Table 1

Battalion Task Force
Preface: Commander’s Combat
Rules
A: Command and Control
B: Maneuver
C: Intelligence and Security
D: Combat Service Support
E: Engineer Operations
F: Fire Support Operations
G: Air Defense Operations
H: NBC Operations
I: Checklists / Load Plans
J: Reports

DS Artillery Battalion
CONTENTS
CARD 100
Coordination
CARD 200
Operations
CARD 300
CARD 400
CARD 500
Operations
CARD 600
CARD 700
CARD 800
CARD 900
CARD 1000
CARD 1100
CARD 1200
CARD 1300
CARD 1400
CARD 1500

INDEX
Fire Support Planning and
Coordination of Tactical
Firing Battery
Survey
Combat Service Support
Communications
Digital Troubleshooting
NBC
Intelligence
Risk Management
Secondary Checks
FDC Checks
Firing Incident Checklists
Checklists
Report Formats

Chapter Headings from Unit Tactical SOPs

a list of chapter headings extracted from three unit tactical SOPs, the remaining chapters tend to
have checklists related to specific tactical operations that are common to two or more
subordinate or supporting units within the command.
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This is not to suggest that unit tactical SOPs are not important. SOPs of this nature are useful
and necessary documents, and reduce the amount of coordinating and special instructions that
have to be written into operations orders. The point is that unit SOPs are not the type of written
techniques and procedures envisioned in the Models and TTP paragraph above, but currently, at
least in the Army (and based on this very small sample), they are the state-of-the-art with respect
to decision-making within tactical command posts.6
One other special class of publications directly related to decision-making during operations is
important to the discussion. These are the reference publications published by commands
responsible for professional military education or other commands with a direct interest in
doctrine and training. The texts are similar to the unit SOPs in that they highlight key tactical
knowledge distilled from the Services’ field manuals and warfighting publications. They also
gather under one cover the Services’ weapons capabilities and equipment performance
information, in effect, the “know how” an officer and NCO needs in order to be, in the words of
the 2d Leadership Principle, “. . . technically and tactically proficient.”
In the interest of brevity, this group is listed in Table 2 along with the proponent and the URL
where the reader can locate them. The bottom three documents listed are evidence of the
transition in C2 support tools from maps and FM radios to the digital C2 systems now being
fielded and in various stages of experimentation and development.

Source

Title

URL, etc.

Battle Command Battle Lab -Leavenworth

Battle Command Handbook

Http://cacfs.army.mil
Handbook
Http://www-cgsc.army.mil
Organizations
Center for Army Tactics
ST 100-3 Online

Command and General Staff College

Student Text 100 -3, Battle Book

MAGTF Staff Training Program

Pamphlet 5-0.3, MAGTF Planner’s Reference Manual

Pamphlet 6-5, The Planner’s Guide to C2PC
TRADOC System Manager, FORCE XXI
Warrior – T

Table 2

Digital Operating Guide for Brigade and Batta lion
Staffs, ABCS, v 6.1
Army Battle Command System (ABCS) Version 6.2
Smart Book

Http://www.usmc.mil
Units
By location
Virginia – Marine Air Ground Task Force
Staff Training Program Center
Publications – Pamphlets
Not available via Http.
Http://www.atsc.army.mil
WarMod XXI
Warrior-T [Call “Contacts” fo r passwords]

Reference Publications Bearing on Decision-Making

In fact, none of these documents address decision-making during the execution phase of an
operation, either, but they are important sources of information for a battle staff.7,8 The
information needs to be accounted for in some way in the Optimum TTP.9
Finally, a word on the Services’ doctrinal publications bearing most directly on decision-making
during current operations. On the Army side, the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate at the
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College currently has in final draft FM 6-0, Command
and Control. As stated in the preface, the manual provides common, authoritative understanding
of the authority, fundamentals concepts, and application of command and control of Army
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operations. It describes the art of command and the science of control. It introduces Mission
Command as the preferred philosophy of command, defines control within command and
control, and describes decision-making during execution (emphasis added). The manual is
written both at a conceptual and detailed level, with the details still relatively conceptual in tone.
It is an excellent document. It promises to fill a long standing gap, and it would be a key
reference in developing the Optimum TTP.
The Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication series addresses decision-making entirely at a
conceptual level. MCDP 1, Warfighting sets the broad architecture; MCDP 6, Command and
Control, defines it further; and MCDP 1-3, Tactics refines elements in MCDP 6. The
Coordinating Draft of MCWP 6-2, MAGTF Command and Control, provides additional
organizational detail.
Thus far the discussion has attempted to make the case that TTP should flow from concepts,
preferably doctrinal concepts. The Army is on the verge of publishing relatively detailed
doctrine on decision-making during execution. The Marine Corps, as depicted on the Doctrine
Division’s doctrinal hierarchy diagrams, has no plans to provide Service level doctrine beyond
the conceptual documents already in the field. The tentative conclusion is that neither Service
will publish doctrinal publications in the near term that will provide sufficient detail to frame the
TTP.

3 ~ Decision Models
Earlier the discussion stated that what is needed is (1) a cognitive model of decision-making, (2)
a team process model, (3) clear definition of information requirements, and (4) detailed TTP
describing the collective tasks within and among the staff sections. In effect, while the objective
is to develop TTP, logic requires starting with the actual cognitive decision-making process.

A Cognitive Model
The decision-making process for planning and execution decisions is highly cognitive. The
process has been described extensively in the literature of psychology and increasingly in
military periodicals and papers written by officer students during their attendance in professional
military education. Indeed, the Marine Corps Gazette has featured articles by Dr. Gary Klein,
one of the foremost cognitive psychologists in the United States. Dr. Klein has written
extensively on the subject of “recognition-primed decisions” and the function of expertise and
intuition in decision-making. Prior to his research and espousal of recognition-primed decisions,
military officers were trained to believe that all decisions, to include decisions during execution,
had to be preceded by the development of two or more courses of action (COA) and a trade-off
analysis to identify the best alternative. Never mind the reality that commanders in time
constrained circumstances tended to size-up the situation and personally prescribe the single
COA they intended to execute. Clearly, Dr. Klein’s research, writings, and many presentations
broke the multiple COA logjam, and have significantly influenced every other military and
academic writer addressing the topic. That said, the recognition-primed decision (RPD) model is
not sufficient by itself to describe the full range of factors influencing a commander’s decision
during current operations.
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In 1998, an Army Research Laboratory effort attempted to expand on the RPD model to account
for other factors known to influence a commander’s decision. These factors are implicit or
referred to in the RPD descriptions but are not the point of emphasis.
The factors are
sufficiently important that they needed to be highlighted in a more comprehensive model of
military decision-making. The ARL project director believed that a cognitive model of a
military decision had to account more fully for three other factors:
1

2

3

That the decision-maker’s frame of reference for the decision was significantly
influenced by his military training, education, experience, together with the mental
images created by the HHQ order and the unit’s detailed plans bearing on the current
situation,
That the cognitive function of situation monitoring needed to be expanded. This
concerned specifically the periods when either the plan was fully on track or “nothing
was happening,” and then cues or triggers caused the decision-maker to begin to assess
the changing situation, and make a decision. And finally,
That many military decisions are made under conditions of uncertainty, not recognition,
and that cognitive decision strategies under these conditions needed to be explained in
more detail.

The team combined a detailed literature review with field observations at a series of Army
advanced warfighting experiments (AWE). The intention was to fit the models to the actual
decision-making processes observed in the field, not fit the observations to the models. Figure 3
lists the principal concepts, researchers, and articles representing the researchers’ views that
became the nucleus of the integrated cognitive model:

Researcher(s)

Article (See bibliography)

Emphasis in the Integrated Model

Beach

Image Theory: Personal and
Organizational Decisions

Rouse and Valusek

Evolutionary Design of Systems
to Support Decision Making
A Recognition-Primed Decision
(RPD) Model for Rapid
Decision Making
Coping with Uncertainty: A
Naturalistic Decision-making
Analysis

Klein

Lipshitz and Strauss

Table 3

The function of military training, education,
experience in decision-making, together with the
mental images created by the HHQ order and
the unit’s detailed plans bearing on the current
situation
Situation monitoring and the onset of situation
assessment
Recognition-primed decisions

Coping with uncertainty; cognitive strategies to
with which to make effective decisions under
conditions of uncertainty.

Cognitive Decision Models Bearing on Military Decision Making

The resulting model is portrayed in Figure 1, Integrated Cognitive Model of the Commander’s
Decision Process (Adelman, et al., 1998). 10

83

APPROVE PLAN

APPROVE PLAN

Adjust Plan

Adjust Plan

Adjust Plan

IMAGES
Values:
Doctrine of Operations and Tactics
Trajectory: Mission, Cdr‘s Intent, Essential Tasks
S
trategy: Concept of Operation / Synchronization
Strategy:
METACOGNITION

Adjust Plan

IMAGES
Doctrine of Operations and Tactics
Values:
Trajectory: Mission, Cdr’s Intent, Essential tasks
Strategy:
S
trategy: Concept of Operation / Synchronization

METACOGNITION

Abstract / Frame
Battlespace to Assess
Plan Relevance and
Define Critical Indicators
Adjust
Battlespace
Framework &
Monitoring
Criteria

Concept of Operations Still
Relevant and Operations On
Track Toward Desired Endstate

MONITOR PROGRESS
Cues & Expectancies
Critical Indicators
Assess/Forecast Delta’s

Abstract / Frame
Battlespace to Assess
Plan Relevance and
Define Critical Indicators

Images &
Monitoring

Identify Potential Decision Making Window:
-Outcome No Longer Clear
-Opportunity to Exploit Success
-Concept of Operation No Longer Relevant
Situation
Clear ?

Yes

No
Yes

Go To
RecognitionPrimed Decision
Process
(Next Page)

No

Status Quo
Attractive ?

Yes, Consider Possible
Adjustments to Current Plan

No, Need
Possible
Branch or
Sequel

Time
Available?

Situation
Clear ?

Go to
Generate
Options
(Previous
Page)

Identify Potential Decision Making Window:
-Outcome No Longer Clear
-Opportunity to Exploit Success
-Concept of Operation No Longer Relevant

Status Quo
Attractive ?

Go to
Manage
Situation
(Previous
Page)

No, Need
Possible
Branch or
Sequel
Time for
Deliberation
?
Yes, Have Time to More
Carefully Consider
2 or
Options
More
Number of
Yes, Consider
Plan Adjustment

No, Look for Quick
Pattern Match

GENERATE NEW OPTION

REDUCTION OF
UNCERTAINTY

Options?
COMPATIBILITY TEST
(SUITABILITY & FEASIBILITY)

Collect Additional Information
Refine Problem Framework
Rely on SOPs & Doctrine
ASSUMPTION -BASED
-BASED
REASONING

Lack of
Information

Construct “What If” Model to
Improve Understanding
Inadequate
Understanding

SUPPRESSION
Ignore Uncertainty
Rely on Intuition or Experience
Take Calculated Risks
PROACTIVE
RISK REDUCTION
Develop Single, Fast Options
to Bound Problem Space
Develop Contingency Plans

Mental Simulation
Images Provide Evaluation Criteria
Accept Option As
Change To Plan

Compare Against Current Plan
(Status Quo)
Images Provide Evaluation
Criteria
Conflicting
Information
or Choices
First Preference

RECOGNITION --PRIMED
PRIMED
DECISION PROCESS

No Mental Simulation
Feature Match Only
PROFITABILITY TEST
(ACCEPTABILITY &
FLEXIBILITY)

No, Time
Expired

Will It
Work ?

Second Preference

Yes, Accept Option
As Change To Plan

No, Time Still
Available

GENERATE
NEW
OPTION

COMPATIBILITY TEST
(SUITABILITY &
FEASIBILITY)

Only 1

RECOGNITION PRIMED DECISION
PROCESS

Mental Simulation & Story Telling
Images Provide Evaluation Criteria

Concept of Operations Still
Relevant and Operations On
Track Toward Desired Endstate

Yes

No

Time for
Deliberation
?
No, Consider
Adjustments Only

Yes, Consider a New
Course of Action

MANAGE
SITUATION
Assess Type
of Uncertainty

MONITOR PROGRESS
Define Cues / Expectancies
Monitor Critical Indicators
Assess / Forecast Delta’s

Will It
Work ?

MODIFY OPTION
No,
Continue
To Refine
Option

No, Generate
New Option

Mental Simulation & Story
Telling
Images Provide Evaluation
Criteria
PROFITABILITY TEST
(ACCEPTABILITY &
FLEXIBILITY)
Compare Against Current Plan
(Status Quo)
Images Provide Evaluation
Criteria

Images Provide
Evaluation Criteria
Will It
Work ?
No, Consider
Other Options

Yes, Accept Option as
Change to Plan

Coping with Uncertainty

Yes, Accept
Option As
Change To
Plan

Recognition--Primed Decision
Recognition

Figure 1, Integrated Cognitive Model of the Commander’s Decision Process
The purpose here is not to describe the development and logic flow of the model; rather it is to
provide an example of a cognitive model specifically developed to describe a military
commander’s decision-making process during the execution phase of an operation. As a
footnote to this model, the lead author for the Draft FM 6-0, Command and Control, said that the
model—the graphic and the detailed discussion—contributed significantly to the decision
process model described in that publication.

A Commander-Staff Team Process Model
The research effort that produced the cognitive model also produced the beginning of a
commander-staff team process model. This model has grown over the past three years from one
diagram and a list to four diagrams and a different list. It starts with a description of what the
commander and staff actually monitor (mostly).

Tactical Deltas
The ARL effort produced insights not only into the cognitive process, but also into the factors
that most frequently caused a ground maneuver commander to consider making a decision. As
this analyst examined decision after decision, the most common elements to all of them was that
the decision involved (1) a subordinate or supporting unit, or an enemy unit, or a piece of
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terrain—no surprise—and (2) a condition had changed with respect to the unit or terrain that was
not consistent with the plan as currently set. In effect, as the situation monitoring continued in
the command post, the commander or a staff member noticed that one or more units’ situations
had changed in a way that was not as projected in the plan, and the change had the potential to
create an opportunity or cause a serious problem.11 The differences between the plan and the
current situation were termed “tactical deltas.” Tactical deltas indicated an opportunity had
presented itself, or that a unit would not be able to accomplish an assigned task The implications
of the delta normally lead to a decision. The decision would always result in either changing one
or more units’ task(s) (and normally the purpose), or changing the direct support provided to one
or more units, or changing a graphical control measure to provide a spatial advantage to a key
unit. Small deltas between the plan and the situation that did not impair the mission normally did
not cause the commander to make a decision (although, a decision to make no change is still a
decision).
The changes in situations that would generate active assessment always reflected back on some
element of the unit’s mission. Situations varied in gravity from a unit not being able to
accomplish a minor task to situations so serious as to put the HHQ commander’s end state at
risk. So, very simply, the commander and staff monitored the situation focusing on the units and
the key terrain. They were alert specifically for changes in a unit’s situation that affected its
ability to accomplish assigned tasks. When they detected a delta, they assessed the situation in
the context its implications for their accomplishment of their mission, and in very serious cases,
its implications for their HHQ commander’s mission and intentions.12 Figure 2 is a graphic of
the major elements in the monitoring and assessment of tactical deltas.

Tactical Delta: the variance at this moment
between perceived ground truth and
the plan, and the implications
HHQ Commander’s Intent
Tasks Specified by HHQ Commander
of the variance for the
critical images

Critical Images

Situation at the Unit or Terrain Feature
Communications

Current
Location

Combat
Effectiveness
A Delta Involving a . . .

Current or
Imminent
Contact with
the Enemy

Unit
or
Key Terrain

Sustainment
Strength
Time

Movement
Unit’s Restated Mission
Unit Commander’s Intent
Concept of Operations
Task(s) and Purpose assigned to subordinate and supporting units

Figure 2

Tactical Deltas

Cognitively speaking, once a delta is detected, the commander or a staff member assesses it to
determine the implications with respect to the critical images. The commander can make a
decision entirely without input, and in time sensitive cases that was observed to happen. But it is
also true that give time for discussion, the commanders also sought input from their staffs.
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Picture “A Decision”
Once the commander staff interaction begins with respect to a given delta, a simple process
unfolds, although some of the deliberations can be very complex depending upon the situation.
Figure 3 is a diagram of the commander-staff process as the commander decides what to do
relative to a emerging tactical delta.
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A Single Decision During Current Operations

It is a rare operation when the unit accomplishes its mission and achieves the HHQ commander’s
end state with only a single decision having been made during the execution phase. A more
interesting picture emerges when a series of notional decisions are arrayed in terms of the
specifics of an operations order.

Picture the Decision in Terms of the Plan
Figure 4 represents graphically the decisions reached during the planning process. It shows the
conceptual and tasking components of the operation order (OPORD) that the unit is attempting to
execute. In the conceptual portion of the order, the commander has expressed his intent and his
concept of operations. In the tasking part, he assigns tasks (with purpose) to his subordinate and
supporting units. The battle staff must understand the purpose of each subordinate unit task as well
as the subordinate unit commanders understand them. In almost every situation, a tactical delta(s)
arises while a unit is attempting to accomplish an assigned task. Thus the assessment must clearly
include the implications of the situation with respect to the purpose for which the task was
assigned. If one purpose is in jeopardy, other elements of the plan are in jeopardy. In Figure 4, the
time is just prior to H-hour. The unit has completed its rehearsal and is poised to attack.
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Planning Decisions and the Operations Order

Now complete the graphic by crossing the line of departure, executing the assigned tasks, and
achieving the commander’s end state. Figure 5 is a notional view of a series of decisions made
during the execution phase. The small bars on the right side of the graphic represent decisions
arrived at through the commander-staff group process in Figure 3. Once the command crosses the
line of departure, the plan becomes fluid. The thinking adversary is also flexing his will.
Variances—tactical deltas—are beginning to be received in the command post.
During the execution phase, the battle staff monitors and assesses each variance, paying particular
attention to the implications of the information with respect to the overall plan. The information is
assessed for the degree to which it has the potential to affect, or is already affecting the concept of
operations. Exactly what action(s), if any, are decided is a function of the situation and the
expertise of the officers participating in the assessment. Their role is to understand whether the
implications of the information are positive, neutral, or adverse to friendly actions currently
underway, or planned, and to know what options to outline and recommend to the commander.
Through discussion with the staff, the commander reaches a decision. Once the decision is made,
and the fragmentary order is issued, the situation monitoring continues.
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Figure 5 Decisions Made During Current Operations
The initial series of tactical tasks in an operations order are normally reasonably well synchronized.
Once the operation starts, the tactical information flowing into the command post can cover each
battlefield functional area and every facet of the commander’s OPORD—and therefore, each piece
of tactical information that passes the data filters bears on the overall synchronization. The
commander and staff attempt to understand what each piece of information means in terms of the
synchronization. They will determine what must be done with respect to the particular
information, how that action affects the overall synchronization, and what must be done to
maintain the synchronization that still applies. As the operation continues, the well-choreographed
synchronization begins to be overcome by cascading events, and the staff continues to synchronize
the following actions literally “on the fly.”
The hard part is timing the movement and relocation of committed assets—the reserve, artillery
batteries, ADA units, engineer platoons, forward support units, tactical bridging, etc.—to ensure
they are in position to continue to support the main and supporting efforts, as necessary. This
timing frequently needs to be worked out with all interested parties listening to the discussion.
Teamwork and “know how” are critical. Circumstances will determine whether the discussion
should take place at the situation map (digital or analog), or off-line.
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In effect, the current pieces of tactical information are being assessed for implications of the
actions associated with that information—and if the actions were left to continue, how they would
affect the current plan. Clearly, and at frequent intervals, two or more elements of information
have to be considered a whole. But whether the commander deals with single elements of tactical
information or clusters of information considered as a complex whole, he tends to make his
decisions serially.
These activities do not bring to mind the recognition of a series of patterns setting in motion a
grand response. They bring to mind a multifunctional group of competent, proficient persons
performing fast-paced, serial problem solving to keep a fluid enterprise on track toward a goal—a
goal, which, in the beginning, had been determined to be feasible and acceptable.

4 ~ Tactical Information
More granularity accrues to the decision models by considering the decision support
environment in the command posts, particularly number of persons involved in the information
flow. This section looks briefly at one command post simply to appreciate the numbers of
people and systems in it. The section also considers the commanders information requirements.

“A” Command Post
Consider the environment in which many decisions are made, the command post. The reason is
to highlight the number of persons with active roles in supporting the decision process, and to
have a sense of the physical environment in which information flows and decisions are made.13
Figure 6, on the following page, is a sketch of an Army light infantry tactical operations center
(TOC) in a recent advanced warfighting experiment focused on the Army Battle Command
System (ABCS).14 The figure shows 34 + persons in the TOC, a surprising number, but perhaps
not, considering the number of functional activities the battle staff performs in the space. The
purpose is not to enumerate the activities, they can be discerned by examining the sketch, nor is
it to highlight features of the layout. The purpose is to spark the reader’s imagination—given the
number of soldiers and C4ISR systems—of the torrent of information this colony is capable of
producing, particularly considering the ABCS systems in the sketch are only one node in a wide
area network of many nodes. Yet, parenthetically, having observed five of these operations
centers over several weeks, the analyst has yet to observe an occasion when the commander and
key staff members have been in a condition of “information overload.” This is not to say the
potential does not exist, it simply has not occurred to date. The units have not won all their
engagements, but the shortcomings on these occasions were having too little information,
particularly top down intelligence, not having an overload of information. In fact, the shortfalls
were people not knowing how to process information that was present or was reasonably
available from other nodes.15 The absence of adequate TTPs contributed to their lack of
proficiency.
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Figure 6

A Digitized Army Brigade Tactical Operations Center

The command post exists to enable the commander to command and control his units in
accomplishing their assigned mission. During the execution of each mission, uncontrollable
external circumstances almost always arise, necessitating a series of decisions adjusting the plan.
The oxygen that enables these decisions is information. It is useful to ask again, what
information? Within the CP, where does it come from? Who provides it? How is irrelevant
information screened out? Who does that screening? This set of questions has implications for
command post TTPs/SOPs.

Information Requirements
Generally, a discussion of information requirements centers on whether or not the Commander’s
Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) include everything a battalion, regimental, or brigade
commander needs to know and to be apprised of by the battle staff.16 The answer is that it
depends on a person’s viewpoint. After a recently concluded AWE, and concerned that
discussions of information overload never advance to addressing specifics, this analyst attempted
to list the specific information that a commander needs during the execution phase. The idea
was that if people cannot clearly describe the specifics of information overload, perhaps it is
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possible to forestall information overload by stating clear criteria for the information that should
be actively processed. Given a list, such as the one below, if the flow of information were still
overwhelming, then pare down this list. The list in Table 4 was purely a heuristic exercise;
another analyst would compile a different list. The larger point is that if a doctrine developer can
identify the information categories to a reasonable degree, this facilitates identifying each battle
staff member’s responsibilities to the commander for required tactical information.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Higher Headquarters orders as soon as they arrive (warning orders, fragmentary
orders, operations orders)
Current and predicted enemy situation in the unit’s areas of interest (AI) and area
of operations (AO)
Critical incidents involving ROE , Fratricide, civilians or public affairs in the AO,
and political-military interests appropriate to the echelon of command
Information received answering the higher headquarters commander’s CCIR
Information received answering the commander’s o wn CCIR
Information related to Decision Points
Status of subordinate, supporting, and adjacent units relative to their progress in
accomplishing assigned tasks and purpose.
Within this category, the commander needs to know the progress o r problems
encountered in executing the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan; and
again, the progress of each subordinate and supporting unit in the context of
the discussion of “tactical deltas.”

8
9

10

Changes in status of data and voice communications
Changes in status or the projected status of logistics by key classes of supply and
personnel specifically as each affect the capability of the unit to accomplish the
current mission and operations now in the process of being planned. Some of this
will be duplicative of the FFIR in the CCIR (see definitions below).
Immediate appraisal of the emergence of other unexpected or unforeseen events,
which affect the higher headquarters commander’s intent or the commander’s own
intent, or are problems of such magnitude that only the commander can address
them.

Table 4 The Commander’s Information Requirements During the Execution Phase
It is also important to remember that once operations commence in a contingency area, the
planning phase of the next operation runs concurrently with the execution of the current
operation. For instance, the commander is now forward at a tactical CP in the midst of the
current operation. Receiving the HHQ warning order for the next phase of the major operation
or campaign, he calls the nucleus of his operational planning team (OPT) forward to be briefed
on the IPB related to the mission, and the OPT’s initial mission analysis of the order. Given this
information, he then provides them guidance on the COA development and analysis, giving the
OPT the information they need to continue planning. In this case, necessarily, the commander is
dealing with information from different phases in two sequential operational cycles.
The discussions of the command posts and the information requirements are intended to
highlight the necessity for command post TTPs to link individuals within the CPs to the
information they routinely work. The CP environment has always been more complex than the
“tried and unused” CP SOPs managed to covey. Perhaps the environment was so complex that
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attempting to work through the details was “too hard,” and it was easier of salute the idea that the
procedures within a command post were the prerogative of the commander. With the advent of
the digitized C2 systems, the environment is even more complex. As mentioned earlier, it is
interesting that both the Army and the Marine Corps have published very detailed doctrine for
decision-making during the planning phase, but have expended little effort on execution
decisions. Planning decisions have always been considered to be more analytical than execution
decisions. The people that describe them as exercises in Newtonian logic have a point. At the
same time, although more complicated, execution decisions are far more fathomable than to say
they are essentially a “blow of the eye,” the application of “intuition” to “situational awareness.”
The ”models” discussion (and the studies upon which it is based) suggests that current operations
decisions at the battalion, regiment and brigade (not at the company and below) are as analytical
as planning decisions, but they are generally made in time-compressed circumstances, on the
basis of one course of action, and frequently the commander does so under conditions of
considerable uncertainty. And, yes, the commander’s tactical judgment, resulting from training,
education, experience, and intuition, is very important. But the judgment needs to be fed timely,
relevant information. Focused TTPs, developed on the basis of sound concepts and models, can
leverage the judgment.

5 ~ A Strawman TTP Development Process
The doctrine developer cannot leap from the models to writing the TTP without several
intermediate steps. Unless the developer appreciates the “team” nature of the activity, the TTPs
are likely to resemble the individual task lists in the current SOPs. While a task analysis will be
necessary later in the process, the first tier analysis is to reach a consensus on the nature of the
decision making process during the execution phase. The models presented earlier are not the
final answer to the model question, simply a useful start point. The second tier analysis is to
identify the commander-battle staff team proficiencies necessary at the aggregate level. Driving
this approach is the increasing presence of digitization and the need to ensure its capabilities are
factored into the TTP starting from the top down, not from the operator up. The third tier
analysis, closely related to the second, is to split out the proficiencies necessary within the
functional teams (operations, fires support, intelligence, etc.). The fourth tier is the individual
tasks, but it includes the “know how” a battle staff member should have in his or her active
memory or cargo pocket.

2d Tier ~ Commander-Battle Staff Team Proficiencies: teamwork more
productive than task work
Among the more interesting of the Army’s research initiatives related to digitization and the
teamwork necessary within command posts is an effort to develop a “multilevel systems model
of the Army Battle Command process,” and specifically, the team processes necessary to
increase proficiency amid the increase in information systems (IS) and information technology
(IT). The idea is simply that at the center of a C4ISR system lays a distributed human decisionmaking process—a process that can be supported by technology; but, a process that is still
governed by human interactions. How people, teams, and human organizations use and adapt to
new information systems and information technology, new procedures, new organizational
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structures, and new environmental complexities remains at the heart of the performance issue.
Previous research on decision-making under high time stress conditions suggests that the greatest
increase in battle staff proficiency will occur in the area of teamwork, not individual task work.

Behaviorally Anchored Rating Scales
The idea has been to identify from a behavioral science perspective, the team proficiencies
needed to exercise effective command and control, then develop sets of assessment scales for
each team proficiency area identified. The technique used is a training adaptation of a personnel
performance appraisal methodology called behaviorally anchored rating scales (BARS). The
technique has been used to develop training support packages for Army and Air Force aircrews
in cockpit resource management and for hospital emergency room staffs. Teamwork in cockpits
and emergency rooms is characterized by the need for information and time-critical decisions.
In fact, ARL has completed a pilot effort to identify commander-battle staff team proficiencies.
The project focused on developing commander-staff proficiency rating scales to be used by
observer controllers, and is not focused on command post TTP, per se. The project reached its
objectives, and while the BARS that have been produced are short of the detail needed for TTP,
the products indicate what could be accomplished with a very rigorous application of the classic
BARS development method.

A “Reverse Engineered” Prototype
Because the project was a prototype, Dr. Dennis Leedom, the director and a very experience
cognitive psychologist with 30 + years experience in military training analysis and cognitive
research activities, developed an initial set of 17 “battle command” proficiencies (Leedom,
1999). He built the list based on his extensive knowledge of the literature pertaining to the
subject, and, of course, his considerable experience. In classic BARS development, the 17
proficiencies would have been developed entirely on the basis of input from military
practitioners. The military persons are absolutely critical to the process because they are the
subject matter experts (SME); the psychologists in the classic BARS development process are
facilitators and scale development experts only. The military SMEs and the psychologists
together develop the behavioral scales. In this case, military SMEs were not available, and since
the project was a prototype, the project commenced with an educated “best guess” set of
performance dimensions.
With that as background, it is interesting to note that the 17 team proficiencies in Table 4, below,
are written in generic, non-military language. They could apply as easily to a civilian
organizational environment as a to a military unit. Dr. Leedom’s paper provides behavioral
descriptions of each proficiency, which make clear that the proficiencies are intended to for
military applications.17 That said, a military reader may conclude on first reading that a number
of the performance dimensions, even if they were written in military language, may not be right.
That’s okay. The point here is only to layout a proven technique for developing the top-level
team proficiencies, then developing the collective proficiencies within each staff and liaison
team section.
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Performance Area
Establish
Team–Organizational
Structure & Process

Manage
Decision and Production
Strategies
Manage External
Situation Awareness
Process

Monitor & Adjust
Team–Organizational
Process

Table 4

Behavioral Proficiency
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Clarify Expected Roles and Contributions of Individuals -Teams
Establish Clear Strategy for Knowledge Management
Establish Effective Information Exchange Practices
Establish Supportive Behaviors and Error Monitoring
Align Decision Authority With Decision-Making Capacity
Employ Proper Mix of Decision Strategies for Each Situation
Effectively Manage the Collaborative Debate Process
Sequence and Communicate Decisions and Assumptions
Employ Proper Mix of Production Strategies for Each Situation
Balance Push-Pull of Information Flow to Decision-Makers
Maintain Attentional Scanning Across Multiple Decision Threads
Verify Key Information Inputs and Employ Proper Risk Management
Manage Battlespace Images and Their Cognitive Shaping Influence
Anticipate and Prepare for the Emergence of Complexity
Manage Task Priority, Task Sequencing, and Information Cost
Manage Process Error Associated With Staff Rotation and Handover
Practice Continual Self-Critique and Organizational Learning

Prototype List of Commander-Staff Team Proficiencies

The proficiencies are actually fairly broad, and encompass several sub-proficiencies, or “team
tasks.” The project team’s challenge was to decompose the 17 proficiencies into the subproficiencies, then develop three behavioral descriptions of each sub- proficiency ranging from
highly effective behavior, to basically effective behavior, to ineffective behavior. Again, in
classic BARS development, the process of developing the behaviors is based entirely on the
input of the military SMEs. In fact, in a classical BARS development project, the first step is to
develop a large number of descriptions of behaviors the military SMEs have actually seen in the
field related to the entire functional area, or the job being studied. The SMEs literally write each
behavior on a 3x5 card. The second step is for the SMEs to cluster the behaviors into stacks
related to the major tasks that comprise the total job. These stacks are referred to as performance
dimensions, although in Table 4, they are listed under “Behavioral Proficiency.” For example,
performance dimensions for a staff officer would include “planning skills” and “coordinating
skills.” Some of the described behaviors in the stack will achieve highly effective results; some
will achieve only acceptable results, and some will produce unsatisfactory results. The military
SMEs, not the psychologists, assess the effectiveness of each behavior in the performance
dimension. The third step is to array all the behaviors in each stack in order from most effective
in achieving the result, to least effective. In some BARS projects, numerical scales are assigned
to the range of behaviors.18
The result is a set of scales for each major dimension of the overall job, and each set of scales
identifies behaviors that a trainer, for instance, is likely to see when observing people performing
the task.
Thus a trainer could observe the staff performing the particular activity, identify the staff’s
behaviors on the list of behaviors (the BARS), and subsequently be able to counsel the staff on
their performance in getting the job done. The staff being counseled would normally agree that
the behaviors identified by the trainer were in fact an accurate description of manner in which
they were conducting themselves when observed, thus validating the observations. The next step
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would be improving the staff’s proficiencies so they could move to the next level of
effectiveness.
In fact the project team quickly confirmed that each of the basic 17 team proficiency dimensions
contained easily identifiable sub-proficiencies. This is not surprising given the complexity of the
entire commander–battle staff–command post environment. Table 5 shows two proficiency
dimensions from Table 4, each with several sub-proficiencies.
3 - Establish Effective Information Exchange
Practices

8 - Sequence and communicate decisions and
assumptions

Use doctrinal terms and standard formats
Transfer clear, timely, complete in formation
Verify information receive and validate its
implications for the on-going plan (when
appropriate)
Acknowledge receipt
Verify acknowledgement

One third, two thirds rule and planning timelines
Timely warning orders and interim planning products
Use of Liaison Officers

Table 5

Examples of Proficiency Dimensions and Sub-Proficiency Dimensions

Calibrating the Effort
As the reader will sense from the following example of a prototype set of BARS, the detailed,
scaled behavioral descriptions are one level of effort further than necessary to develop effective
TTPs. But the basic BARS development process, particularly the involvement of the military
SMEs to identify the full range of team proficiencies and sub-proficiencies, represented in small
part in Table 5, is a very sound method. Supplemented with a robust literature review, and
tailored to recognize the expertise of the participants, the classical BARS development approach
would accelerate an effort to develop sound team level TTP. That said, the following table
provides an example of the team behaviors for one sub-proficiency in Table 5.

Observational Focus
One Third, Two Thirds Rule & Planning Timelines. Does the battle staff complete planning and
issue the operations order within the one-third, two-thirds guideline? Does the battle staff develop
an internal planning timeline very soon after receipt of mission and adhere to it? Does the battle
staff subsequently coordinate timelines with it’s higher headquarters, and issue an expanded
planning-briefing-rehearsal timeline to it’s subordinate units?
Exceeds standards (Rating 7): Battle staff performance of sequencing and communicating
decisions and assumptions enhances team effectiveness (Few if any errors).
The commander and staff are well-disciplined to execute their planning requirements within the
1/3 – 2/3’s allocation of time. The staff first determines the amount of time in the 1/3 allocation,
then determines 1/4 of the time, and allocates the 1/4 to the MDMP planning tasks. Once
planning is underway, the XO or S3 coordinates with HHQ to determine the times for the brief
back to HHQ and the HHQ’s rehearsal. The S3, with the CO’s approval, issues the unit’s own
briefing and rehearsal times to the subordinate units.
Meets standards (Rating 4): Battle staff performance of sequencing and communicating
decisions and assumptions contributes to team effectiveness (Recoverable errors).
The commander and staff normally executes their planning requirements within the 1/3 – 2/3’s
allocation of time. The staff first determines the amount of time in the 1/3 allocation, and further
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allocates it to the planning tasks. The staff tends to wait for the higher headquarters to announce
its briefing and rehearsal schedule. The S3, with the CO’s approval, issues the unit’s own briefing
and rehearsal times to the subordinate units.
Below standards (Rating 1): Battle staff performance of sequencing and communicating
decisions and assumptions jeopardizes team effectiveness (Unrecoverable errors).
The battle staff invariably overruns the allocated time, taking up to 1/2 the time available. The
staff simply has difficulty completing all the steps within the time intervals they initially
determined. The unit tends to wait for the higher headquarters to announce the briefing and
rehearsal schedule, and as a result, frequently does not begin to coordinate this schedule until they
have completed their operations order. This causes other subordinate units to have to cancel key
activities.

Table 6

Example of Prototype BARS for One Sub-Proficiency

The BARS developed to this level would be useful in a training situation, but are clearly more
than is needed to establish the full range of team proficiencies for a comprehensive command
post TTP. The object is to identify the multilevel systems model of commander-battle staff team
proficiencies, and a traditional task analysis may not be the methodology for the effort. But the
basic BARS development process, particularly the involvement of the military SMEs would
identify the full range of team proficiency dimensions, and the third tier staff and liaison section
proficiencies as well. The BARS technique can include more than one group of military SMEs,
and arguably it should. The effort to identify the effective team level behaviors should be as
inclusive as possible.
It is feasible for a project team comprised of military SMEs to identify TTP simply on the basis
of a literature review, small group discussions, and interviews. The group would want observe
several exercises, as a group, as part of the process. The output of the effort is likely to be
oriented more to individual and section tasks, than to commander-staff level team proficiencies.
But this approach is far preferable to no TTP at all.
Any approach to developing TTPs that will describe the flow of information within the command
post to get the right information to the commander for decision-making is an acceptable
approach. It is even more acceptable if it is sufficiently descriptive that persons performing
duties in a command post can read the document before an exercise to improve their personal
proficiency.

Summary
This short paper covered a relatively broad stretch, relying on the reader’s curiosity to look a
second time at the detail in the tables and figures to fill in detail I have passed over. Time and
space did not permit explanations of the usefulness of the integrated cognitive model, for
example, but the implications of simply understanding the range of strategies in which decisionmakers tacitly deal with uncertainty are significant. Some of the coping mechanisms would not
occur to a person naturally, but being aware of them adds insight and future stratagems to the
reader’s store of tactical judgment. The process model is useful as well. It should cause the
reader ask exactly what the range of staff drills should be to deal with the most frequent of the
tactical deltas across each of the battlefield functional areas. Figure 5, showing the series of
decisions made during the execution phase, suggests the staff has a vital role in ensuring at the
end of each fragmentary order that the remaining shards of the original order and the urgent new
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tasks are all synchronized toward key tasks, and still contributing to the original intent if that is
still feasible. The list of commander’s information requirements is a simple strawman, but it
provides a framework for commanders and their staffs to continue their discussions of critical
information, or start if they have not done so already.
The behaviorally anchored rating scale methodology of identifying what people and teams do is
a solid technique for getting a group of military officers and NCOs talking about what need to be
done in a command post. Other techniques will reach the same objective, but this is an
interesting one that has been tried recently on commander-battle staff team proficiencies.
Finally, I have attempted to make the case for doctrine focused on decision-making during the
execution phase. The doctrine needs to include a cognitive description of the process, a
commander-battle staff team description, and it needs to reach down to the TTP for teamwork in
the increasingly digitized command posts in the land warfare Services. Information technology
has the potential to support the cognitive processes, or frustrate them because of bad design.
Either way, the TTP are so complicated it is unreasonable to expect battalion, regimental, and
brigade commanders to work them out at the unit level. Detailed, generic TTP for digitized
command post operations are DOTES/DOTMPL responsibilities.

#
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ENDNOTES
1

Referring to Army brigades which, like Marine regiments, are normally commanded by a colonel and are
comprised of three battalions.
2
The lieutenant colonel and colonel level decision situations are the most challenging because they are the first two
echelons where the commander is out of personal sensory distance of the battle, but they have the shortest windows
within which to access the situation and make a decision. This means the quality of the information they receive
from their own units and from Higher headquarters must be very good and very timely. The window is so short that
the intelligence systems at the higher headquarters are hard pressed to provide fused, analyzed intelligence to the
“colonel” commands in time for the commanders to use it effectively.
3
In some cases in the “high tech” command posts, due to the older braves being not nearly so computer savvy as the
young braves, the roles have been slight reversed. Fortunately, in increasing numbers of cases, the senior NCOs
have recognized the necessity to become computer literate, and the old brave model is reasserting itself.
4
Hypothetically, the absence of a conceptual and detailed frame work as basis for requirements could also result in
requirements people identifying a less urgent requirement as the focus for development and experimentation.
5
Of interest, the Marine Air Ground Task Force Staff Training Program (MSTP) Center’s home page features a
series of training materials used by the MSTP staff during their training events with Marine units and groups. A
slide in the lesson materials for the “Execution” class says that (1) commanders us SOPs to standardize routine or
recurring actions not needing their personal involvement, (2) SOPs include specifics on the organization, functions,
and responsibilities of a particular commander’s staff, (3) organization for combat that differs from day-to-day
operations should be clearly defined by the command’s SOP, and (4) benefits of SOPs are (a) simplified, brief
combat orders, (b) enhanced understanding & teamwork among commanders and staff, (c) established synchronized
staff drills, and (d) established abbreviated or accelerated decision-making techniques. (c) and (d) are interesting,
but at the moment, the author has no examples of Marine Corps unit SOPs to comment on the manner in which the
units have described the synchronization drills and the abbreviated decision-making techniques.
6
With respect to Marine Corps SOPs, during the brief window in which I prepared this paper, I did not have the
opportunity to request and review any Marine Corps MEU, RLT, or BLT level command post SOPs. My
expectation is that the MEU level SOPs, in particular, would be comprehensive, and would have detailed discussions
of the rapid planning process. I had the opportunity two years ago to watch the MCWL’s Special Purpose MAGTF
(X) work on their SOPs and was impressed by the technique they used to trace decision threads among multiple
locations, particularly for fire support coordination decisions.
7
The efforts and products of two organizations need to be highlighted. The Marine Corps’ MSTP staff has
produced a series of “MSTP Pamphlets” addressing a score of command and control topics at a more detailed level
than is currently found in the Marine Corps doctrinal publications. In addition, the MSTP staff makes available on
their home page the training aids for many of the classes they conduct for MAGTF staffs and other groups, such as
classes in the Marine Corps University. The entire set of materials is a valuable resource for persons interested in
the human dimension of command and control. Similarly, TRADOC task organized a small group of officers,
NCOs and civilians to provide direct support to the FORCE XXI training development effort. Called “Warrior T,”
the group has published a series high quality training materials designed to assist the training efforts of the 4th
Infantry Division, the Army’s “First Digitized Division (FDD),” at Fort Hood, TX.
8
Neither FM 101-5-1 nor MCRP 5-12x contains a definition of the term “battle staff.” The term comes up
sufficiently frequently that a working definition is useful. DRC has used the following in project reports to ARL.
The battle staff is the combination of coordinating and special staff officers and NCOs in a command post or
operations center with the functional (e.g., intelligence, operations) and battlefield functional area expertise (FSC,
ALO, Combat Engineer) necessary to monitor and assess operations; to provide decision support to the commander
during the execution phase of the operation; to provide effective coordination among higher, adjacent, supporting,
and subordinate commands; and to provide continuous future operations planning. Normally comprised of the
command’s senior coordinating and special staff officers, and the other staff officers and NCOs on the current watch
in the command post. With respect to sleep cycles, the senior staff members are battle staff members on a 24-hour
basis, and are recalled from rest as needed.
9
The Optimum TTP is an open definition at this point. The TTP could be adequately described in one, two, or more
nested documents depending upon the comprehensiveness of the development process.
10
Persons interested in an electronic copy of the paper, contact the author at JimM@drc.com.
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11

The operational events the team observed were all built around conventional operations, and involved no civilians
on the battlefield. But clearly, if civilians had been present, the monitoring would have included changes in civilian
situations that affected the unit’s ability to accomplish its mission.
12
The term “assessment” as used here is slightly different from the MSTP use of the term. Here it is meant
specifically as the cognitive activity a person directs at a specific situation in order to determine the seriousness of
the situation and what should be done to correct it or minimize it.
13
In fact, commanders make many decisions when they are forward on the battlefield, connected to the operations
center by FM voice radio or data communication, or both, or not connected at all.
14
The unit commander determines the layout of his own TOC. The analyst has seen six different brigade TOC
configurations during the on-going ABCS experimentation, and while each was laid out differently, obviously, the
functions being performed by the battle staffs were all essentially the same.
15
The fact is, nobody present—not the participants, the observer-controllers, the analysts—really knew how to
process and correctly filter all the information present or not present because it had not been requested. The TTP
had not been worked out, and still have not been worked out.
16
CCIR: the information required by the commander that directly affects his decisions and dictates the successful
execution of operational or tactical operations. CCIR normally result in the generation of three types of information
requirements: priority intelligence requirements (PIR), essential elements of friendly information (EEFI), and
friendly force information requirements (FFIR). In the interest of brevity, definitions of PIR, EEFI, and FFIR are
available in MCWP 5-12 series and FM 101-5-1, as well as several of the MSTP pamphlets available at the MSTP
home page.
17
Nonetheless, the idea that proficiencies area as applicable to civilian organizations is interesting and in a sense,
makes a prima facia case for their utility.
18
The psychologist’s role is to act as a facilitator and social scientist. With respect to the latter, particularly when
the BARS are to be used as performance appraisal instruments, the psychologist ensures proper attention is paid to
reliability and validity in both the clustering step and the scaling step.
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If the key to symbolic reasoning is representation then it certainly follows that the foundation of
expert-system-based, decision-support systems is the rich manner in which the entities, concepts,
and notions relevant to the domain space(s) are represented [4, 10]. This requirement can be
accommodated through the development and employment of one or more ontologies. An
ontology in this sense can be defined as a relationship-rich, typically object-based representation
of the entities, concepts, and notions relevant to the domain(s) of operation. The problem arises
when two or more of these systems, each operating over a potentially extensive ontology attempt
to collaborate with each other. While collaboration within each of these systems may be based on
very high-level descriptions of entities, concepts and notions, it will undoubtedly be subject to
various application-specific biases. For example, in a tactical command and control system an
entity such as an M1A1 tank may be viewed, and therefore represented as a tactical asset. In this
case the bias would be toward tactical utility. However, in a logistics system the same M1A1
tank would most appropriately be viewed as a potential supply item with emphasis on logistical
inventory and supply. In both cases, however, the subject is still the exact same M1A1 tank with
basic characteristics. The difference resides in the manner in which the tank is being viewed by
each of these systems. Another term for this bias-based filter is perspective. Perspective is not
only a natural component of the way in which we perceive the world but moreover should be
viewed as a highly beneficial and desirable characteristic. Perspective is the ingredient in an
ontology-based decision-support system that allows for the representation of domain-specific
notions and bias. For example, if a decision-support system is to assist in the formulation of
logistical supply missions then it is more appropriate, and beneficial for an entity such as a
howitzer to be primarily viewed as a supply item instead of a tactical asset. If viewed as a supply
item the description of a howitzer could provide great detail in terms of the items shipping
weight, shipping dimensions, tie-down points, etc. In the context of a tactical command and
control system such information is essentially irrelevant and certainly not of primary focus. What
would be relevant in such a tactical system would be characteristics such as projectile range,
effective casualty radius, advancement velocity, etc. Again, it may be the exact same howitzer
that is being discussed between the two disparate systems. However, it is being discussed within
two different contexts exhibiting two distinctly different perspectives. While collaboration within
or across systems supported by the exact same perspective-based representation performs well,
the problem arises when collaboration needs to occur between systems or system components
where the perspectives are in fact not the same and potentially drastically dissimilar. In this unto
common case, the extent to which systems can collaborate on events and information is
essentially limited to low-level data-passing with receivers having little or no understanding of
content and implication. Simply stated, the problem at the heart of interoperability between
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symbolic reasoning-based systems resides in the means by which information-centric systems
exhibiting wholly, or even partially disparate perspectives, can interoperate at a meaningful and
useful level.
The solution to this dilemma can take primarily two different directions. The first of these paths
focuses on the development of a universal ontology. Such an ontology would represent a single,
all inclusive view of the world. Each system would utilize this representation as the core
informational basis for operation. Since each system would have knowledge of this common
representation of the entities, notions, and concepts, interoperability at the information level
would be clear and concise requiring no context-diminishing translation. However, as
straightforward as this may appear there are two major flaws with this approach. First, in
practicality it is highly unlikely that such a universal description could actually be successfully
developed. Considering the amount of forethought and vision this task would require, such an
undertaking would be of monumental scale as well as being plagued with misrepresentation.
Inevitably, certain notions or concepts would be inappropriately represented in a particular
domain in an effort to model them adequately in another.
The second flaw with the universal ontology approach is less obvious but perhaps even more
destructive. Considering the number of domains across which such an ontology would need to
encompass the resulting ontology would most likely be comprised mainly of generalities. These
generalities would typically only partially represent the manner in which any one particular
system wished to see the world. In other words, due to the number of perspectives a universal
ontology would attempt to represent, the resulting ontology would ironically end up being just
the opposite, a perspective-absent description falling far short of system needs and expectations.
While perspective was the cause of the original interoperability problem it is still a highly
valuable characteristic that should not only be preserved but should be wholeheartedly embraced
and promoted. As mentioned earlier, perspective is a valuable and useful means of conveying
domain-specific notions and bias, which are crucial to information-centric decision-support
systems. To omit its presence is to significantly reduce the usefulness of an ontology and
therefore the effectiveness of the utilizing decision-support system(s). This coupled with the
highly unlikely potential for developing such a comprehensive, inter-domain description of the
world renders the universal ontology approach both unrealistic and wholly ineffective.
The second, more promising solution to interoperability between decision-support systems
introduces the notion of a perspective filter. Based on the fa ade design pattern [1, 2, 3]
perspective filters allow core entities, concepts and notion accessible to interoperating systems to
be viewed in a more appropriate form relative to each collaborator s perspective. In brief, the
fa ade pattern allows for a certain description to be viewed, and consequently interacted with in
a more appropriate manner. Similar to a pair of infrared night vision goggles, overlaying a filter
may enhance or refine otherwise limited information. In the case of ontology-based collaboration
this filter essentially superimposes a more perspective-oriented, ontological layer over the initial
representation. The filter may not only add or modify the terminology and constraints of the core
descriptions but may also extend and enhance it through the incorporation of additional
characteristics. These characteristics may take the form of additional attributes and relationships
as well as refining constraints. For example, Figure 1 illustrates the use of a logistically oriented
perspective filter over a core description of conveyances. Note first that while the core
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conveyance ontology appears to represent only a limited amount of bias the effectiveness of
perspective filters certainly does not require such a general core description. If the core ontology
were heavily biased toward a foreign set of perspectives it would simply mean that the
perspective filters would need to be more extensive and incorporate additional constraints,
extensions, etc. However, for clarity of illustration a limited, rather general core ontology was
selected.

Figure 1 — Partially Derived Logistics Ontology
Core to the logistics perspective presented in Figure 1 is the notion of a transport. However,
although the logistics system may have a notion of all of the types of conveyances (i.e., vessels,
vehicles, and aircraft) represented in the core ontology it, in the context of this example, may
only consider vessels and rotary aircraft as potential transports. In this situation it would be
valuable to represent this refined constraint in the ontology forming the representational heart of
the logistics system while still employing the core conveyance ontology. As Figure 1 illustrates,
representing such refinement can be accomplished by explicitly introducing a constrained notion
of a transport in the application-specific filter ontology. An abstract Transport is defined to have
two specific derivations (VesselTransport and HelicopterTransport). At this point it is
immediately apparent that a vehicle is not a transport candidate. In the context of the example
logistics system transports can only be VesselTransports or HelicopterTransports. The task now
becomes linking these two system specific notions to the core conveyance ontology. Relating
these two transport types to their conveyance ontology counterparts can be achieved in two
different ways. For illustration purposes, the definition of VesselTransport adopts the first
method while HelicopterTransport employs the second. The first method defines an explicit
relationship between the VesselTransport and the core description of a vessel outlined in the
conveyance ontology. Utilizing this approach, obtaining the core information relative to the
corresponding Vessel from a VesselTransport requires both knowledge of their relationship in
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addition to another level of indirection. For reasons of performance and logical integrity, both of
these requirements may not be desirable.
The second method, illustrated in Figure 1 using HelicopterTransport, avoids both shortcomings
inherent in the first approach. In this case, HelicopterTransport exists as a fa ade, or filter, which
transparently links at the attribute level into the core RotaryAircraft description. That is, each
attribute of RotaryAircraft desired to be exposed to users of HelicopterTransport is explicitly
declared in the fa ade. For example, since the maximum range of travel is relevant to the
definition of a HelicopterTransport the maxRange attribute of RotaryAircraft (inherited from
Conveyance) is subsequently exposed in the HelicopterTransport fa ade description. By virtue of
being declared in a fa ade any access to such an attribute would be transparently mapped into the
corresponding attribute(s) on which it is based. In the case of the range attribute of
HelicopterTransport, access would transparently be directed to the inherited maxRange attribute
of RotaryAircraft. Notice also the use of alternative terminology over that used in the core
ontology (i.e., range vs. maxRange). It should also be noted that the derivative nature of a fa ade
attribute is not limited to mapping into another attribute. Rather, the value of a fa ade attribute
may also be derived through calculation, perhaps based on the values of multiple attributes
residing in potentially several different core objects. In either case, the fact that the value of the
fa ade attribute is derived is completely transparent to the fa ade user.
Another perspective-oriented enhancement to the core ontology illustrated in Figure 1 is the
notion of a SupplyMission. Being a fundamental concept in the example logistics system a
supply mission essentially relates supply items in the form of equipment to the transports by
which they will be delivered. Once again, the definition of a logistics-specific notion (i.e., supply
items) is derived from a notion defined in the core ontology (i.e., equipment). In this case, an
explicit relationship is declared linking SupplyMission to zero or more Equipment items. Since,
from the perspective of the logistics system Equipment scheduled for delivery are viewed as
items that are to be supplied, the term supplyItems is used as the referencing nomenclature. Such
an enhancement demonstrates the ability to integrate new concepts (i.e., supply missions) with
existing core notions.
In the context of interoperability among information-centric, decision-support systems
significant benefits could be obtained from essentially drawing relevant concepts and notions
into a system s local set of perspective-rich, filter ontologies. As the above example illustrates,
key components of these perspective-oriented ontologies could be derived from a set of core,
relatively unbiased common notions forming the basis for informational collaboration among
systems. There are several benefits to adopting this approach. Collaboration among informationcentric, decision-support systems would take place in terms of various core ontologies (i.e.,
Conveyance) with each collaborator viewing these core entities, concepts and notions according
to its own perspective. Figure 2 briefly extends the logistics example presented in Figure 1
showing collaboration between the original logistics system and a tactical command and control
system. Collaboration between these two example systems is in terms of the common, core
ontologies on which they share their derivations. A conveyance is still a conveyance whether it is
viewed in the context of logistics or tactical command and control. To represent domain-specific
notions (e.g., transport, supply item, tactical asset, etc.) each collaborating system would apply
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the appropriate filter. Although discussing a conveyance from partially disparate perspectives
both systems can collaborate about core entities, concepts , and notions.

Figure 2 — Two disparate domains linked into the same core ontology

Another advantage of supplementing core, non-system-specific ontologies with perspective rich
filters is the preservation of both time and effort during the development of such informationcentric systems. Core ontologies could be archived in a sort of ontology library forming a useful
reference assisting in the development of new system ontologies. Models created for new
decision-support systems could make use of this ontology library as a strong basis for deriving
system-specific filters. In addition, such a process would promote the use of common core
descriptions increasing the potential for interoperability even further.
Interoperability between disparate decision-support systems is crucial to the operational
effectiveness of information-centric, decision-support systems. As the emergence of such
systems increases the need to support inter-system collaboration at the information level
becomes increasingly critical. By constraining valuable, perspective-based biases to local,
system-specific filter ontologies coupled with the use of core, relatively unbiased ontologies,
interoperability between disparate information-centric decision-support systems becomes both
feasible and effective.
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Abstract
This paper provides an overview of select architectural concepts, structures, and mechanisms
employed in the development of the Collaborative Agent-Based Control and Help System
(COACH). COACH is an Office of Naval Research (ONR) sponsored system to demonstrate
the feasibility and utility of a software system based on the Integrated Cooperative Decision
Model (ICDM Architecture) to facilitate repairs to naval systems by inexperienced personnel.
ICDM is a joint product of the CAD Research Center and CDM Technologies.
The
architectural underpinnings of COACH have subsequently been applied to the development of
other ONR projects such as the Ordnance Tracking and Information System (OTIS), and the
Shipboard Integrated Logistics System (SILS).

Introduction
During the initial phases of the COACH project three fundamental design concepts were
identified that were not well addressed by the technology embodied in ICDM at that time.
1. Probabilistic diagnosis is at the core of most repair problems.
2. It is not practical to hard code rules to deal with every repair situation.
3. Repairmen must be able to interact with the system in a hands free manner.
The case based reasoning paradigm provided solutions to the problems associated with all three
concepts. While not a core feature of the paradigm, most implementations support probabilistic
notions. A core feature of the paradigm is the capability to add cases over time and the
simplistic nature of the underlying knowledge format is ideally suited to end-user or automated
extensions to the knowledge base, which in essence enables the enveloping system to learn over
time. The question and answer format coupled with the text based similarity mechanisms
provided by the paradigm are naturally suited to speech-based interactions with the system.
The remainder of this paper focuses on the ICDM architecture, its underlying concepts, and the
extensions incorporated to provide case base reasoning facilities. Additional details on the case
based reasoning paradigm are not provided in this paper.

Software Architecture
Since this paper is to deal with architecture it should begin with a definition of the architecture of
a software system. Unfortunately there appears to be as many definitions as there are authors in
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this field of endeavor. In fact entire web site are devoted to the question what is software
architecture (CMU 2001). For example, one definition is The high-level division of a system
into major sub-systems and their dependencies (Fowler 239). This definition is fairly nonconcise, where is the line drawn between high level and low level, between major subsystem and
minor subsystem. Also this definition says nothing about the core mechanisms with which the
subsystems collaborate, which is equally important if not more than the dependencies.
Another definition is The set of significant decisions about the organization of a software
system (Booch, et al 1999b). The problem with this definition is that what is considered
significant is fairly arbitrary. In practice, a significant decision is probably defined as those the
system architect got to in the time allocated to produce the system architecture document.
These issues have lead me to define the architecture of a software system as the underlying
model from which the system is specified and implemented. Traditionally this model has been
resident in the minds of the designers, developers, and project managers associated with the
system. With the advent of the Universal Modeling Language (UML) (see Fowler and Scott
1997) and supporting computer aided software engineering (CASE) tools, this model can now be
captured in a standard, consistent, and persistent format. Note this model grows and changes
over time but at any instant in time it provides the current conception of the system architecture.

PackageName: Architectural Specification

PackageName: Modelling Tool

PackageName: Models

PackageName: Views

PackageName: Diagrams

View1.1

Diagram1.1.1

Model 1

Documents
View1.2

Diagram1.1.2

Figure 1 Architectural Specification

One or more models may represent the system architecture. An example of a possible
breakdown is the user domain model, system model, and development model. The user domain
model is essentially an analysis tool used to understand the user community their responsibilities,
organizational structure, existing information system environment. It may also be used to
capture the knowledge acquisition process and structure of the resulting artifacts. The system
model captures the structure software under development and will be discussed throughout the
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rest of this paper. The development model captures the development environment and processes
as well as the project management aspects of the system such as milestones, deliverables, tasks,
and timelines.
While the underlying models represent the system architecture, the architecture is specified
through views, diagrams, and documents as depicted in Figure 1. One of the particularly
powerful aspects of UML is that it is built on an underlying formal grammar. This allows views
and diagrams to show specific aspects of the system while contributing to an underlying selfconsistent model that is much to complex to depict in any one picture. This approach allows
Software Architecture specifications to exist at the multitude of different scopes and levels
typically required as shown in Figure 2.

<< Development Pattern >>
PackageName: Architectural Levels

<< Development Pattern >>
PackageName: Architecural Scopes

<< level >>

Deployment

Contractual

<< level >> << import >>

<< refine >>

Executable
<< level >> << import >>

Analysis
<< refine >>

Physical
<< level >>

<< import >>

Design
Logical
<< refine >>
<< level >>

<< realize >>

Implementation

Functional

Figure 2 Architectural Scopes and Levels

In addition to UML the architectural approach to these projects extensively utilizes the pattern
approach to software engineering. Software Engineering patterns provide the industry with the
means to capture proven solutions to software engineering problems in a generic system
independent manner. A well-documented pattern provides a unique descriptive name, describes
a software engineering problem in regards to a specific context, and presents a well-proven
generic scheme for its solution. Patterns in software engineering are most associated with
software design due to the classic reference Design Patterns by the gang of four that introduced
the industry to the pattern concept (Gamma et al 1994); however, they are equally applicable
across the ranges of scale and abstraction within the discipline.
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In order for patterns to achieve their primary purpose of capturing expertise for reuse by others
they must be organized and catalogued in a pattern system that allows pattern users to quickly
find the patterns that address their current issues. In addition to providing an organizational
scheme to its constituent patterns, a pattern system should provide a sufficient base of patterns,
describe all constituent patterns in a uniform manner, identify relationships between patterns, and
show how to apply and implement its constituents.
Common top-level pattern categories are shown in Figure 3. Analysis patterns capture
conceptually related domain model entities in a generic fashion that crosses individual domain
boundaries providing for the reuse of concepts and allowing for the direct sharing of information
between domains. Architectural patterns provide problem solution sets that focus on the system
as a whole. Design patterns are similar to architecture patterns except that they provide a lower
level focus on the design subsystems rather than the system as a whole. An idiom is low-level
programming language specific pattern that describes how to implement particular aspects of a
software component or subsystem. An example of a good pattern system is provided in
Bushman 1996.

PackageName: Pattern System

Analysis Pattern
Architectural Pattern
Design Pattern
Idiom
Figure 3 A Pattern System

Patterns are a particularly useful tool for developing and specifying the architecture of a software
system. They provide software system architects with the means to quickly identify existing
solutions to their architectural problems and provide the architectural design team with a high
level descriptive vocabulary with which to discuss design issues. They also capture past
experience which guards against major mistakes. This is especially important at the architectural
level where a poor choice may not be evident until later on in the development process resulting
in costly reworking of the system. They are also very useful in the documentation process as
they provide a wealth of information in a very abbreviated format.
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Physical Architecture
The physical architecture addresses the runtime aspects if the system. It specifies the system
executables and the runtime components from which they are assembled. Runtime components
such as dynamic link libraries, Java Jar files, ActiveX controls are built from the source level
artifacts specified in the Logical Architecture.
The top level underpinnings of the ICDM architecture are best described by the Blackboard
Pattern. This classical architectural pattern has been employed successfully by the artificial
intelligence (AI) community since the early 1970 s as an approach to problems for which no
deterministic solution strategies are known. The name blackboard was chosen because the
approach parallels the situation in which human experts sit in front of a real blackboard and work
together to solve a problem (Bushman 1996).
The blackboard architecture employs a collection of independent programs (knowledge sources)
that work cooperatively on a common data structure (blackboard). Each program is specialized
for solving a particular part of the overall task, and all programs work together on the solution.
The specialized programs are completely independent of each other. They do not call each other
and there is no predetermined sequence for their activation. The direction taken by the system is
primarily determined by the current state of the solution. This type of data directed control
facilitates experimentation with different types of algorithms and allows experimentally derived
heuristics to control processing.
Prior to the development of COACH a distributed object server and communication facility had
been incorporated into ICDM along with a rule-based inference engine and object management
layer (OML) for use by end-user client applications. In this arrangement the object server plays
the role of the blackboard. The individual agents operating within one or more agent engine
instances play the role of knowledge sources. The managers within the agent engine instances
provide control over the application of knowledge to the solution being developed by the
associated agent federation. The human users, through their client applications, provide an
additional source of knowledge and control as depicted in Figure 4.
The incorporation of one or more human users distinguishes this architecture from traditional
blackboard implementations that were designed to solve problems for users rather than with
them. The partnership between human users and the software agents (knowledge sources)
eliminates the control problems often associated with blackboard architectures. Humans can
keep the developing solution on track and provide the stimulus to get it going again when stalled.
The same data-driven features that provide for the interaction of diverse independent software
agents may also be employed to simultaneously link spatially distributed human users into a
collaborative environment; thereby realizing an information age version of the conceptual
stimulus for which the blackboard pattern is named.
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<<executable>>

<<executable>>
Blackboard

Control/Knowledge Source

Object Server

Client Application
<<Architectural Pattern>>

<<executable>>

Blackboard
Knowledge Source

<<executable>>
Agent Engine

Knowledge Source

Control/Knowledge Source

Search Engine
<<executable>>
Recall Engine

Figure 4 The Physical Architecture

In support of the identified requirements for COACH a case based reasoning facility was
incorporated into ICDM in a manner similar to the existing Agent Engine, which prompted the
name Recall Engine. Each Recall Engine instance manages multiple recall sessions supported
by one or more case bases. Either a human user or a software agent may invoke a recall session.
The question and answer dialog used to drive forward the probabilistic values of the retrieved
cases associated with the session is posted on the blackboard; thereby, allowing the developing
solution to be viewed by all participating knowledge sources. By linking the text based
questions to objectified observation concepts and answers to objectified phenomenon human
users may respond to the dialog in a natural text based manner while agents may respond with
their knowledge in an objectified manner.
This same basic pattern for extending the architecture was repeated to support the OTIS
requirement to dynamically plan optimal routes for the movement of ordnance aboard Navy
carriers. The Search Engine provides a generic graph searching facility. Each Search Engine
instance can manage multiple graphs whose arc weights are dynamically calculated through links
to objectified entities within a domain specific instance model, which may in turned be queried
by both agents and users for the results of specific searches of various types.

ICDM Subsystems
ICDM utilizes a combination of templated subsystems and code generation to provide high-level
domain specific functionality in a generic fashion. This approach greatly decreases the
development time of any particular system while ensuring robust performance. The approach
utilizes high—level specification formats, such as UML, wherever possible to define the domain
specific ontology and logic of a system. Code generators are then employed to translate the
high-level specifications to the low-level targets specified in the subsystem templates.
Subsystems may be precompiled much like a commercial database system in which case the
templated entities are loaded at runtime to tailor it to the domain. This is the approach used by
the Agent, Recall, and Search Engines. Alternatively the code generators may produce entities
that are compiled into the subsystem as is done with the Object Server. In addition to providing
the templated entities, some subsystems may require certain base level entities in the domain
specific ontology like the observation and action packages required by the Recall Engine. The
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subsystems also require the means to communicate in a distributed fashion. This capability is
provided by the CORBA implementation of the Object Broker Pattern (Bushmann et al 2000).
These ideas are captured in Figure 5.
<< framework >>
PackageName: ICDM Framework
<< subsystem >>
PackageName: ontological framework

PackageName: Recall Engine

<<analysis pattern>>

<case logic,default knowledge,properties>

Observation
<< subsystem >>
<<analysis pattern>>

PackageName: Agent Engine

Action

<agent logic,knowledge representation,interests,properties>

<< subsystem >>
PackageName: Object Server
<client proxies,server proxies,server implementations,default knowledge,properties>

OML
{Imported}

client elements

server elements

PackageName: Platform

Object Broker
<<design pattern>>
platform elements

CORBA

Figure 5 ICDM Subsystems

Logical Architecture
The logical architecture specifies the source and compile-time artifacts from which the physical
architecture is built. The top-level local design addresses the need to share system components
across families of similar systems and to specifically identify and capture the core technology of
the company independent of any particular project. It partitions the design artifacts into four
interdependent relaxed layers as depicted in
Figure 6. The unique aspects of a specific system design are grouped into the ICDM system
layer. The artifacts contained in this layer leverage heavily on the subsystems and service
libraries provided by the underlying ICDM Framework layer and must be considered in relation
to the framework to be fully understood.
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The general design artifacts applicable to a wide-range of decision support systems have been
abstracted from existing systems over the years into the ICDM framework, ICDM toolkit, and
ICDM guidelines, which are representative of the research center s core technology. The toolkit
provides the development and build environment including the code generators, which transform
ICDM System layer artifacts into subsystem targets specified in the ICDM Framework layer.
The ICDM guidelines provide informal descriptions of the ideal characteristics of a good
decision support system and capture the vision of the center s directors, which serve as a
backdrop against which system design decisions are evaluated.

<< systemModel >>
inputs

ICDM Conventions

ICDM System

<< import >>

<< framework >>
<<architectural pattern>>

ICDM Toolkit
outputs

ICDM Framework

<< import >>

Relaxed Layers
External Support

Platform
Figure 6 Top-level System Design

The Relaxed Layers pattern (Buschmann 1996) indicates the call level dependencies between the
ICDM System layer and the ICDM Framework layer may only be in the direction from system to
framework. The framework contains many high level subsystems that are indirectly dependent
on the system layer to provide domain specific context. The subsystems work with these
elements at the meta-level and therefore do not violate the call-level dependencies. These
elements are often specified in a high-level form, such as UML, that is abstracted from any
particular implementation.
The External Support and Platform layers group the externally developed elements of the system.
It is important to differentiate external design elements at the architectural level because they are
relatively fixed and may limit the flexibility of the system to evolve over time. They may also
have associated runtime issues such as licensing fees and runtime validation problems. The
Platform layer is distinguishable from the External Support Layer in that it groups the relevant
external elements provided by the computing infrastructure of the client enterprise. These
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elements need to be distinguished from other external elements because their configurations and
upgrades are outside the control of the system s developing organization.

System Tiers
The system specific design is further structured into three distinct tiers as described by the
Information System pattern (Fowler 1997) as depicted in Figure 7. The Domain Tier provides a
direct executable model of the system domain that is independent of any particular application or
source data model. It represents the active core of the system and provides the central focus for
the development effort. The Application Tier provides local applications to support domain
interactions of specific user groups. The Data Tier provides for the persistent storage of the data
that underlies the information represented by the domain model.

PackageName: ICDM System

Application Tier

Domain Tier

Data Tier

Information System
<<architecture pattern>>

Figure 7 ICDM System Layer Structure

The Information System pattern was selected to address the fundamental decision support system
requirements to provide concurrent collaborative support to multiple users, to provide a highlevel objective model of the domain that provides the necessary context to support agent-based
reasoning, and to interoperate with existing data based systems within the system domain.

Domain Tier
The core of this architecture is the Domain Tier. The Information System pattern assigns the
responsibility of saving/restoring the associated domain model to/from the Data Tier to the
Domain Tier. This responsibility is typically addressed by providing the individual domain
model objects with the capability to save and restore themselves, which is reasonable for simple
stand-alone systems that have the complete freedom to specify the storage format of their
persisted elements. Unfortunately, real-world systems are rarely this simple, especially those
geared toward decision support. Decision support systems must interact with existing systems,
taking feeds as necessary, and dealing with the fact that many systems with varying
representations (ie. relational, hierarchical, flat files, etc.) may have to be accessed to get the
integrated picture required to provide adequate decision support.
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The code required to implement this type of external system interaction is substantial and will
pollute the purity of the domain model masking its initial intent and limiting its utility in other
contexts. This dilemma is addressed by partitioning these responsibilities of the Domain Tier
between a Data Interface Tier and a Representation Tier as shown in Figure 8. The Domain Tier
Representation provides the executable model of the domain, while the Domain Tier Data
Interface assumes the responsibility for moving information between the Representation and
Data Tier. This level of indirection also provides the system with the additional flexibility
required to more easily adapt to Data Tier changes over time or due to local variations at
different deployment locations. The Data Broker pattern (Fowler 1997) describes the internal
structure and dynamic behavior of the Data Interface.

PackageName: Domain Tier

PackageName: Application Interface

PackageName: Representation

PackageName: Data Interface

Agent Logic
<<architecture pattern>>

<<architecture pattern>>

Facade

Data Broker
Ontology

Case Logic

Figure 8 The Domain Tier

The Domain Tier must also provide an interface for the various applications within the domain.
The pure representational model is not ideally suited for this purpose due to the complex
interrelationships and high-level domain specific type specifications. It also does not address the
transactional nature of the interactions between the user applications and the domain. In order to
address these deficiencies an additional fa ade (Fowler 1997) based sub tier tailored to the needs
of the system s applications is inserted into the Domain Tier. This application interface is
responsible for all accesses to the domain representation and does any processing other than that
specifically required for the user interface. The addition of this layer also benefits the
development process as it allows user interface and domain model design to occur in parallel
somewhat independent of one another. Once these pieces stabilize facades are developed that
map the interface into the domain.
Within the context of this architecture, an information system utilizes a class based object model
to represent the domain. Classes represent the types of things within the domain and are
structured into a hierarchy that relates similar things. They serve as templates for the creation of
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objects that specify object characteristics in terms of attributes, object behavior in terms of
operations, and object context in terms of associations. A decision support system can be
thought of as a value added extension to a traditional information system. Within the context of
a decision support system, the information system object model is known as the ontology. The
ontology provides the domain vocabulary upon which the agent logic is specified in the form of
expert system rules. This logic is used to express the business rules of the domain, maintain
high-level derived information, and to generate alerts and statements of implication.
From the developer perspective, the rule-based representation of the agent logic is very flexible
in dealing with dynamic change; however, since the rules are compile time entities they do not
provide this same flexibility to system users at runtime. This is where the case logic is
particularly useful. The case logic uses a fixed compile time model composed of problems,
questions, actions, and their interrelationships. The domain specific nature of the case logic is
therefore represented in the form of object instances rather than model classes. This allows the
case logic to be dynamically extended or modified at runtime either directly or indirectly
(through embedded system learning processes) by system users. The case logic is also expressed
in a form that serves as an appropriate basis for English based, interactive dialogs between the
system and the system users to zero in on appropriate courses of action.

Summary
The continued evolution of the ICDM architecture to address system specific requirements has
greatly enhanced development productivity and the quality of the client systems. The trend
towards high-level model based (UML) specification for domain specific elements coupled with
code generation to framework level targets is expected to continue. The capabilities of the
Recall and Search engines continue to progress and the incorporation of other AI based domain
facilities such as neural networks and probabilistic engines based on Bayes law are expected in
the future.
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Multi-Viewpoint-Clustering Analysis (MVP-CA)
Technology for Analysis of Integrated Marine Multi-Agent
Command and Control System (IMMACCS)
Mala Mehrotra & Dmitri Bobrovnikoff
Pragati Synergetic Research, Inc., Cupertino CA.
Abstract. We present the results obtained by analyzing several IMMACCS agents with
Pragati’s Multi-ViewPoint-Clustering Analysis (MVP-CA) tool. Key findings include: exposure
of existing software architecture, generation of intermediate concept nodes to aid in user
comprehension of the knowledge base, and detection of templatizable regions which could make
the system more reusable and interoperable. Pragati’s Multi-ViewPoint-Clustering Analysis
(MVP-CA) tool provides a support framework for analyzing large knowledge-based systems
from multiple perspectives through clustering. It is a semi-automated tool that allows the user to
focus attention on different aspects of the problem domain and thus provides a valuable aid for
comprehension, maintenance, interoperability, integration and evolution of large and complex
knowledge-based systems. MVP-CA generates usage-based knowledge trees by reverse
engineering a knowledge base in a user-directed fashion. Often, the actual usage patterns are
found to contrast in interesting ways with pre-declared class hierarchies such as the IMMACCS
object model. The application of the MVP-CA tool provides a high-level functional view of the
base ontology and the rules that use it. It augments the information-centric base ontology with a
knowledge-centric view by extracting clusters of rules having a functional basis or role in the
system.

1.

Motivation

The IMMACCS (Integrated Marine Multi-Agent Command and Control System) system,
developed by CAD Research Center, provides near real-time decision support for military
command and control personnel in the form of enhanced situation awareness. It is an adaptive
system that uses agents to filter and tag information according to its currency, relevance and
reliability. IMMACCS works collaboratively, with the computer-based agents helping human
users to solve the problem at hand. In order to be responsive to human intent, the system has
been designed to process information, not just data. It accomplishes this goal by maintaining a
global IMMACCS Object Model that allows it to access objects in terms of their behavioral
characteristics and relationships to other objects. An agent engine is responsible for the
environment’s dynamic problem-solving aspects. It generates the desired views of the battle
space to support the planning and training activities. The informational aspects of the objects are
thus separated from the logic aspects of the system.
The bulk of the effort in building such multi-agent systems has thus been devoted to attempting
to define the information nuggets or objects at a high-enough conceptual level. Such an ontology
needs to capture the belief system for each agent so that the problem to be solved can be
formulated in concrete as well as natural terms. In other words, the aim is to capture the realworld problem environment in terms of all objects of interest in the environment, their
behavioral characteristics, and their interrelationships, such that the problem solving aspects of
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the agents can be simplified. Agent reasoning and collaboration can then take place in the
context of such an ontology through formulation of simplified agent rules.
Even though every effort needs to be taken to define the right information at the right conceptual
level in the ontology, it is often the case that all the different aspects of object and problem
definition cannot be foreseen a priori in the forward engineering phase of the project. Often
certain subtle but important relationships become evident through time, after studying the
patterns of data/information accesses in the system. In this project, we have shown the feasibility
of detecting such patterns in the knowledge base through Pragati’s MVP-CA (Multi-ViewPoint
Clustering Analaysis) technology, so as to expose the system in the context of how the various
concepts are used in the knowledge base, as opposed to how they are declared. By advocating
such a reverse engineering approach,we provide a complementary perspective on the
relationships of the concepts. The clusters provide us with a functional perspective on the degree
to which concepts are inter-related in the system. Also if there are gaps across the declared
concepts, then formation of intermediate level concepts is suggested by the system. Therefore,
the advantage in reverse engineering these systems is that the knowledge being exposed has a
functional basis, that is, one is conscious of how it is being used, as opposed to how they were
declared. Hence, new connections across concepts can be created and defined contextually.
In our experience with the IMMACCS system, we have discovered that even though the rules in
the agents are well-organized in their respective groups, each rule is rather long, containing a lot
of repeated clauses across the rules. Since each rule references many different types of objects
from the object model, the knowledge base becomes very opaque from an understandability
point of view; one has to frequently switch contexts in order to understand each rule. Often, a set
of rules display only slight variations on a base concept. This implies either a need for additional
structure in the object model to accommodate the variations, or else a need to factor the
commonalities into higher-level rules. Such changes would serve to make the rule base more
efficient and comprehensible. The strong similarity across groups of rules can also be exploited
to formulate rule templates that would facilitate
� identification of interoperable/reusable components in the system
� new knowledge acquisition and
� long-term maintenance of the rules
In this paper we discuss our experiences of applying Pragati’s Multi-ViewPoint-Clustering
Analysis (MVP-CA) prototype tool to expose such conceptual modules in a system, by
performing a combination of statistical and semantic clustering on the rules in the system. These
clusters can provide a foundation for building intermediate concept nodes in the knowledge base
as they expose groups of rules in the context of their usage. As an alternative to the declared
class-subclass hierarchy in the IMMACCS object model, MVP-CA tool semi-automatically
generates a complementary knowledge tree by reverse engineering the knowledge base. Thus the
application of the MVP-CA tool is shown to provide an even higher-level view of the base
ontology, that is, augment the base ontology which is information-centric with even higher-level
abstractions which promises to make the system knowledge-centric.
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2.

Multi-ViewPoint Cluster Analysis (MVP-CA) Technology

Overview of the MVP-CA Tool
Pragati’s Multi-ViewPoint-Clustering Analysis (MVP-CA) tool provides a framework for
clustering large, homogeneous knowledge-based systems from multiple perspectives. It is a
semi-automated tool allowing the user to focus attention on different aspects of the problem,
thus providing a valuable aid for comprehension, maintenance, integration and evolution of
knowledge-based systems (Mehrotra 1994, Mehrotra 1995b, Mehrotra 1996). The generation of
clusters to capture significant concepts in the domain seems more feasible in knowledge-based
systems than in procedural software as the control aspects are abstracted away in the inference
engine. It is our contention that the MVP-CA tool can form a valuable aid in exposing the
conceptual software structures in such systems, so that various software engineering efforts can
be carried out meaningfully, instead of in a brute-force or ad-hoc manner. In addition, insight
can be obtained for better reengineering of the software, to achieve run-time efficiency as well as
reduce long-term maintenance costs. It is our intention to provide a comprehension aid base first,
through our MVP-CA tool, for supporting all these software engineering activities (Mehrotra
1999).
The MVP-CA tool consists of two major stages: Cluster Generation and Cluster Analysis. In the
Cluster Generation phase the focus is on generating meaningful clusters through clustering
analysis techniques augmented with semantics-based measures. The clustering algorithm starts
with each rule as a cluster. At each step of the algorithm, two clusters which are the most
“similar” are merged together to form a new cluster. This pattern of merging forms a hierarchy
of clusters from the single-member rule clusters to a cluster containing all the rules. The
“similarity” of rules is defined by a set of heuristic distance metrics which measure the
relatedness of two rules in a rule base. The type of information captured by the metrics is to
some degree dependent on the class of the expert system being analyzed (Chandra 1986,
Mehrotra and Wild 1995, Mehrotra 1995). By utilizing different distance metrics and parameters
for those metrics, individual clustering runs are generated. Once clusters have been found, the
Cluster Analysis Phase can proceed. In this phase, the user is aided by a set of detection routines
that flag potentially interesting clusters. Parent clusters and child clusters help the user in either
breaking up a high level concept into constituent concepts or combining lower level concepts
into higher-level abstract concepts. Often the formation of higher-level concepts is reflected in
the topology of the mergings, which can be visualized through dendograms presented by the
tool. This then points to the groups that need to be examined more closely. The clustering and
analysis process is iterative; results from one clustering run will often suggest a new set of
parameters for a subsequent run.
Overview of IMMACCS
The FIRES agent is one of thirteen agents that have been built in IMMACCS. Some of the other
agents are: Sentinel, Rules of Engagement (ROE), Engagements, Logistics, Hazard, Intelligence,
Decision Point, Blue-On-Blue Agent. The FIRES agent responds to “Call for Fire” messages in
the system. In response to such a message its purpose is to select the best weapon based on
availability, deliverability and acceptability. To accomplish this goal it accesses concepts such as
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range, time of flight, target type, urgency, circular error of probability (CEP), effective casualty
rate (ECR), availability and rules of engagement (ROE) from the IMMACCS object model. The
deconfliction rules in the FIRES agent also address the trajectory of the munitions relative to the
position of other friendly assets and infra structure objects. The FIRES agent contains 49 COOL
rules and is the largest knowledge base compared to the other thirteen in IMMACCS. The total
number of rules across all agent rules in IMMACCS is 153.

3.

Experimental Results

Multiple runs were performed with different parameter settings for the FIRES agent data set. In
this section we discuss the results of those clustering runs.. We first describe the high-level
software architecture and then present the three broad categories of concepts that were
discovered, Conflicts, Targeting and Weapons. We can generalize the qualitative aspects of our
results by stating that the clusterings helped us discover the following:
�
�

�

High-level software architecture
o To aid comprehension of the knowledge base by helping us extract the “big”
picture
Opportunities for insertion of intermediate concept nodes in the object model
o To aid more efficient knowledge organization (static ontological engineering
aspect) and
o To aid with search and retrieval of concept terms (dynamic aspect)
Opportunities for template formation (structurally common axioms) in both intra- and
inter-agent analysis
o To aid detection of interoperable rule sets having a functional basis
o To aid more efficient knowledge entry

3.1 IMMACCS FIRES Agent’s Software Architecture
Figure 1 provides a high-level view of the FIRES agent’s software architecture, as extracted
using the MVP-CA clustering tool. Concepts have been identified at two levels. On the top-level
we have discovered three main or broad categories of problem-solving concepts. We have called
these the Weapons, Targeting and Conflicts group. The names for these groups have been coined
in an attempt to categorize the various observation subgroups that were found to exist under the
broad concept. In other words these groups consist of other subgroups feeding into the umbrella
concept consisting of Weapons, Targeting or Conflicts.
The subgroups that were found to exist under the Weapons group deal with either weapon
capabilities or guided munitions or concentrate on various aspects of Weapon Presentation. The
Weapon Presentation group further subdivides into the Weapon Selection and Weapon
Recommendation groups. The Conflicts cluster had two parallel sets of rules that dealt with the
concept of a weapon trajectory conflict due to a building or a rotary wing being in the way. The
concept of Targeting yielded two major subgroups that utilize disjoint concepts of non-enemy
entity near target and target range for the solution process. The discussions that follow will be in
the context of these subgroups that were identified through the tool.
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Targeting
Weapons

Non-enemy
entity near
target

Weapon Capabilities

Target Range

Guided Munition
Weapon Presentation
Weapon Selection
Weapon Recommendation

Conflicts
Blocking
Rotary Wing

Blocking
Building

Figure 1: IMMACCS FIRES Agent’s Software Architecture (Extracted via MVP-CA)

3.2 Intermediate Concept Formation
Intermediate concept node formation is geared towards augmenting the system’s object model or
ontology from a functional perspective. All the relationships in the object model are declared in
the forward engineering phase of system development. Reverse engineering the system through
clustering provides a “hind-sight” benefit in evaluating those relationships in the context of their
usage. In other words, if a certain combination of concepts proves handy for providing a
particular functionality, perhaps a composite concept addressing that functional aspect needs to
be in place in the object model as an abbreviation or shorthand reflecting the reuse of the
combination. Intermediate concept node formation is very akin to common factoring in compiler
design where the code that is used repeatedly can be factored out and compiled in an optimized
manner for run-time efficiency. It allows the user to formulate his/her ideas in terms of
composite concepts so that, once a base rule captures the essence of the functionality in the
common set, only the unique portions need to be mentioned in the new rules. We have
mentioned in our preamble that each rule in IMMACCS is so long that the meaning is not
immediately clear from a manual examination of the rule base. Clustering the rules in
IMMACCS showed that repeated references were being made to the same objects in the object
model, with only very minor variations across a rule set. Intermediate concept node formation
attempts to abstract the commonalities across the objects in a rule cluster, so that the future rule
formulations are simplified conceptually.
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Thus, in order to reduce the opaqueness of the rules we have proposed the following solution for
restructuring the rule base through the formation of intermediate concept nodes:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Identify clusters of rules with similar content.
Create an intermediate object to capture functional aspects of the rule cluster.
Formulate a base rule with the intermediate object to capture the commonalities.
Adapt original rules as a derivation from base rule and instantiation of the intermediate
object.

Figure 2: Term Usage for Conflicts Cluster
Consider for example, the Conflicts cluster represented in Figure 2. It contains two subclusters:
conflicts due to blocking rotary wing and conflicts due to blocking building. The figure shows the
objects from the IMMACCS object model, such as Munitions, Entity, Position, etc. that are
referenced by the rules in the cluster. Notice however, that the Rotary Wing is exclusive to one
sub cluster and so is Structure and Dimension, because the arc from these nodes lead to only
their respective sub clusters. Figure 2, and others that follow, represent visually how
intermingled the various object nodes are with respect to the problem formulation. The
cluster consists of the following rules:
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule

#
#
#
#
#
#

44
45
46
47
48
49

FIRES::Structure_Trajectory_Weapon
FIRES::Structure_Trajectory_Entity
FIRES::Structure_Trajectory_Platform
FIRES::RotaryWing_Trajectory_Weapon
FIRES::RotaryWing_Trajectory_Entity
FIRES::RotaryWing_Trajectory_Platform
Rules for Conflicts Cluster
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We present the Structure_Trajectory_Weapon rule from the FIRES agent in Program Segment
1 to show its complexity. This rule fires if a building is blocking the trajectory of a weapon.
While not detailed here, the other rules in the conflicts due to blocking rotary wing cluster,
(defrule FIRES::Structure_Trajectory_Weapon
(declare (salience -5))
(object (is-a Agent)(name ?oFireAgent)(agentId "FIRES"))
(object (is-a CallForFire)(name ?oCFF)(targetLocation ?oTargetPos))
(object (is-a Position)(name ?oTargetPos)(latitude ?fTLAT)
(longitude ?fTLONG)(altitude ?fTa))
(object (is-a WeaponSelection)(name ?oWS)(CFFId ?oCFF)
(cons $?lCONS)(pros $?lPROS)(choice FEASIBLE)(ammoType AMMO)
(rating ?nRATING)(ammoId ?oMN)(weaponId ?oLW)(entityId ?oET))
(test (member$ "within range" $?lPROS))
(object (is-a Munitions)(name ?oMN)(maxSpeed ?V))
(object (is-a LethalWeapon)(name ?oLW)(encyclopedic FALSE)
(weaponAmmo ?oMN)(location ?WLoc))
(object (is-a TrackPosition)(name ?oWLoc)(latitude ?fENTLAT)
(longitude ?fENTLONG)(altitude ?fSa))
(test (<> ?fENTLAT ?fENTLONG 0))
(object (is-a Structure)(referenceName ?building)
(location ?oBuildingPos)(structureDimension ?oDimen))
(object (is-a Dimension)(name ?oDimen)(height ?fheight))
(object (is-a Position)(name ?oBuildingPos&~?oTargetPos)
(latitude ?fBLAT)(longitude ?fBLONG)(altitude ?fBa))
(test (InTheWay ?fENTLAT ?fENTLONG ?fBLAT ?fBLONG ?fTLAT ?fTLONG))
(test (not (member$ (str-cat ?building
", potential obstacle in trajectory path") $?lCONS )))
(test (> 0 (TrajectoryCheck ?fENTLAT ?fENTLONG ?fSa ?fBLAT ?fBLONG
(+ ?fBa ?fheight) ?fTLAT ?fTLONG ?fTa ?V)))
=>
(bind ?delta (TrajectoryCheck ?fENTLAT ?fENTLONG ?fSa ?fBLAT ?fBLONG
(+ ?fBa ?fheight) ?fTLAT ?fTLONG ?fTa ?V))
(send ?oWS put-rating (+ ?nRATING (* 10 ?delta)))
(send ?oWS put-cons (insert$ $?lCONS 1 (create$ (str-cat ?building
", potential obstacle in trajectory path")))))
Program Segment 1: Original “Structure_Trajectory_Weapon” Rule

Structure_Trajectory_Entity and Structure_Trajectory_Platform, are very similar to
Structure_Trajectory_Weapon.
Upon examination of rules 44, 45, and 46, we find that it is possible to factor out the rules’
shared object usage by introducing an intermediate concept node,
ConflictDueToBlockingBuilding, as shown in Program Segment 2.
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(make-instance of ConflictDueToBlockingBuilding
; building-related slots
(buildingName ?building) (buildingLatitude ?fBLAT)
(buildingLongitude ?fBLONG) (buildingAltitude ?fBa)
(buildingHeight ?fheight)
; target-related slots
(targetLatitude ?fTLAT) (targetLongitude ?fTLONG)
(targetAltitude ?fTa)
; munition-related slots
(munitionMaxSpeed ?V)
; weapon selection-related slots
(weaponSelection ?oWS) (weaponId ?oLW) (ammoId ?oMN)
(weaponRating ?nRATING) (weaponCons ?lCONS))
Program Segment 2: Intermediate Concept Node
“ConflictDueToBlockingBuilding”

We also introduce a new base rule, Structure_Trajectory, that abstracts the rules’ common
functionality. This base rule appears in Program Segment 3.
(defrule FIRES::Structure_Trajectory
(declare (salience -5))
(object (is-a Agent) (name ?oFireAgent)(agentId "FIRES"))
(object (is-a CallForFire) (name ?oCFF)
(targetLocation ?oTargetPos))
(object (is-a Position) (name ?oTargetPos) (latitude ?fTLAT)
(longitude ?fTLONG) (altitude ?fTa))
(object (is-a WeaponSelection)(name ?oWS) (CFFId ?oCFF)
(cons $?lCONS)(pros $?lPROS) (choice FEASIBLE)
(ammoType AMMO) (rating ?nRATING)(ammoId ?oMN)
(weaponId ?oLW))
(test (member$ "within range" $?lPROS))
(object (is-a Munitions) (name ?oMN) (maxSpeed ?V))
(object (is-a Structure) (referenceName ?building)
(location ?oBuildingPos) (structureDimension ?oDimen))
(object (is-a Dimension) (name ?oDimen) (height ?fheight))
(object (is-a Position) (name ?oBuildingPos&~?oTargetPos)
(latitude ?fBLAT) (longitude ?fBLONG) (altitude ?fBa))
(test (not (member$ (str-cat ?building
", potential obstacle in trajectory path") $?lCONS )))
=>
; create intermediate object
(make-instance of ConflictDueToBlockingBuilding
... [see above for full intermediate object definition]))
Program Segment 3: New Rule Structure Trajectory

Given the new object and the new rule described above, each of rules 44, 45, and 46 can be
simplified. For example, a simplified Rule Structure_Trajectory_Weapon is shown in Program
Segment 4.

150

(defrule FIRES::Structure_Trajectory_Weapon
(declare (salience -5))
; match intermediate object
(object (is-a ConflictDueToBlockingBuilding)
(buildingName ?building) (buildingLatitude ?fBLAT)
(buildingLongitude ?fBLONG) (buildingAltitude ?fBa)
(buildingHeight ?fheight) (targetLatitude ?fTLAT)
(targetLongitude ?fTLONG) (targetAltitude ?fTa)
(munitionMaxSpeed ?V) (weaponSelection ?oWS)
(weaponRating ?nRATING) (weaponCons ?lCONS)
(ammoId ?oMN) (weaponId ?oLW))
(object (is-a WeaponSelection)(name ?oWS)( entityId ?oET))
(object (is-a LethalWeapon)(name ?oLW)(encyclopedic FALSE)
(weaponAmmo ?oMN)(location ?WLoc))
(object (is-a TrackPosition)(name ?oWLoc)
(latitude ?fENTLAT)(longitude ?fENTLONG)(altitude ?fSa))
(test (<> ?fENTLAT ?fENTLONG 0))
(test (InTheWay ?fENTLAT ?fENTLONG ?fBLAT ?fBLONG ?fTLAT ?fTLONG))
(test (not (member$ (str-cat ?building ", potential obstacle in
trajectory path") $?lCONS )))
(test (> 0 (TrajectoryCheck ?fENTLAT ?fENTLONG ?fSa ?fBLAT ?fBLONG
(+ ?fBa ?fheight) ?fTLAT ?fTLONG ?fTa ?V)))
=> … [same as the original rule]
Program Segment 4: Simplified Rule Structure_Trajectory_Weapon

Rules 45 and 46 would be similarly simplified.
A similar operation can be carried out on rules 47, 48, and 49 by introducing a new intermediate
concept node, ConflictDueToBlockingRotaryWing and a new base rule. In fact the two new rules
that we introduce can be further factored out because they are fairly similar except for the
difference as shown in Program Segment 5.
Portion of rule for ConflictDueToBlockingBuilding:
(object (is-a RotaryWing) (encyclopedic FALSE)
(referenceName ?chopter) (location ?oChopterPos))
(object (is-a TrackPosition) (name ?oChopterPos) (latitude ?fBLAT)
(longitude ?fBLONG) (altitude ?fBa))

Portion of rule for ConflictDueToBlockingRotaryWing:
(object (is-a Structure)(referenceName ?building)
(location ?oBuildingPos)(structureDimension ?oDimen))
(object (is-a Dimension)(name ?oDimen)(height ?fheight))
(object (is-a Position)(name ?oBuildingPos&~?oTargetPos)
(latitude ?fBLAT)(longitude ?fBLONG)(altitude ?fBa))
Program Segment 5: Differences in rules for

ConflictDueToBlockingBuilding and ConflictDueToBlockingRotaryWing
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Thus by formulating a higher-level intermediate concept node, in this example
ConflictDueToBlockingObject, we can significantly simplify the design of sets of related rules.
No doubt the designer had such a concept in mind while writing the these six rules that appear in
the above cluster. However, because the domain ontology does not have the infrastructure for
defining composite concepts, the deficiency manifests itself in the rules being unusually long and
unreadable. Revelation of such higher-level concepts would have taken tedious manual
inspection without our tool. We could have used the rule names as being suggestive of the
similarity across the rules; however, the strength of our tool lies in exposing these similarities
without depending on the rule naming conventions. Moreover, as we have seen above,
sometimes a central concept like conflict for the cluster has not been mentioned even once in the
rule name. Hence it is dangerous to base any conclusions on such a superficial examination.
Such revelations from clustering the system can be exploited to restructure rules for readability
and reorganize the ontology hierarchy in the object model. The contention is that such an
exercise would in the long run make knowledge entry more efficient and reliable while
increasing the run-time efficiency of system because bulk of the instantiations will have to be
invoked only once for a set of rules.
3.3 Templatizable Clusters
In this section we show the templatization application of clustering in the context of the targeting
and weapon capabilities addressed by IMMACCS. Clustering juxtaposes structurally similar
rules that can be generalized and used to generate templates. Thus certain portions of the code
can be treated like the constants of an equation common to the various instantiations; the rest are
the variable parameters. Such templates can be used as an aid to high-level knowledge entry as
we illustrate in a couple of examples below.
3.3.1 The Targeting Cluster

Figure 3: Term Usage for Targeting Cluster
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Within the general concept of targeting we discovered two subclusters, as shown in Figure 3.
The first subcluster, which we call non-enemy entity near target, has only two rules. These are
applicable when non-enemy entities, such as civilians or friendly forces, are near a target. The
second subcluster, which we call target range, has six rules dealing with targets being in or out
of range. Figure 3 shows that many objects such as Lethal Weapon, Entity, Weapon Selection
etc. are used by both conceptual clusters. However, Munitions and CivilianOrganization are used
exclusively by non-enemy entity near target and Platform is used only by target range. Notice
that the majority of the objects are accessed by both clusters.
The rules in the cluster are shown below and the template for the rules are given in Program
Segment 6. The slots to be filled in the template are bold and in angle brackets.

FIRES::Friend_Unit_Near_Target
FIRES::Civilian_Entity_Near_Target

If a new type of non-enemy entity different from civilian or friendly forces is identified—say, a
non-aligned force—this template can be used to put the rules in place very quickly by giving the
filler slots values for the new setting. The basic skeleton is in place now to perform this function
efficiently and reliably.
(declare (salience -5))
(object (is-a Agent)(name ?oFireAgent)(agentId "FIRES"))
(object (is-a CallForFire)(name ?oCFF) (targetLocation ?oTargetPos))
(object (is-a Position)(name ?oTargetPos)(latitude ?fTLAT)
(longitude ?fTLONG))
(object (is-a WeaponSelection)(name ?oWS)(CFFId ?oCFF)
(cons $?lCONS)(pros $?lPROS)(rating ?nRATING)
(ammoId ?oMN)(weaponId ?oLW)(entityId ?oET))
(object (is-a Munitions)(name ?oMN)(CEP ?nCEP)(ECR ?nECR))
(object (is-a LethalWeapon)(name ?oLW)(weaponAmmo ?oMN)
(location ?WLoc))
(object (is-a TrackPosition)(name ?WLoc)(latitude 0.0)
(longitude 0.0)) <non-enemy-entity>
<optional-friend-code>
(object (is-a TrackPosition)(name ?oENTPS)(latitude ?fENTLAT)
(longitude ?fENTLONG))
(test(and (not
(member$ <non-enemy-entity-near-target-message> $?lCONS))
(<= (kmDegDistance ?fENTLAT ?fENTLONG ?fTLAT ?fTLONG)
(/ (+ ?nCEP ?nECR) 1000))))
=>
(bind ?d (DegDistance2 ?fENTLAT ?fENTLONG ?fTLAT ?fTLONG km))
(if (<= ?d 0) then (bind ?d 0.001)) <cep-binding>
(bind ?drating (* -15 (/ ?cep ?d)))
(send ?oWS put-rating (RatingPercentage ?nRATING ?drating))
(send ?oWS put-cons (insert$ $?lCONS 1
(create$ <non-enemy-entity-near-target-message>))))
Program Segment 6: Template for the group non-enemy entity near target
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3.3.2 The Weapons Cluster
There are three major subgroups within the general concept of weapons: weapon capabilities,
weapon timing and weapon presentation. The majority of the objects from the object model are
used by the rules in these major subgroups. Due to the information overload in each rule, in order
to understand the rules functionally, one has to draw meaning from the rules based upon their
structure, that is, on how they are being used, and not just on what is the content. Here, MVP-CA
aids us by exposing this usage information. Details of all the various groups and subgroups have
been discussed in the ONR final report (Mehrotra 2001). In this paper we choose the weapon
presentation cluster for templatization. The rules in this cluster deal with various aspects of
weapon selection and weapon recommendation, concepts which form the two major subgroups.
As evidenced by Figure 4, Weapon Selection uses Entity, Munitions and Platform whereas
Weapon Recommendation uses the extra concept of Alert from the object model. This group
merges the concepts of “weapon selection” and “weapon recommendation”.

Figure 4: Term Usage for Weapon Presentation Cluster
The rules for weapon selection are
FIRES::Recommend_Best_Weapon
FIRES::Recommend_Feasible_Weapon
FIRES::No_Best_Weapon_Recommendation
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And rules for weapon recommendation are
FIRES::WeaponSelection_NoPlatform_NoEntity
FIRES::WeaponSelection_NoWeapon_NoPlatform_NoEntity
FIRES::CreateWeaponSelection_Entity
FIRES::CreateWeaponSelection_Entity_Platform

Program Segment 7 shows a template for rules related to weapon recommendations. The rule
saliences are set so a best weapon recommendation alert shows up before the list of feasible
weapons. If there is no weapon recommendation, an alert to that effect shows up instead.

(declare (salience <salience>))
(object (is-a Agent)(name ?oFireAgent)(agentId "FIRES"))
(object (is-a CallForFire)(name ?oCFF))
?lw <- (object (is-a LethalWeapon)(name ?oLW))
(object (is-a WeaponSelection)(name ?oWS)(CFFId ?oCFF)
(choice <specific-choice>)(rating ?nR1)(weaponId ?oLW)
(ammoId ?oMN)(platformId ?oPF)(entityId ?oEN))
(not(object (is-a Alert)(alertAgent ?oFireAgent)
(causeObjects ?oCFF ?oMN ?oLW ?oPF ?oEN)))
=>
(bind ?msg (WeaponSummary ?oWS))
(bind ?weaponName (send ?lw get-referenceName))
(make-instance (GetUniqueName Alert) of Alert
(source "FIRES")(sourceReliability COMPLETELY)
(referenceName (str-cat <recommendation-name> ?weaponName ))
(alertMessage ?msg)(alertAgent ?oFireAgent)
(causeObjects ?oCFF ?oMN ?oLW ?oPF ?oEN)))

<specific-choice> can take the values:
Best, Feasible

<recommendation-name> can take the values:
Recommend_Best_Weapon, Recommend_Feasible_Weapon
Program Segment 7: Template for weapon recommendation
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Another interesting cluster worth mentioning was obtained for weapon timing in the guided
munitions cluster. The following rules were members of this cluster:

FIRES::Weapon_OnTime_Emergency
FIRES::Weapon_NotOnTime_Emergency
FIRES::Weapon_OnTime_Immediate
FIRES::Weapon_NotOnTime_Immediate
FIRES::Entity_Weapon_OnTime_Emergency
FIRES::Entity_Weapon_NotOnTime_Emergency
FIRES::Entity_Weapon_OnTime_Immediate
FIRES::Entity_Weapon_NotOnTime_Immediate
FIRES::Platform_Weapon_OnTime_Emergency
FIRES::Platform_Weapon_NotOnTime_Emergency
FIRES::Platform_Weapon_OnTime_Immediate
FIRES::Platform_Weapon_NotOnTime_Immediate

This cluster picks up rules related to various aspects of weapon timing: emergency, immediate,
on time, or not on time. All rules in the above cluster follow the same naming pattern
{Entity_,Platform_}_Weapon_{OnTime,NotOnTime}_ {Emergency,Immediate}. Many of the
rules in this group are quite similar to each other, providing opportunities for templating and/or
abstractions to higher levels of the ontology. For instance, if we compare the rule
(FIRES::Weapon_OnTime_Emergency) and rule (FIRES::Weapon_NotOnTime_Emergency) we
find that they are almost identical except for using opposite operators. This is a bit different
from the examples of templating given in other observations (reference, for example, “nonenemy entity near target”). Most of those examples illustrate parallel concepts such as “civilians
near a target” and “friendly forces near a target”. Here, the concepts
“Weapon_OnTime_Emergency” and “Weapon_NotOnTime_Emergency” are complementary
rather than parallel. Parallel similarities occur between many of the rules, and are evident both
through the rule naming covention and the clustering results.

4.0

Results from Inter-agent Clustering

In this section we present the results from clustering across agents in IMMACCS. Rules with
striking similarities were found showing the role of clustering in exposing interoperability issues
in the system, that is, functionalities that span across agents, and could perhaps impact future
construction of similar systems. We found that clustering brought into focus rules across agents
that had same rule names even though content was slightly different in each. When examined
closely, each rule had been adapted just slightly for addressing the specialized behavior in their
context. An example is presented in Program Segments 8, 9 and 10 for updating and
acknowledging the Call for Fire Alert message. In the BLUEONBLUE and ROE agents the
“causeObjects” object is referenced instead of the “affectObjects” as in the INTEL agent. The
rest of the functionality across the rules is more or less similar, except for a few extra assertions
being made in the consequent of the ROE rule for the SENTINEL agent. This proves that
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clustering can provide opportunities for higher level concept formation across agents. They can
be considered as prime candidates for templatization as well, across various agents, thus
addressing the need for functional abstraction when designing various agents.

(defrule BLUEONBLUE::UpdateAcknowledgedCFFAlertMessage
?agent <- (object (is-a Agent)(name ?agentName)(agentId "BLUEONBLUE"))
?cff <- (object (is-a CallForFire)(name ?cffName)
(acknowledged TRUE)
(targetNumber ?targetNum&:(neq ?targetNum "")))
?alert <- (object (is-a Alert)(source "BLUEONBLUE")
(alertAgent ?agentName)
(causeObjects $?causeObjects&:(member$ ?cffName ?causeObjects)))
=>
(bind ?msgFormat
(str-cat(send ?alert get-alertMessage)
"%n“ "+++ ACKNOWLEDGED +++%n""
CallForFire has been acknowledged with%n"" target number %s"))
(bind ?alertMessage (format nil ?msgFormat ?targetNum))
(send ?alert update-slot alertMessage ?alertMessage)
(send ?alert update-slot acknowledged FALSE))
Program Segment 8: Rule for the BLUEONBLUE Agent

(defrule INTEL::UpdateAcknowledgedCFFAlertMessage
?agent <- (object (is-a Agent)(name ?agentName)(agentId "INTEL"))
?cff <- (object (is-a CallForFire)(name ?cffName)
(source "INTEL")
(acknowledged TRUE)
(targetNumber ?targetNum&:(neq ?targetNum "")))
?alert <- (object (is-a Alert)(source "INTEL")
(alertAgent ?agentName)
(affectObjects ?cffName))
=>
(bind ?msgFormat
(str-cat(send ?alert get-alertMessage)
"%n""+++ ACKNOWLEDGED +++%n""
CallForFire has been acknowledged with%n"" target number %s"))
(bind ?alertMessage (format nil ?msgFormat ?targetNum))
(send ?alert update-slot alertMessage ?alertMessage)
(send ?alert update-slot acknowledged FALSE))
Program Segment 9: Rule for the INTEL Agent

5.0

Concluding Remarks

In this project the feasibility of applying the MVP-CA tool to a multi-agent system was
demonstrated. It has been shown that a semi-automated tool such as Pragati’s MVP-CA (MultiViewPoint Clustering Analysis) tool can provide valuable aid for comprehension, maintenance,
integration and evolution of expert systems by structuring a large knowledge base in various
meaningful ways. The similarity in existing rule bases can be exploited by the MVP-CA tool to
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“mine” the knowledge existent in them, thus paving the way for these systems to be elevated to
becoming knowledge-centric, instead of remaining at the information-centric level. To achieve
this goal, the knowledge in the system must be suitably abstracted, structured, and otherwise
clustered in a manner that facilitates software engineering activities (Mehrotra and Barr 1998,
Mehrotra et al. 1999a, Mehrotra et al. 1999b). Hence, by exposing the knowledge contained in
knowledge-based system through the Multi-ViewPoint Clustering Analysis tool, we formulate a
basis for addressing reusability, maintainability, and reliability issues for such systems.
Clustering showed that the strong similarity across groups of rules can be exploited to build
more hierarchically organized rules. It also showed how to reorganize the object model to suit
the application demands in terms of slight variations on base concepts and how to discover as
well as relieve some of the pressure points in the declared object model. Creation of intermediate
concept nodes abstracts common functionalities and allows the user to think in terms of higherlevel concepts and goals. Clustering also helps to identify under/over-used concepts across
agents which may be over/under-specified in the object model and make proper adjustments to
the ontology or the rules. Formulation of templates can help facilitate new knowledge acquisition
and long-term maintenance of the rules. Most importantly, clustering aids in the identification of
common functionalities across agents and the identification of reusable components in the
knowledge base, thus addressing interoperability issues in the system.
(defrule ROE::UpdateAcknowledgedCFFAlertMessage
(object (is-a Agent)(name ?agentName)(agentId "ROE"))
?cff <- (object (is-a CallForFire)(name ?cffName)
(acknowledged TRUE)
(targetNumber ?targetNum&:(neq ?targetNum "")))
?alert <- (object (is-a Alert)(source "ROE")
(alertAgent ?agentName)
(causeObjects $?causeObjects&:(member$ ?cffName
?causeObjects)))
=>
(bind ?msgFormat (str-cat(send ?alert get-alertMessage)
"%n""+++ ACKNOWLEDGED +++%n""
CallForFire has been acknowledged with%n"" target number %s"))
(bind ?alertMessage (format nil ?msgFormat ?targetNum))
(send ?alert update-slot alertMessage ?alertMessage)
(send ?alert update-slot acknowledged FALSE))
(deffacts MAIN::SENTINEL_Facts
(SENTINEL_RED_RANGE_METERS 4000.0)
(SENTINEL_CFF_RANGE_METERS 500.0))
Program Segment 10: Rule for the ROE Agent

6.0

Future Work

Having shown the feasibility and usefulness of clustering a multi-agent command and control
system such as IMMACCS, we are now poised to study the design issues to be considered for
building reusable, interoperable ontologies. Even though the goal of an ontological engineer is to
try and formulate the ontology in a general manner, in reality, the design issues in an ontology
are influenced by the need to solve the problem at hand in an optimal fashion. Hence, an
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ontology written for a specific problem slants the views in the ontology towards being efficient
at formulating the problems in that class. The level of detail for an object definition, object type
specification, an object’s placement in the ontological hierarchy to reflect its relationships to
other objects in the ontology, all get influenced by the overall problem solving goals for the
agent(s) that will use the ontology. This implicit bias poses a problem for reuse of the ontology
for subsequent projects, in which agents have to often deal with a slight shift in focus on the
problem solving aspects, while using a domain similar to the previous project.
Due to the existence of biases in the existing ontology’s perspective, a new problem will likely
be formulated in the old framework clumsily at best; in some cases, it may note be possible to
formulate the problem at all. The good news is that ontological engineers can often provide
insight into the types of modifications needed to render the old framework reusable for the new
problem. However, the cost of understanding the complexities in the current ontology, recasting
the new problem in the old framework and then deciding what changes should take place in the
old ontology to effect a natural problem formulation, is an expensive proposition. The frequency
with which old ontologies need to be recast as well as the extent to which they need to be recast,
warrants that a high level approach be taken towards semi-automating some of the ontology
redesign tasks. The focus of our future work will, therefore be to create a software support
environment for building and reusing ontologies so that the cost of ontology design in multiagent systems is amortized over several different projects. The MVP-CA tool will help guide the
design process by revealing important hidden relationships across objects in existing ontologies,
so that they can be made explicit and usable for future construction of intelligent agent-based
systems.
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Abstract
SEAWAY is an ICDM-based decision support application. A computational intelligence based
planning agent is described that optimizes delivery of supplies according to a statement of
requirements to a number of operational units onshore from a sea base. The statement of
requirements contains required items, priorities, and time windows. A preliminary version of the
planning agent that uses evolutionary computation has been demonstrated. This approach allows
rapid planning, and rapid re-planning as the situation changes.

Keywords
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Introduction
SEAWAY was developed as an ICDM-based decision-support application. ICDM provides a
formalized architecture with a set of development and execution tools that can be utilized to
design, develop, and execute agent-based, decision-support applications. The ICDM model has
three layers, which are defined as illustrated in Figure 1. CDM Technologies, San Luis Obispo,
California has coordinated and led SEAWAY development, including development of the ICDM
model.

Computational Intelligence
Computational intelligence is a process or methodology involving computing (usually involving
a computer) that exhibits an ability to adapt to new situations, and/or to self-organize, such that
the system is perceived to possess attributes such as reason, decision, prediction, implication, and
intention. Capabilities of a system with computational intelligence may include generalization,
discovery, abstraction, and/or association. Put another way, computational intelligence
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comprises practical adaptation and/or self-organization concepts, paradigms, algorithms, and
implementations that enable or facilitate intelligent behavior in complex and changing
environments (Eberhart et al. 1996).

Presentation Tier
Client User
Interface

Client User
Interface

Client User
Interface

Information Tier

Persistence

Information
Query Server

Subscription

OODBMS

Agent Server
Agent
Session

Agent
Session

Agent
Session
Agent
Session
Agent Engine

Figure 1: ICDM system architecture
Computational intelligence systems in silicon often comprise hybrids of paradigms such as
artificial neural networks, fuzzy systems, and evolutionary computation systems, augmented
with knowledge elements. Computational intelligence silicon-based systems are often designed
to mimic or augment one or more aspects of carbon-based biological intelligence.
Evolutionary computation (EC) comprises adaptive optimization and classification paradigms
roughly based on mechanisms of evolution such as natural selection and self-organization. The
evolutionary computation field includes genetic algorithms, evolutionary programming, genetic
programming, evolution strategies, and particle swarm optimization.
Primary application areas of EC include:
•
•
•

Optimization: finding the best possible solution to a complex problem (often NP hard) in
the specified time.
Classification: operating in multiple-fault dynamic environments.
Explanation: providing explanation facilities for systems such as complex artificial neural
networks
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We view evolutionary computation as providing a foundation for computational intelligence. It
seems to us to be in some sense the mortar that holds the bricks together. All of our recent
applications involve evolutionary algorithms plus other components; the evolutionary paradigm
is always present.
An artificial neural network (ANN) is an analysis paradigm that is roughly modeled after the
massively parallel structure of the brain. It simulates a highly interconnected, parallel
computational structure with many relatively simple processing elements (PEs) (Eberhart et al.
1996). ANNs are able to approximate any non-linear function to any specified degree of
accuracy.
Primary application areas of ANNs include:
•
•
•
•
•

Classification as reflected in decision theory: determining which of a set of predefined
classes best represents an input pattern.
Associative memory: obtaining an exemplar pattern from a noisy and/or incomplete one.
Clustering, or compression: significantly reducing the dimensionality of an input.
Control systems: modeling a non-linear system as well as designing the control system.
Simulation: generation of structured sequences.

Fuzziness refers to nonstatistical imprecision and vagueness in information and data. Fuzzy sets
model the properties of imprecision, approximation, or vagueness. In a fuzzy set, fuzzy
membership values reflect the membership extents (or grades) of the elements in the set. Fuzzy
logic comprises operations on fuzzy sets, including equality, containment, complementation,
intersection, and union; it is a generalization of crisp (two-valued) logic.
Primary application areas of fuzzy systems include:
•
•

Control systems: controlling complex systems in real time.
Fuzzy expert systems: providing support in diagnostic and decision support systems

For more complete discussions of computational intelligence, see (Eberhart et al. 1996) and
(Eberhart et al. 2000).

Objectives
From the SEAWAY proof-of-concept definition (CDM Technologies, Inc. 2000), the scheduling
agent is a future-plan agent, which is an agent session in the agent engine tier. It supports the
satisfaction of logistical requirements through supply mission planning. However, there is no
pre-determined performance objective. The performance can be evaluated from following
perspectives:
•
•

Time of schedule optimization.
Dynamic scheduling. The agent can reschedule the delivery based on current progress.
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•

Based on critical resources, there can be several optimization goals, for example, shortest
time, and shortest path. For this project, the critical resources should be the number of
assets and the time window of the supply points. So the maximum weighted quantity of
supplies delivered is one kind of optimization goal.

This intelligent scheduling agent is a part of the SEAWAY system and will be incorporated into
the SEAWAY system as an agent session. More exactly, this capability exists as an
app.agent.MentorAgent agent.
The project staff at the Purdue School of Engineering and Technology at IUPUI includes Prof.
Russell Eberhart (PI), Prof. Zina Ben-Miled (Co-PI), Prof. Yaobin Chen (Consultant), Xiaohui
Hu, (Ph.D. Candidate), and Chen Wen (Graduate student).

Framework
Similar to the architecture of SEAWAY project, this scheduling agent can be divided into three
layers: the interface layer, the translation layer, and the agent layer. Figure 2 shows the layers of
the process.
Interface
Translation
Agent

Figure 2: Architecture (layers) of the scheduling agent.
The interface layer deals with the communication between the scheduling agent and other parts
of the SEAWAY system or possible user interfaces.
The translation layer is a pre-processing and post-processing step. It communicates between the
SEAWAY data and the parameters of scheduling agent, for example, distance between any two
points, speed of assets, and loading and unloading times. Other factors such as weather
parameters are transferred into the parameters in this level. It also translates the result into a
format the other parts of SEAWAY can understand.
The central agent layer is the schedule optimization agent that implements the core algorithm.
Only standardized parameters are used for the algorithm. The process can be used for a wide
variety of problems, i.e., the agent can be generalized to other kinds of scheduling problems.
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Agent Algorithm
In order to get an optimal or near-optimal result, there are several points in the scheduling system
that need to be tuned:
•
•
•

Item delivery sequence. This is the main scheduling objective.
Asset s behavior. When loaded, what kind of delivery strategy should the asset adopt to
obtain a better result? Strategy examples are loading sequence, priority sequence, and
quantity sequence.
Base point-landing rules. Each base point has its own limitations, for example, limited
landing positions for assets.

For a scheduling system, there are a variety of approaches to accomplish the optimization
(Cormen et al. 1990):
1. Linear algorithms, such as greedy algorithms, Dijkstra s algorithm, Kruskal s algorithm,
Prim s algorithm, etc.
1. Expert systems.
1. Computational intelligence (CI) tools such as genetic algorithms and particle swarm
optimization.
Linear algorithms refer to traditional ways to achieve the optimization based on detailed
established mathematical models. For example, greedy algorithms assume the problem has two
properties: a greedy-choice property and optimal structure, which are not easy to establish in this
class of problem. Furthermore, when the conditions are dynamic (as they always are in this kind
of problem), the model has to be re-established to accommodate the changes.
An expert system is a computer application that performs a task that would otherwise be
performed by a human expert . For example, there are expert systems that can diagnose human
illnesses, make financial forecasts, and schedule routes for delivery vehicles. Some expert
systems are designed to take the place of human experts, while others are designed to aid them.
To design an expert system, one needs a knowledge engineer, an individual who studies how
human experts make decisions and translates the rules into terms that a computer can understand.
For this scheduling problem, it is not easy to get the knowledge from the scheduling system and
it is also time-consuming to develop rules. More important, it is not suitable for dynamic
systems, in which things always change unexpectedly. Traditional expert systems are also
brittle. If conditions move outside their domain of expertise, they can fail catastrophically.
Now we look at CI tools. The optimization of asset behavior and base point landing rules can be
predetermined, so the optimization is the main problem, and for a given environment there
should be an optimal item delivery sequence. Therefore we can use computational intelligence
tools to find an optimal or near-optimal solution, which could not be done by linear algorithms.
Computational intelligence tools are an important means to solve non-linear problems. Possible
solutions include genetic algorithms, genetic programming, evolution strategies, evolutionary
programming, and particle swarm optimization. They share some common procedures in that
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they all generate an initial group of candidate solutions. The second step is to calculate the
fitness values of the candidate solutions. Based on their fitness values, the system generates a
new group of solutions according to some rules. The last step is to check if each solution meets
the requirements; if so, the solution is acceptably near to the optimum; otherwise, the system
goes back to the second step to repeat the procedure.
Consider the characteristics of the scheduling agent, using a genetic algorithm as the approach.
Genetic algorithms are a kind of optimization technique for functions defined in finite domains.
All the possible solutions are mapped or encoded to a finite string. The algorithm will manipulate
the string instead of the original problem.
The two key points in the GA implementation are the solution encoding and the fitness function.
In our problem, the solution is an optimized cargo delivery sequence. If every cargo item is given
a number, the solution is a number sequence that can be represented by a finite string. Fitness
values are computed for each individual of each population, and the values indicate how close
the individuals are to the optimum. Based on the fitness values, the algorithm tries to update the
population and finds the best fitness value for the problem. In this scheduling system, the fitness
function can be a simulation process, which simulates the whole transferring process based on a
given delivery sequence. In our case, the simulation result metric is how many missions have
been completed. This is the fitness value of the sequence. Then we use genetic algorithm rules to
generate the next generation of the population. By repeating the process, we can approach and
find the optimum or acceptable near-optimum.

Summary of Work Accomplished
Our current work is mainly based on a demonstration scenario provided by CDM
Technologies, San Luis Obispo, CA. They provided the following information:
In the demonstration scenario, one sea base vessel sits approximately 50nm off the shore. We
have one supply point on shore and we have two supply points inland. Assume a 50 nm distance
between the sea bases and the shore-based supply point and assume a 75 nm distance between
the sea base and the inland supply points. We have access to two types of transports, CH-53E
helicopters and LCAC air-cushion transports. The CH-53Es can travel to either the shore or
inland supply points, while LCACs can only travel to the shore supply point. We will have five
units to supply (Unit 1 through Unit 5), but we will only deliver items to supply points, not to the
actual unit location (requirements will state when a unit can receive cargo at a specific supply
point).
The objective of the first stage of the project is to develop a prototype of the scheduling agent.
We have not incorporated detailed information about the SEAWAY architecture and interface
standards, so our focus is on the agent layer of the project, the algorithm.
The current system was developed on Java2 SDK 1.3. It includes over 20 source code modules.
The majority of the code comprises the simulation process, i.e. the process used to maximize the
fitness function of the algorithm based on the given demonstration scenario. However, it is
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designed to have a great expandability and could be used for other similar kinds of scheduling
systems. There are three main class types: start point, end point, and asset. Start point classes
(e.g., seabase.java) deal with arranging and loading of cargo items, asset classes are kinds of
transportation tools to move cargo items from start point to end points, and end point classes deal
with the unloading of cargo items.
For the starting point, the cargo item delivering sequence is determined by outside algorithms
such as linear algorithms, expert system or CI tools.
The asset manages the cargo items on it and tries to move it to the end point. The following is the
status transfer diagram of the assets:
Loading

Ready to Base

Landing Base

Ready to Load

Leaving Base

Moving

Leaving Point

Moving

Ready to Unload

Landing Point

Ready to Point

Unloading

Figure 3: The status transfer diagram of an asset
After the end of the simulation, the simulation results are used to calculate the final fitness value
for the given delivery sequence.
The main (or entry) class for the simulation is PSETMain.class. To run the simulation, then,
from within a Java environment, run \path\java PSETMain, where path is the path to java.exe,
and PSETMain.class is in the current directory.
A simple graphical user interface (GUI) was also developed for demonstration purposes, which
shows the simulation process working, alongside a tabular list of asset activities. The list shows
what is happening to each asset on a minute-by-minute basis. The user can choose which asset
to view, and select the time interval between graphical updates on the screen. The default time
between updates is 1,000 ms (one second). The user can specify a different time interval in
milliseconds. For example, if it is desired to speed up the graphical presentation, the time
interval can be shortened to 250 milliseconds or some other value less than 1,000.
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The user can also specify the loss of an asset during the simulation, and the time at which the
asset is lost. The algorithm runs as though all assets will be available for the entire simulation up
to the time the asset is lost. A new schedule is then generated, optimizing the scheduling of the
remaining activities without the lost asset.
Since the project software was written in Java, the documentation capability of JDK1.3, called
Javadoc, was used to provide the primary software documentation. Javadoc provides a series of
HTML files, one for each Java class plus an index HTML file. To begin viewing the software
documentation, it is suggested that the user click on the index.html file.

Future Activities
The next work tasks defined for the project are to:
1. Refine the algorithm. Compare different types of computational intelligence tools and tune
the parameters of the algorithm. A version that allows selection of a greedy algorithm, a
genetic algorithm, or particle swarm optimization will be available soon.
2. Incorporate the capability to change the statement of requirements during a simulation.
3. Plug the agent session into the main SEAWAY platform (code).
4. Apply the approach to other aspects of SEAWAY.
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Introduction
In October 1995, at the direction of the Commanding General of the United States Marine Corps
Combat Development Command in Quantico, a handful of Marines and civilian scientists
embarked on what is now called Project Albert. The fact that this date coincides with the
beginnings of ROLF 2010 is not remarkable in and of itself. However, we believe that the
intersection of the two efforts could, perhaps, turn out to be a collaboration remarkable not in
coincidence, but in relevance. The two efforts, vastly different in focus, location, and
methodology could, in combination, become a canonical example of non-linearity or at least
exhibit the archetypical hallmark of non-linearity: the sum >> the parts.
This combination is still in the making and should not be construed at this point as anything
other than a developing idea. But it has actually matured to the point of having a designation and
has been named after the Viking exemplar of maneuver warfare: Red Orm. Here we ll
summarize Project Albert and ROLF 2010 before describing how they come together in the Red
Orm project.

Project Albert
Project Albert uses a series of new models and tools, multidisciplinary teams, and the scientific
method to explore questions. The approach utilizes the meta-technique called data farming to
look at 21st Century questions from the perspective of the whole and lots of data points are
needed to explore this whole . This meta-technique has been made possible by a convolution
of advancements including:
•
•
•
•

Advances in agent-based models, i.e. distillations, which have the promise of capturing some
of the adaptability and other key factors inherent in conflict.
Advances in computing power, which enables us to increase our volume of data.
Advances in our ability to organize, analyze, and visualize scientific data.
Advances in concepts on how to integrate across the spectrum of operations research
techniques.

Project Albert is a research effort, which embraces the process of Operational Synthesis; the
focus is on looking at the whole rather than reducing systems into parts. This process is a
complement to traditional Operations Analysis it supports the study of asymmetries, risks, and
potentials through the use, inter alia, of distillations. In summary, Project Albert is designed to
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develop new tools to capture emergent behavior in synthetic environments that over time will
lead to more effective maneuver warriors.
Articles in reference [1] as well as this book describe some initial efforts by the Marine Corps to
understand the potential mesh of the nonlinear sciences and complex adaptive systems with the
study of warfare. One such effort is the development of an agent-based model called ISAAC, a
mobile cellular automata model in that the individual fighting entities, called agents, move
through a lattice and carry information with them as they go. The agents are given
characteristics which include: a default local rule set specifying how to act in a generic
environment, goals directing behavior, sensors generating an internal map of environment, and
an internal mechanism to alter behavior. The figure below is a snapshot (with arrows added) of
the ISAAC distillations. We have ported ISAAC to the Maui High Performance Computer and
run it many millions of times as part of a process we call Data Farming, described earlier in this
book. Briefly, what we try to do is grow data in the area of interest that provide insight into the
answers to our questions. The fundamental underlying principal here is that we need to look at a
vast landscape of possibilities because of the uncertainty inherent in and the nonlinear nature of
conflict. Thus our research so far has concentrated on methods to create, access, and understand
large amounts of data from distillations.
Figure. ISAAC snapshot.

In the ISAAC distillation depicted above, the first group of parameters represents capabilities
such as sensor and fire range. The next group of parameters, or p-weights, represents the
personalities of the agents, or how they will move and select strategies. This is done by
inputting a set of weights, which are used to rank possible moves according to the agent s
proximity to the various types of agents and goals. The other inputs represent another tier of
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adaptability, perhaps sociology, whereby the default personality is altered according to local
threshold constraints. And finally, below the dark lines we see a tally of alive and injured
agents one hit creates an injury and two removes the agent from the play.
Reference [1] describes some of the initial research efforts using ISAAC. One of the key areas
of research is the examination of the role of intangibles such as cohesion, trust, and leadership in
warfare. It should be stressed that these efforts are merely illustrative to this point. However,
next generation distillations are now being tested at Quantico and at the Maui High Performance
Computing Center and research has started on applying new distillations in real ways to real
questions.

Rolf 2010
ROLF stands for "R rlig Operativ LedningsFunktion", in Swedish. Translated into English this
means " Mobile, Joint Command and Control Function for the year 2010". ROLF suggests that
small mobile units carry out overall joint command and control. The concept is not intended
solely for combat applications, but has also been discussed for other uses, particularly within the
field of total defence, e.g., for commanding peacetime rescue operations, and international
operations. Details of ROLF can be found in reference [2]. Here we will describe three aspects
of ROLF that we think likely differ from other concepts. First, the ROLF staff is quite small, a
second difference is the seating, and the third is the nature of the display.
The staff concept should be seen as a network of centers for excellence rather than individual
cells of staff being united. Specifically, this means that different nodes, staff elements, in this
network will work with different issues concurrently. In the initial architecture the intention is
that a complete staff unit will include at least four staff elements. In order to create a robust
network, there are a number of small and mobile elements that are less vulnerable than the
traditionally big staff units. However, the size has certain implications.
-

-

Despite its smaller size, the ROLF staff still must do almost the same work as a traditional
staff. The interconnections made possible by modern information technology may support
this workload and relieve the staff of much of the need for co-ordination of the units.
Work in the ROLF staff is likely to be quite intense, requiring a number of shifts. This
highlights the attendant problem of keeping continuity of command and control action
despite the changes in personnel.

The complexity and the dynamics of the command and control situation for a ROLF staff are
assumed to create high uncertainty. It is reasonable to believe that no human could manage this
environment by himself, and thus expert knowledge and competence must be instantly
accessible. Other resources can be accessed through the net. In order to handle the situation a
management team must be seated close together, in this case around the same table. The seating
is chosen to facilitate the co-operation. We think that the seating around the same table will
create at least two different advantages in handling complexity and dynamics.
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-

-

we believe that successful communication under the stressful conditions of battle is close and
physical. This is the form of seating that humans have always chosen when they have
serious matters to discuss, from the gathering of the early stone age people around the camp
fire to the conference tables of modern board rooms. Serious discussions are possible only if
psychological distance is minimised. There must be an opportunity for full communication,
including body language and eye contact in order to gauge the mental state of the other
persons in the staff.
the seating creates a common focus. There is a common display of the situation that the staff
members can refer to in their discussions. This should facilitate the development of shared
situational awareness.

In order to illustrate and visualize the situations in different perspectives over time in a collective
image in front of each participant in the staff element or in a number of elements, ROLF deviates
from traditional means of combat representation. Traditionally, in the military environment there
is a presentation of a 2D map that shows the so-called battle room. We believe that it is possible
to present more informative situation maps by using new technologies and 3D, as well as
multimedia techniques. This will improve not only the support for a trained group of individuals
but also, hopefully, the perception of less highly trained people such as media representatives
and politicians. The two main reasons for searching for new forms of presentations are:
-

-

At the same time as 3D solution is assumed to improve the perception, they also involve the
risk of adding complexity. In our view, the need for a 3D display is a consequence of the
concept of battle space. The battle space concept refers to a volume, rather than a surface.
The fact that the battle space must be constructed mentally by each staff member raises the
possibility that different staff members may construct different representations and this in
turn may lead to misunderstandings. There may be little chance of sorting out these
misunderstandings during the hectic pace of modern battle.
To support the decision process by improved ability to interact with the presentation. This is
enabled by manipulation of the symbols in the representation directly by grabbing and
moving them around and illustrating one s conception of the possibilities for action in the
battle space. This is assumed to facilitate the dialogue between the participants in the
environment, in the room as well as elsewhere in the network.

Red Orm
Red Orm seeks to significantly advance the state of the art in command and control. It focuses
on human decision making processes, vice techno-centric decision environments. As such, its
objectives are to discern, investigate and leverage key attributes of the decision-making milieu:
•
•
•

non-linearities of warfare — the influence of initial conditions and dynamics inherent in
conflict
intrinsic human characteristics of warfare — previouslyunquantified attributes of fighting
forces (e.g., trust, leadership, elan, fear, )
co-evolving landscapes —the codependent adaptation of forces within the crisis-space
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•
•
•
•

crisis learning processes— adapting behavior to leverage own strengths and exploit
opposing weaknesses to optimize mission accomplishment
crisis-space uncertainty and complexity — effectively managing and exploiting the fog
and friction of conflict and crisis
multi-dimensional reasoning —the human affinity for spatial environments, symbolic
representations, common understanding of the crisis-space, and behavioral connotations
in command team decision making
time criticality — the preeminence of the temporal domain in crises and an awareness of
the time-uncertainty trade-space

In support of the above Red Orm objectives, the plan is to mutually extend and collaboratively
integrate current areas of research to generate a prototype command and control laboratory.
Prototype development will be achieved through a process of evolutionary enhancement. The
American partner will apply their expertise in data farming and new methods of modeling and
simulation. This will be extended to encompass multi-resolution/variable granularity command
behaviors, planning, course of action analysis, and crisis-space characterization and response, all
augmented by high performance computing. The Swedish partner will apply their expertise in
innovative command and control environments. This will be extended to encompass
development of interactive, multi-modal, aspect-dependent, human-centric perception tools for
command and control settings.
In summary, we anticipate that in Red Orm the two partners will cooperatively investigate and
develop user interfaces that integrate Project Albert and ROLF 2010 efforts, hopefully
culminating in a working laboratory that will enable accelerated command and control
innovation by both parties. And, in conclusion, we state our ultimate goal: to develop better
ways to make decisions in support of maneuver warriors.
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Abstract
COTS middleware services promise to provide developers a high level platform that can
be used to easily create distributed system that will run on any platform and across any
network. While these middleware services work reasonably well on commercial wired
networks, they can provide unacceptable levels of service when used on tactical
networks. Our experience over the last four years shows that the causes of many of these
failures is often related to a subtle interaction between the distribution model used by the
middleware service, the underlying communication protocols it uses, and the transport
services which are well supported by the tactical network. Re-implementation of specific
key communication services components can be used to overcome many of these
difficulties while continuing to use other middleware services unchanged.
This paper discusses the implementation and evolution of a COTS middleware-based
information distribution service supporting the distribution of a military Common
Tactical Picture across existing and experimental military tactical networks. It presents
lessons learned fielding selected middleware architectures and proposes additional
services that should be considered in future middleware implementations.

1

Overview: Powering A Revolution

Recent years have seen significant changes in how we collaboratively share information
using distributed computing systems. As recently as fifteen years ago, systems tended to
be developed on large isolated machines with dedicated client access. Data was shared
between systems by either using very primitive internal networks or more often by
sneaker-net1. Organizations wanting/needing to share information more widely would
occasionally band together to create dedicated networks providing a limited connectivity
between key nodes (ARPA-net is an excellent example). As a result, data and
information were very difficult to share or even locate.
1

Sneaker-net refers to the process where a computer operator copies the file to be shared onto a disk and
then walks it over to the other machine where it is uploaded.
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Today s computing environment is very different. Significant increases in computing
power and computer manufacturing allow computers to be commonplace appliance on
both office and home desktops. Extremely capable networks, able to move a wide variety
of information with relative ease, interconnect these same homes and offices. Data and
information are rapidly becoming generally available commodities. Tools (such as
search engines and web browsers) enable school children to locate and search data
repositories for information of interest. Other tools (such as web servers, and
applications servers) allow individuals and corporations alike to create their own data
repositories which they can share as they see fit. These changes have had a profound
impact on how we access and share information, and even on simple day-to-day tasks.
For example, determining the current price of a stock 15 years ago would have required
either a call to your broker, or installation of a fairly expensive dedicated ticker. Today
this information is readily available from your browser as either a limited free service, or
as an enhanced (say real time) pay-for-service commodity.
While these changes are phenomenal, they are only a precursor of the next age in which
we are able to share information rather than just data.

2

Building Block Approach

The revolution in how we share data and information was a result of several significant
developments. Any of these developments on their own would be important, but all of
them together provide a much more powerful environment for building information/data
sharing systems. The five most significant developments include:
•
•
•
•
•

Powerful & Affordable Computing Resources
Widely available & highly Interconnected Networks.
Generic and Simple Data/Network Protocols (e.g., IP)
Simple and Generic Transport/Application Protocols (e.g. SMTP, IIOP,
HTTP, FTP)
Application Services (e.g., CORBA, Web Servers)

The last three are of significant interest and are shown in Figure 1.
Application
Web Server
XML
CORBA
JINI
IP Protocols

Custom code (business logic, gui, etc.)
Largely Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS)
aka Middleware

Figure 1. Typical Development Stack

While physical networks (such as phone lines) were readily available, the process of
writing/validating a protocol that would run over a variety of different networks (e.g.,
Ethernet, frame-relay, ATM, token ring, etc.) was arduous. The Internet Protocol (IP)
provided a generic and very capable set of primitive services that allowed information to
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move between systems. More importantly, it provided an abstraction layer that allowed
packets of data to move between different types of networks, and alleviates programmers
from having to deal with the internals of the physical network. Rather, they could spend
their efforts on the applications rather than on the network.
However, even IP wasn t enough to engender the revolution. In the past 10 years, a set of
very simple, but again powerful, transport and application protocols have been built
which build upon the foundation of IP. Protocols such as HTTP implement a generic
request-receive protocol where the client sends a request (in a specific format) to a server
that processes the request and sends the data back to the client (again in a specific
format). FTP is a similar service, but one specifically targeted to file transfer. SMTP
likewise is responsible for moving email between machines. Other services such as the
Internet Inter-Orb Protocol (IIOP) are more targeted towards moving information
between client-server implementations on potentially different types of platforms. These
services provide a stronger platform for developing data sharing systems.
The combination of IP and transport/application services was enough to provide us with
the basic tools needed. However, the ability for companies and individuals to rapidly
(and effectively) build data/information sharing services relies on a wide variety of
application building services (generically called middleware) such as CORBA, JINI, Web
Servers, etc. For example, a web server allows any user who can write a simple HTML
page (or use a program that knows how to change text and graphics into HTML) to
publish the pages for anyone who has a web browser. The user is completely unaware of
how information is being managed or distributed. Likewise, the JINI protocol provides
an abstract mechanism for registering and locating services of interest (e.g., a color
printer in the area, or a correlation service). Similarly CORBA provides a family of
services for locating and accessing objects of interest — regardless of where they are
located across the network. Finally, XML provides a similar service for organizing and
transporting data in a structured and machine neutral format.
These latter tools provide developers (and in some case regular users) with the ability to
create sophisticated data/information processing and sharing facilities. Most of these
services have been standardized by international or special focus groups and, a result, are
available from a wide variety of commercial and free sources.

3

Dreaming The Dream

The development stack described in the previous section promises to provide a very rich
programming environment. In an ideal world, these tools allow developers to concentrate
on their customer s specific data handling and visualization requirements (a.k.a. mission
needs) while relying on the lower layers of the development stack to handle issues such
as how to locate or move data between machines.
As usual, there is more than one way to solve the problem of moving and locating data.
As a result, a number of competing (and usually incompatible) technologies have evolved
(e.g., HTML/CGI Applications, CORBA, DCOM, client-server, etc.) Each of these

177

technologies promises many of the same capabilities (e.g., ability to move, secure and
locate data), but often uses a very different model of information sharing. For example,
the standard HTML (or web) model assumes that the client asks the server for
information. Likewise, they support various types of information distribution — e.g., oneto-one private communication (used for most web activities), one-to-many (such as
watching a streaming video of a live event), or even many-to-many (such as a
collaborative white-board session). Determining which of these technologies to use is
difficult, and most organizations have a new breed of senior developer, often called a
technologist, responsible for making the decision.
The ease in which these technologies can be used to rapidly build commercial systems
has had a significant impact on the large number of systems that are available today. It
has caused a flurry of development focused on not only building the next generation
system , but also in wrapping legacy systems so that they can take advantage of many
of the new data/information distribution techniques (e.g., adding a web front-end to an
existing inventory system.)
In addition to ease of development, the development stack and the standardization
process promise us a great amount of flexibility in using different COTS vendors. More
recent efforts have resulted in a number of bridges which are intended to allow systems
built on different technologies (say CORBA and RMI) to seamlessly interoperate.
Like the commercial environment, the advent of these middleware services has spawned
a great deal of interest in DoD, and an unprecedented number of new (and often
incompatible) proposals from its contractors.

4

Living The Nightmare

For the past ten years, we have been building middleware-based applications for various
DoD organizations such as EUCOM, USA, DISA, and more recently for the Marine
Corps Warfighting Lab, and the Extending the Littoral Battlespace ACTD.
Many of these systems have used different middleware technologies, but until recently
have been targeted towards larger command and control environments comprised of
fairly high end systems connected via state of the art networks. In general, we rarely (if
ever) experienced problems with the amount of available network services.
Our recent, and near-term, developments have increasingly focusing on systems where at
least a part of the application is connected via a tactical network. Further, they are
operating in an environment where the timeliness of information can be either life
critical, or have a strong impact on tactical decisions.
While we are strong believers that the use of COTS middleware can indeed provide us
with the ability to rapidly develop data/information-sharing systems, our experiences
over the past four years have shown that there are many pitfalls to this approach as well.
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Many of these lessons were not fully learned until our systems failed to work in the
tactical environment. These experiences have led us to adopt a set of approaches to
developing and adapting middleware components and protocols supporting the tactical
network environment.

4.1 The Tactical Network Environment
There are several important characteristics that differentiate a normal office or laboratory
network from a tactical network. In summary these are:
•

Stability — Normal office networks are comprised of a carefully configured set
of routers and cables. An on-site guru is generally responsible for properly
configuring and maintaining the connections. The configuration for this type of
network does not change very often. A tactical network is often comprised of a
mobile communications nodes connected via a variety of RF links. In many
instances, we are required to support a zero-footprint network which does not
rely only on ANY stable (or pre-existing) nodes. The precise configuration of
the network may be created dynamically and change often. The on-site guru s
in the tactical environment have other things on their mind, and are not
particularly available to reconfigure the network.

•

Connectivity — Normal office networks are generally well connected to each
other. In fact we EXPECT our networks to be connected (if you don t believe
me, disconnect your site s connection to the outside world and see how long it
takes before the users start to scream — it won t be long.) Tactical networks
(particular those that are mobile) have a much lower level of connectivity. The
level of connectivity is strongly influenced by RF characteristics (e.g., how the
airplane s antenna is pointed while it banks, or EMI interference.) In general,
connectivity in a tactical network is either: 1) carefully staged (such as setting
up a fixed satellite ground terminal at a good line-of-sight location), or 2) adhoc (occasionally network connectivity). The more mobile the resources, the
more likely the latter will be true.

•

Throughput — Basic office networks have at least a T-1 bandwidth. Packet
loss rates and packet latency are generally very low (no more than 3% and 250
msec respectively). The resulting network is able to efficiently move
information using traditional protocols such as TCP/IP. The throughput on
tactical networks can be quite different and is impacted by a number of
variables. The characteristics of RF signals and a mobile environment make
packet loss much more likely and communications relays may add a significant
amount of latency. Together these can severely limit the ability for generic
communications protocols to work effectively. Finally, the amount of power
available to fielded devices (particularly users who are already carrying packs
and weapons) can severely limit the raw bandwidth that can be transmitted.
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While many of these problems are similar to those we are starting to see in commercial
cellular data-passing networks, the problems are different enough to look elsewhere. In
addition to these significant differences, tactical networks must provide an unprecedented
amount of security and flexibility in being able to adapt to various tactical needs. For
example, the same network may need to dynamically support a large number of local
users with a relatively high bandwidth, or a remote set of users via a lower bandwidth.

4.2 Middleware Architectures
As before, over the past few years, we have been involved with teams of developers from
other government organizations and industry in building information sharing systems.
During this period we have experimented with a number of different middleware
architecture and at the same time have been run in an environment comprised of a
number of different tactical networks.
In this section, we ll briefly describe each of these systems, its middleware architecture
and the tactical network(s) used to connect the users to the system. During each phase,
we learned a number of lessons, but have distilled those down into a single lesson we
learned concerning how middleware interacts with tactical networks.

4.2.1 Web Portal Architecture
The Urban Warrior experiments took place during the summer of 1998 in the San
Francisco Bay area. The intent of these experiments was to evaluate the effectiveness of
various techniques and tactics in dealing with conflicts in an Urban Environment. The
primary intent of the software system was to provide a Common Tactical Picture (CTP)
representing the location of hostile, neutral, and friendly forces as well as allowing users
to request actions by others (fires, medical evacuation, resupply, etc.)
As shown in Figure 2, an information-centric decision support system (IMMACCS) was
designed to support the information collaboration needs of the exercise. By intent, all
IMMACCS components would communicate and exchange information solely via a
common object model. A CORBA-based middleware system (Shared Net) was deployed
aboard the USS Coronado. The Shared Net used the IMMACCS object model, with its
rich associations, to provide an information-centric representation of the battlespace.
Shared Net used a standard publish-subscribe model to distribute objects of interest to
specific clients. IMMACCS Translators (MCSIT) were used to interface between
existing military systems (GCCS, LAWS, & TSCM) that normally communicated via
message-oriented protocols and the objectified forms used by the Shared Net.
Unfortunately, due to personnel problems, earlier efforts to build an IMMACCS object
model aware client had failed. Instead, users (both aboard ship in San Francisco, and
those fielded in Oakland) were provided with a web browser, and used a web portal to
access tactical information (such as location of enemy and friendly units as well as
medical evacuation requests) maintained in the Shared Net. In effect, the web portal
receives a service requests (via HTTP) from a small application running on top of the
client s web browser, the web server responds to the request by making an appropriate
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call to the underlying information service (in this case Shared Net). The web server then
takes the information returned by the information service, and re-encodes it (often in
HTML) and sends it to the client s web browser via HTTP.
In a portal architecture, the user s client is generally nothing more than a COTS web
browser augmented with a few (usually small) Java applets. The majority of the
processing needed is done by the web server (and its associated processes) is related to:
1) taking the information request provided by the client and converting it into a request
that the underlying information store(s) can understand (e.g., converting to SQL), and 2)
taking the information provided by the store(s) and converting it into a format that can be
either directly displayed on a web browser, or one that can be interpreted by the client s
Java applets.
Web Browsers
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Figure 2. IMMACCS over INITS

The Urban Warrior exercise used a two-tier network (called INITS). The long haul was
comprised of a multi-hop microwave link. Communications between the microwave
tower and the fielded users was via a commercial wireless Ethernet (using the 802.11
protocol). Microwave relays were generally pre-positioned in areas that would provide
good connectivity to the ship. Amazingly enough, this involved shooting a signal from
San Francisco to Oakland which passed between the top of San Francisco Bay and the
bottom of the Oakland Bay Bridge.
Performance
The performance of the web portal architecture during the exercise was mixed. Users
who were aboard ship were generally able to share information effectively. However,
fielded users in Oakland rarely saw the same common picture as their counterparts
aboard ship. In addition, the ship received very little position or tactical data from the
fielded users. Overall, the system s ability to support the goal of the exercise (users
fielded in an Urban environment) was poor. In trying to understand the poor
performance, we looked at two components: the network and the web portal (the other
components appeared to be working well and were not examined further.)
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As before, shipboard clients worked well, but fielded clients did not. The primary
difference between these users was the type of network used to connect them to the web
portal. As is typical for software developers, we initially thought that the problem was in
the network. However, other systems (such as a live streaming video feed and the
standard network news protocol) were able to run across the same (INITS) network with
little or no problem.
Reviewing the web portal, we discovered that the portal had crashed a number of times
and needed to be restarted. While not of significance in itself, it was worth examining
and helped us in further evaluating the middleware architecture.
Its important to note that both the web portal and the INITS network performed well in
independent testing. However, something in the interaction between these two systems
resulted in the poor field results.
One possible problem was primarily related to the system s scalability. The web portal
approach uses a web-standard request-reply communication model — in effect it is a
private one-to-one communication between the client and the server. However, a CTP
requires that all users receive approximately the same set of information so it is more
akin to the one-to-many communication model. Under the one-to-one model, a single
position update by a fielded user would result in each client downloading the new
information. While not a problem with small numbers of users, it could be a problem
with larger numbers. Combined with the slightly lower bandwidth of the INITS network,
this could have been enough to cause the servers to time out on the client s request.
Lesson Learned:
While COTS middleware can help in rapidly building distributed systems, COTS approaches work
well only if the information distribution model they provide meets your needs.

4.2.2 CORBA Client-Server Architecture
The IMMACCS system (described previously) continued to evolve. Based on our Urban
Warrior experience, we made two significant changes:
1. An IMMACCS Object Model aware client was developed in Java.
2. Modifications were made to the Shared Net s information distribution services to
enable it to handle a larger number of clients. Additionally, a service (similar to
the CORBA event service) was provided that distributed only the part of objects
that had changed (rather than the whole object).
In effect the COTS CORBA middleware approach used by the Shared Net to
communicate with the other IMMACCS servers (translators, agents, etc.) was extended to
communicate with the Java clients. Together they replaced the web portal middleware
approach with a client-server approach.
Additionally, a tactical network being developed as part of the Extending the Littoral
Battlespace (ELB) ACTD replaced the INITS network. The ELB network, called Warnet
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uses a novel 3-tier approach combining VRC-99, TCDL, NTDR, and wireless 802.11
links. Warnet nodes are mounted on HMMWVs, fixed wing aircraft, rotary aircraft, and
ships. Users are equipped with 802.11 cards that connect them to the nearest Warnet
node. Communication between the nodes is time-division-multiplexed and the number
of slots assigned to communication between any two nodes can be configured to support
the required bandwidth. Warnet also has the ability to broadcast in a one-to-many mode
that enables all nodes to receive the same packet without requiring it to be individually
broadcast to each node. Warnet represents a self-configuring network where the nodes
are continuously entering and leaving the network.
The combined system (shown in Figure 3) was field tested as part of ELB s Full System
Test (FST-2) in Gulf Port, MI during August of 2000. This was the first time the
systems had been run together.

Java Clients
Wireless LAN

Java
Clients

VRC-99
Ethernet high
speed network

VRC-99
VRC-99

ECOC
TCP/IP & CORBA

Wireless LAN
Shared Net
GCCS

Java
Clients
LAWS

TSCM

Figure 3. IMMACCS over Warnet

The goal of FST-2 was to show that we could provide a CTP to mobile users distributed
over a reasonably small tactical area (10s of miles). Due to scheduling conflicts, the
command center was moved from the ship to the shore.
Performance
The performance of the COTS CORBA architecture used by Shared Net during the
exercise was mixed. ECOC users, connected via a traditional Ethernet, were generally
able to share information effectively. However, fielded users connected via Warnet
rarely saw a CTP. In fact, two fielded users connected to the same communication node
(and often standing right next to each other) didn t see the same picture. In some cases,
one fielded user would see 10 tracks, and his buddy would see more than 200. In some
instances, a fielded client would take as long as 45 minutes to fully populate tracks.
Again, the operational goal of the system was not met.
As before, we tried to understand the interaction between the middleware and the
network. This was greatly complicated by the fact that both were experimental and
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significant changes had recently been made. A few clues helped our investigation:
•
•
•

Starting up clients one at a time (rather than all at once) seemed to help. This pointed
us towards a resource (network or server) utilization issue.
Clients were still able to use news clients to connect to the ECOC, but had difficulty
in using newer applications such as web browsers.
Network tools indicated that IP receive window was often frozen — generally
indicating that the receiver is has still not received a missing packet even after it has
requested its retransmission several times. This could have been caused by either the
network dropping a lot of packets, or the application layer trying to send too many.

As before, the problem was not in solely in either the network, or the software, but in the
complex interaction between the two. While INITS was reasonably similar to a wired
Ethernet, Warnet displayed most of the characteristics we would expect to see in a true
tactical network. Packet loss was high (~ 30%), and latencies were long (~3 seconds).
Further the extremely damp weather, constantly mobile nodes, and not infrequent
lightning strikes resulted in very short duration communication windows (routers do not
respond well to being hit by lightning.) While improvements could certainly be made to
Warnet (and were), it was a reasonable representation of a tactical network.
Unfortunately, the COTS middleware software had been developed to support enterprise
computing over traditional networks. As such it made heavy use of the TCP/IP protocol.
This was the crux of the problem. The long latencies and relatively large packet loss rates
exhibited by Warnet were well outside the performance parameters of TCP/IP which
exhibits incredibly poor performance if the latency exceeds 300 msec or the packet loss
rates exceed 8%. In both cases we were well in excess of those values. The result is that
TCP/IP traffic simply did not get through the Warnet network. The more traffic we tried
to send (say retransmits of missed messages, or new clients starting up and trying to
retrieve objects) the worse the communications became.
Perversely enough, the network statistics showed that the network was performing well.
Unfortunately, the network statistic was based on bandwidth — how many bits cross the
network regardless of what they represent. From a software perspective we are interested
in throughput — a measure of whether the packets we send from one application
successfully reach the other application. Thus while the bandwidth was high, the
throughput was very low.
Lesson Learned:
While COTS middleware can help in rapidly building distributed systems, COTS approaches work
well only if the environment they are intended to support (e.g., communications, host processors, etc.)
is VERY similar to the deployment environment.

4.2.3 Adapted CORBA Client-Server Architecture
Based on the lessons learned from FST-2, both Warnet and the middleware component of
Shared Net evolved. Warnet continued to reduce packet loss and latency, and added new
algorithms to better handle flow control and efficiently support broadcast protocols (such
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as multicast). The Shared Net s middleware components also exhibited significant
change:
•
•
•
•

Approximately 95% of the routines that used TCP/IP were rewritten to use
Multicast. Only direct CORBA set and get methods were left using TCP/IP.
The Multicast layer was tailored to meet the parameters of the Warnet. This
included automatically broadcasting each packet again after a fixed amount of
time.
Middleware services were modified to implement a timed store-and-forward
service where information destined for unreachable nodes is queued (for a
bounded time), and delivered when communications was available.
The middleware client-stubs were substantially rewritten to mimic a writethrough cache. In general, all client read operations are served by a local object
cache, an update service is then used to ensure that the distributed cache is
synchronized between all clients and servers.

The resulting architecture is virtually identical to that shown in Figure 3. In fact, one of
the advantages of the middleware approach is that the implementation of the middleware
components can be substantially changed (say by replacing TCP/IP with Multicast in 3
months) without requiring changes to be made to servers or clients using the Shared Net
middleware.
The resulting modified architecture was fielded during FST-3 that took place at Camp
Pendleton (near Oceanside, CA) during March 2001.
Performance
The performance of the modified COTS CORBA architecture used by Shared Net over
Warnet was significantly better and generally usable. ECOC users, connected via a
traditional Ethernet, retained their virtually identical CTP. However for the first time,
fielded users, connected via Warnet, also saw a relatively common CTP.
However, the CTP for fielded users wasn t perfect and tended to become less common as
network communications became less reliable. COTS CORBA requests issued by the
clients (sets and gets) were not able to get through during marginal communications.
Similarly, when communications were re-established, each client requested
retransmission of the multicast traffic it had missed and tried to resubmit CORBA calls
that had failed. While the multicast rebroadcast approach helped to satisfy multiple
client s needs with a single broadcast, the overall traffic on the Warnet was unacceptably
high and reportedly could cause the network to go into flow control mode.
This pointed out three significant issues for a tactical architecture:
• Since each client acts independently, there is generally no mechanism to limit the
impact that a rogue (or even greedy or starved) client can have on the network.
• In mobile topologies, at some time or another the server is at the far end of the
network, and the clients needing the information most are at the other. This
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•

happened more often that we would have expected and has a significant impact on
the network.
Having only a single server connected via a network that provides only occasional
connectivity can significantly frustrate users who are used to working on a highly
connected network. While this rightly falls in the no-duh category of obvious
problems, it still hit us. We finally had to take away options that allowed users to
refresh their screen by re-retrieving all of the information.

Lesson Learned:
While COTS middleware can help in rapidly building distributed systems, COTS approaches work
well only if the network connectivity the COTS product is intended to support is similar to the one in
your deployment environment.

While this seems relatively obvious, its important to realize that most commercial
software is not intended to support long (say > 30 second) communications outages. In
most cases, the connections are dropped and the user is expected to reconnect at a later
time. Blame is generally focused on the network service provider, since we are
prepossessed to expect a perfect network.
4.2.4 Distributed Middleware Servers
The final version of the Shared Net middleware is currently being field tested running
over both INITS and Warnet in preparation for ELB s Major Systems Demonstration #2,
and the Marine Corps Capable Warrior exercises both occurring in the South West states
during June 2001.
The most significant change to the architecture has been in installing lite (NT laptop)
versions of the Shared Net middleware servers in the majority of Warnet s
communications nodes. In effect, there are now Shared Net nodes in HWMMVs, fixed
wing aircraft, helicopters, and potentially LCACs. A total of 11 Shared Net servers will
be used to support the upcoming exercises.
Each Shared Net node is able to support a number of clients in the same way that the
single server did. However, in this architecture, Shared Net nodes are also clients to
other Shared Net nodes. In effect the distributed Shared Net servers implement a loose
but ordered, quorum. The information available on a server is at least as good as the
client could have received by itself, and in most cases is significantly better.
This approach has a number of advantages, particularly in a tactical arena where
communications outages will likely be common, and an accurate and timely local tactical
picture is more important that a less timely (or accurate) regional picture:
•
•

The clients are more likely to be able to communicate with the local
communication node s server than with a remote server.
The local server effectively maintains the local Common Tactical Picture to its
local clients. It selectively shares this picture with other servers, and in turn
receives updates from them, as communications bandwidth is available.
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•
•

Each server acts as a reliable store-and-forward service, once it receives a change
from a client, it is the local Shared Net server s job to ensure its delivery it to all
other interested2 servers.
The vast majority of traffic across the Warnet (or any haul network links) is now
comprised of server-to-server updates rather than client-server communications.

Performance
In mobile field tests held during the past month, the distributed architecture appears to be
meshing well with the tactical network. The test involved a command center aboard the
USS Coronado docked in San Diego, multiple maneuvering Marine units (in both STOM
and RSTA configurations) at Camp Pendleton, and RSTA units in El Centro, CA and
Yuma, AZ. Each location was connected via Warnet; in some cases this required using
multiple airborne relay hops.
The clients associated with each local server shared an identical local (or relevant)
Common Tactical Picture. They also received updates from other servers when
communications were available (in some situations, connectivity was only provided for
minutes each hour).
Lesson Learned:
When its properly modified and selected, COTS middleware can support the information sharing
needed to maintain a Common Relevant Tactical Picture across tactical networks.

5

Learning From the Past

While we learned a number of valuable lessons during this process, we have always been
aware of the fact that news was almost always able to run across the tactical networks
when our more advanced and capable systems could not. During some of the exercises
news was virtually the only reliable way of moving information between commands, and
the users moved significant amounts of information (in the form of spreadsheets, images,
and documents) between each other by attaching them to news postings. Why then could
this rather old product operate when we could not?
News ability to function in this environment is largely due to the environment in which
the Network News Transport Protocol (NNTP), used to exchange news postings across
networks, was developed. NNTP was initially developed at a time when machines were
very loosely connected by modems and dial-up connections. NNTP servers would
occasionally dial-up another NNTP and share postings in selected news groups with
each other. Connections were generally bad, and it was not unusual for the connection to
break before the exchange was complete. As such NNTP provides the ability for servers
to reconnect and resume the state of their last connection.
In many ways, the characteristics of the network connections NNTP was developed to
support are very similar to those we experience in tactical networks today. From a
2

In our architecture, we assume that not all servers will share all information. For example, servers could
be configured to share particular types of information within either geographic or echelon boundaries.
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modern architecture point — NNTP may be rather sophisticated. In modern terms, NNTP
implements a store-and-forward distributed server architecture that uses local caching and
opportunistic subscription-based exchange. Interestingly enough, a significant subset of
the same approaches that Shared Net eventually evolved to use.
So why aren t our COTS components as resilient as our older approaches? There are two
possible scenarios:
1. There is little market force for this type of reliability. This seems rather unlikely
since commercial organizations are spending a significant amount of money to
make their systems fault tolerant.
2. Our COTS components (and our own developers in general) assume a fairly high
level of service from the underlying networks and protocols. As time pressure to
develop software has increased, we ve moved our resources to implementing
applications layered upon these services and give little though to how they will
react under different network situations.
The latter is not only likely, but it may be completely appropriate for COTS. It is
important to realize that COTS is a market driven commodity. As such it is highly
unlikely that a COTS manufacturer would invest the effort necessary to make their
software tolerant of faults (or behaviors) that occur only on networks that are NOT used
by any significant percentage of their market share. In any event, a customer suitably
motivated to use a particular COTS middleware program will likely be willing to pay for
customization, either by their own staff or the vendor.

6

Communications Services for Tactical Networks

Undoubtedly, COTS middleware can provide us with significantly enhanced capabilities
to build information sharing systems. However, as we ve seen in the previous examples,
out-of-the-box COTS, may be insufficient to meet our needs — particularly if we extend
our information sharing systems across tactical networks.
It is essential that we don t merely tune our systems to a target network. Like our
software systems, networks are evolving at a rapid pace. Its unlikely that the network we
use today will be the same as the ones the system will run on 5 years from now. Rather,
we need to provide a generic set of communications services (either under or within our
middleware layers) that will allow an integrator to configure the system to support the
particular needs of their users and capabilities of their network(s).
Our experience with Shared Net has shown us that we can use 85% or more of the out-of
the-box COTS software services (for example, we can use persistence, but need to
modify CORBA event services). The portion that needs to be modified is generally
focused on lower level communications routines used by many of the higher level
services. In order to maximize our portability (and ability to use any future COTS or
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GOTS implementation that evolve to meet our tactical communications needs) we need
to implement our changes within the structure of middleware standards. For example, if
the specification of the CORBA event service meets our architectural needs, but the
implementation will not run on a tactical network, then we need to re-implement the
event service to give it greater capabilities, not write an entirely different service which
would be unique to our system.
Based on our lessons learned, these communication services need to have the following
properties:
Efficient & Transparent Encoding of Information.
In many tactical networks, packet size must be small. It is important that we
maximize the use of the network resource. However, at the application layer, the
ability to share information between systems is largely based on more greedy forms.
For example, XML provides a widely accepted interchange format that is easily read
by other programs. Unfortunately, it is based on tagged ASCII text, which is hardly
an efficient representation of numeric data. The communications layer should allow
the applications to use these verbose forms, but should convert the information into a
network-suitable form (encoding and packet size) before it transits the network, and
transparently convert it back when it reaches the appropriate level on the other side.
Error Correction and Recovery
The reliability of our commercial networks, and the low cost of simply detecting (say
thru checksums) and retransmitting corrupted packets have made the use of error
correcting approaches less appealing. However, in instances were the networks are
less reliable or retransmission imposes a significant time lag and/or excessive use of
resources, error corrections and recover approaches can provide a significant
enhancement network throughput. While these approaches increase the amount of
information that needs to pass over the network, in many cases they will allow a
damaged packet to be recovered thus avoiding the cost of retransmitting the packet
again and allowing the information to be used more quickly.
Quality of Service Indicators
Not all information has the same delivery requirements. In some cases, critical
information MUST be delivered as quickly as possible. In others, information might
be delivered using a best-effort approach where the information is dropped if it can
be delivered after a number of tries or may be queued for delivery until higher
priority traffic has been delivered. Likewise, many type of information have a
lifespan after which it is useless and can be discarded. Finally, certain types of
information may be replaced — i.e., updates that supercede earlier updates should
replace them rather than using the resources to transmit the original followed by the
change. This service is not without dangers. Many systems using this service may
be built upon belief of how network protocols such as TCP provide data (say totally
ordered and complete). As such, the application layer should indicate the quality of
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service it needs, and the communications layer should attempt to provide it or signal
the reason why it cannot.
Efficient Transport/Confirmation
Standard IP protocols provide for either an acknowledgement for every message
received (TCP) or no acknowledgements at all (UDP). The former uses a significant
amount of bandwidth, and the later leaves responsibility for reliable and ordered
deliver to the application layer. Neither are acceptable solutions for our tactical
network. Commercial IP stack vendors are beginning to experiment with more
optimistic acknowledgement approaches (such as negative acknowledgements,
summary acknowledgements, and piggy-backing acknowledgements on regular
outbound traffic.) The communications layer should utilize or offer these services to
optimize reliable transport across the network. Additionally, it may be beneficial to
adaptively and pre-emptively retransmit packets that our monitoring systems or
recent history lead us to believe will not be received.
Independence of the Distribution and Communications Models.
In many commercial applications, the distribution model (one-to-one, one-to-many,
or many-to-many) tends to dictate the communication model (unicast, multicast, etc.)
As our experience has shown, some networks may not be amenable to certain
communication models (as Warnet was not amenable to TCP). Unfortunately, in
Shared Net the communication and distribution models were tightly coupled. By
giving up TCP, we needlessly gave up the ability to give tailored information feeds
to individual clients. This caused a significant loss of capabilities and was an
extremely inefficient use of bandwidth. The communications layer should be wholly
independent of the distribution model.
Support for Partial Ordering of Events.
Communication protocols, like UDP, do not guarantee that packets will be delivered
to the application in the same order they were delivered. Further, using the Quality
of Service Indicator means that under certain conditions, packets should not be
delivered at all. In total ordering systems, packets are only delivered to the
application if all previous packets have already been sent up. This can result in sever
time delays especially if the retransmission delay is long. Often, this is mitigated by
waiting a maximum amount of time before giving up on the packet and processing
the rest that are behind it. The total ordering requirement is often unnecessarily
strict. In most of our systems, a more relaxed, or partial ordering, of events would be
entirely sufficient. For example, its important that a create event on object A is
processed before an modify event on the same object. However, the order in which I
process create events on objects B and C is unimportant. If the create event on
object A is not delivered, then we must suspend processing of the modify on object
A. However, we are completely free to process the create events on objects B & C.
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7

Living The Dream

The promise of building distributed information sharing systems using COTS middleware
components is alive and bright. Our experience over the past four years has shown that
many of these components and approaches can be directly used in the tactical
environment.
However, tactical networks provide a level of service that currently is significantly
different from that offered by commercial wired networks familiar to most developers.
As a result, portions of these middleware products do not perform well on tactical
networks, and must be adapted before they can be used.
The significant evolution that has taken place in the Shared Net application over the past
three years could not have been accomplished with our small team without middleware.
The fact that these significant changes were made within minor or no impact on the
clients is a strong endorsement middleware ability to provide a service-based
architecture.
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Abstract
Information Age technology offers empowering opportunities to the organizations that
can best take advantage of them. The Navy introduced network centric warfare as their
Information Age concept. Unfortunately, the current acquisition system strangles initiative and
precludes motivated Naval personnel from initiating network centric operations in the fleet.
Further, this acquisition system will not permit the procurement of the more technically
challenging network centric components needed for a true long term network centric force.
Analyzing the five tenets of the network centric warfare concept reveals tangible end
items needed to grow a network centric force. The results of those analyses suggest these
requirements separate into two groups: essential hardware and software acquirable in the near
term by adjusting the current acquisition system; and advanced networks and platforms available
only after fundamental change to the acquisition process. This paper indicates these short term
adjustments will launch rudimentary network centric operations in the Navy while the necessary
long term reforms will make possible the envisioned future network centric force.

Keywords
network centric warfare; DoD acquisition process; joint requirements; military innovation;
program management.

Introduction
The Information Age is rapidly permeating the existing Industrial Age business and
social infrastructure. Shifts in the evolution of work offer considerable opportunity to those who
change effectively. The Navy recognizes this opportunity and has responded with a broadly
defined concept known as network centric warfare, designed to capitalize on those novel
technologies. Proponents predict network centric warfare will qualitatively improve the Navy,
allowing it to meet its commitments without significant funding increases. However, change
involves risk. Most observers agree that adopting network centric warfare concepts will cause
significant and long lasting change to the Navy. Critics deride the notion of "Lifting the Fog of
War", (Owens, 2000) as Admiral Bill Owens puts it. Marine Colonel T. X. Hammes argues that
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network centric warfare will not survive the first salvo (Hammes 1998). The happy news is that
this tension is healthy and will ensure that network centric warfare will meet the nation’s needs.
Unfortunately, the current acquisition system stifles innovation and prevents fiscal
flexibility. Moreover, the longer term outlook for acquiring the true revolutionary network
centric warfare tools is worse. The platform centric acquisition process will not support the
needed procurement for a network centric Naval force. Parochialism, both platform and service
oriented, is a sturdy roadblock to necessary enlightened thinking. Congress oversees DoD
spending "in an episodic, erratic manner. (Hamilton 1999)"

Perspective
The Navy already owns the resources who can start network centric warfare in the Fleet;
its people. Daily, hundreds of sailors, Marines, and Navy civilians use networks attempt to
institute innovative new ways to execute operations more efficiently and effectively, but are most
often thwarted. Numerous examples illustrate this daily frustration.
Shipboard configuration control requires testing nominated software, but the
configuration control authority has insufficient funds to test all potential software introductions.
Yet the software provider is not allowed to pay for the testing either, so a Fleet need goes
unfilled (Patterson 2001).
Another example is the Navy’s inability to translate an unexpected winning idea into an
organized and supported program. A program known as Collaboration at Sea (CaS) first
deployed in the USS John C. Stennis battle group in January 2000. Increased battle group
situational awareness, reduced routine message traffic, and improved battle group collaboration
resulted. Consequently CaS was installed on all subsequent deploying battle groups.
Nevertheless, CaS could provide considerably more network-based capability for the warfighters
if not for the lack of an official program sponsor or integrated support infrastructure.
There is precedence for progress. After World War I the Navy developed a new way of
naval warfare based on carrier aviation, despite limited funding. The keys were open debate,
rapid establishment of a supporting bureaucracy, and experimentation and concept development.
Most importantly, the dialogue between Naval War College, the Washington Navy bureaus, and
the fleet was nearly continuous.
How can the Navy grow a network centric force with this intractable acquisition
process? This paper bridges the gap between the high brow concepts of network centric warfare
and the hardscrabble realities of the current acquisition process by using a three step process:
1) understand the network centric warfare concepts and equate those concepts to operationally
relevant examples; 2) analyze those examples and find tangible requirements and their associated
characteristics needed to achieve a network centric force; and 3) determine potential strategies
for achieving the necessary adjustments and reforms necessary to move towards a Navy network
centric force. The process result is a potential way ahead to both kick start network centric
operations today and achieve the advanced network centric warfare force of the future.
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Understanding Network Centric Warfare
The Naval Warfare Development Command is responsible for concept development in
the Navy. They define network centric warfare with five tenets (see figure 1) (Martoglio 2000).
In the complete paper an operational example is designed to examine Naval force
employment across a broad spectrum of warfare challenges, from peace operations to
conventional warfare. This translation into an operational example brings clarity to
what many argue is just wishful thinking. For the sake of brevity, analyzing the operational
example generates the following requirements, as noted in figure 2.
NWDC Network Centric Warfare Concepts
1. Know the adversary
2. Establish situational awareness
3. Iteratively create commanders intent
4. Decentralized execution
5. Self synchronization

Figure 1: NWDC Network Centric Warfare Tenets

NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE EQUIPMENT
REQUIREMENTS
NEAR TERM
LONG TERM
(modify current acquisition process)

Internet Protocol Based Force
Coordination and Planning Network

(reform acquisition process)

Widespread Force Control Network
Deployable Micro Sensor Grids

Knowledge Sharing Infrastructure
Unmanned Combat Vehicles
Visualization and Awareness Tools
Engagement Grids

Figure 2: Representative Network Centric Warfare Equipment Requirements
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When these requirements are analyzed, they split into two broad categories: capabilities
acquirable by using the existing acquisition system; and the technically and doctrinally
challenging items, that can only be acquired after reforms of the current acquisition system.

Adjusting the Current Acquisition System
Obstructions experienced daily that are attributable to the current acquisition system
include the inflexibility of the system to move money, the disastrous side effects of well
intentioned rules, and the lack of structure and support for innovative ideas. These obstructions
slow acquisition of the identified near term requirements and stifle innovation. Several
modifications to the acquisition process can assist making the Navy network centric today.
First, realizing the existing and future benefits that the current acquisition process
provides is important. These benefits are found in the realm of program management. From the
integrated product teams, which first put together a program, to the lifecycle functions that
nourish programs, the program manager and his or her team provide a plethora of services that
sustain specific programs. Program managers support programs by identifying and supplying
required maintenance, manpower, supply support, training and associated training devices, and
support equipment. Program managers actively seek improvements to their programs during its
lifecycle, and when a program reaches the end of service, ensure that disposal requirements
mandated by law are satisfied. Program managers and their staffs are acquisition professionals;
most are highly trained and experienced in their fields of expertise.
Just as in industry, the fleet operators, day in and day out, observe ways to improve
operational processes. Capitalizing on the immense pool of intellect in the fleet can rapidly
improve the use of the new technologically advanced tools and move the Navy forward towards
networked operations.
For such an idea to succeed, it needs four components: 1) an operational advocate who
can push the opportunity; 2) an organization that ensures associated education and training are
given to all fleet users; 3) a systems command to provide program office support for
installations, logistics support, and manuals; and 4) a program sponsor to provide necessary
funding. The Rapid Prototyping Cell at Naval Air and Strike Warfare Center meet these
requirements, and has succeeded or is in the middle of migrating ten fleet generated ideas to the
entire fleet( Wilke 2001). This idea should be tried at other primary warfare centers.
This approach can be more successful if program sponsors were given more leeway in
how they apportioned their money. Extending a model started in the Army several years ago,
known as the Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP), offers one way of greatly
increasing the flexibility and spending discretion of the CNO’s program sponsors. For fiscal year
1998, the Department of the Army set aside $100 million for accelerating the "procurement of
systems identified through warfighting experiments as compelling successes that satisfy urgent
needs (Department of the Army, 1999)." The Chief of Staff of the Army himself approved
disbursement of the monies. The purpose of the fund was to support rapid prototyping of
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promising technologies emerging from any of the nine Army battle laboratories. Response time
for funding requests was 30 days maximum.
If program sponsors on the CNO’s staff had access to money of this magnitude, it would
greatly increase their flexibility. For example, CaS rapidly gained high level support, but
remains burdened with unsupplied promise. If a program sponsor could have responded within
30 days with the approximately $3 million needed to properly execute the CaS program, the
Navy would already be reaping the additional potential benefits CaS offers.
The unintended negative consequences of bureaucratic rules continue to plague
innovation. Reinstitute the 1994 DoD rule which states:
Waiver-of-regulations requests must be acted upon within 30 days. After 30 days,
if no answer is forthcoming, the party asking for the waiver can assume approval and
implement the waiver. Those officials with the authority to change regulations can
approve waiver requests, but only the head of the agency can deny a request (Collins
1999).
These adjustments can make a credible difference in starting network centric operations
in the Navy. Give sailors a chance to be innovative, and there is no end to what may be
accomplished, even before the high technology tools promised in the future become available.

Reforming the Acquisition Process to Complete the Network Centric Warfare
Dream
Gaining the new tools of network centric warfare requires structural change in the current
acquisition system. The acquisition system must change the mindset of the participants from an
Industrial Age focus on platforms to an Information Age focus on networks. The networks will
be the drivers of network centric success; platforms, sensors, weapons, and personnel must plug
in and use the network to best tactical and operational advantage.
Admiral Owens suggest a small cadre that produces joint requirements and budgets the
Department of Defense (DoD) resource allocation according to those requirements (Owens
2000). The Special Operations Command already conducts joint requirements generation and
budgeting for all the services’ special forces. The Swedish Armed Forces use a cadre of less than
100 people to do the same for their armed forces (Gustafsson 2001). Owens’ idea requires
Congressional action to change the meaning and definition of Title X in the United States Code.
Moreover, Congress must pass legislation regulating its own role in DoD oversight.
They must focus their oversight on ensuring the DoD is moving towards an Information Age
force, an added responsibility. However, they must also agree to eliminate the duplicative and
conflicting oversight by which they now subject the DoD. This can be accomplished by: 1)
establishing one DoD organization which serves as Congress’ single point of contact with DoD;
2) institute an electronic tracking system for Congressional information requests; 3) agree upon
recurring reports and procedures which minimize unscheduled requests (Scott 1995); and
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4) require Congress to establish a cost benefit measure for oversight and report that measure
publicly twice a year.

Final Thoughts
Network centric warfare is not just about buying new technology, but smartly and
effectively employing that technology in new and innovative ways. Adjusting the current
acquisition process will enable the Navy to start network centric operations today, setting the
foundation for the new and revolutionary tools to follow. The transition from the present
platform centric force to the fully netted force of the future also requires a carefully considered
migration plan. This means change management. Finally, modifications and reforms to the
acquisition process will help the Navy achieve network centric warfare, but not all by itself.
Changes to our education and training process, forward thinking leadership, and the rapid
development of tactics, techniques, procedures, and doctrine will share the forefront.
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Abstract
A changing geo-political environment, growing reliance on economies beyond our borders, and
requirements for U.S. presence in remote locations; place increased demands on logistics
systems and networks to provide the right material, to the right location at the right time while
supporting an ever changing mission. The U.S. Government s lengthy and complex resourcing
process, combined with the numerous stovepipe organizational relationships, makes it difficult to
obtain the material, and personnel required to meet the challenges of this highly dynamic
environment. The current desire for varied and more detailed information will require a
responsive partnership of organizations and the effective integration of data, information, and
decision makers. Failure to utilize modern information management techniques and capabilities
will yield sub-optimized decisions, wasted resources, and unsatisfactory results.
Keywords
Sub-optimized, decision support, logistics network, transportation, inventory management, justin-time, financial management
Disclaimer
The views expressed in this discussion do not necessarily represent the official position of the
U.S. Navy, or the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Introduction
Modern military actions require the effective management of assigned assets, and the ability to
obtain adequate resources to operate and maintain them. The Federal Government s Planning,
Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) process, requires the Department of Defense (DOD) to
submit annual budget requests to the President approximately eighteen months prior to the start
of the fiscal year the funds are needed. Budget requests cover a five year period, the Five Year
Defense Program (FYDP), placing demands on agencies to predict future year funding years up
to thirty months in advance of actual resource spending. Challenges exist when service agencies
must predict: global threats, platforms or force structure (ship, aircraft) to counter these threats,
personnel (grade level, skill set, replacement) to support execution plans, research &
development initiatives to meet out year threats, and annual facility and unit operations and
maintenance resources. Within the Department of the Navy (DON) this effort requires a
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complex balance of future capability with the need to go Forward From the Sea anytime,
anywhere. Historically, prior execution has been the basis for projecting future requirements
however, significant benefit would be derived if better predictive models were available, and
assisted support systems were developed to bring together the numerous disparate legacy
information management systems in order to provide accountable personnel with the knowledge
needed to make better decisions.
The Challenge of Change
The security environment in which we live is dynamic and uncertain, replete with a host of
threats and challenges that have the potential to grow more deadly.
President Clinton, National Security Strategy, 1999
The demise of the Cold War has resulted in the development of strategic plans which are based
on the assumption that there will be no Naval peer competitor for the next two decades. There is
a recognition that in order to ensure regional stability the Navy will need to maintain a forward
presence in the Middle East, Asia, Europe, and the Americas. The threat will include the transfer
of technologically advanced weapons and sensor systems as well as nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons to aggressor states.
In order to prepare for the future, the impacts of fiscal restraint of our adversaries, our allied or
coalition forces, and ourselves can not be downplayed. As an example the costs associated with
building, operating, and maintaining modern nuclear submarines while maintaining a stealth-like
operational signature results in foreign powers constructing conventional submarines in order to
provide this important capability. This threat has been a major concern to maritime nations since
World War II. During RIMPAC 2000, a major fleet exercise that takes place every other year
with nations around the Pacific rim, the Royal Australian Navy s (RAN) Collins Class
submarine demonstrated such a capability, highlighting the importance of working with our
allies and friends in order to ensure global challenges are met with a balanced and coordinated
concept of operations, and training regime.
The U.S. Navy must continue to dominate the maritime environment to dissuade regional powers
from aggressive actions, and be prepared to engage in a full spectrum of Military Operations
Other than War (MOOTW). Recent global events highlight the Navy s role in humanitarian
disaster relief, non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO), peace support missions,
enforcement of embargoes and no-fly zones, drug interdiction, illegal immigration, international
criminal activity, and rapid response to terrorism.
In order to meet the challenge of change we must be able to sustain a long-term, forward
deployed presence. Within the Pacific Fleet this can mean supporting our deployed forces
through the discipline of sea-based logistics with a full spectrum of battle force replenishment,
operational logistics, weapons handling, force support, maintenance, and infrastructure from
logistics bases over 14,000 NM away. These disciplines include the challenges of: conducting re
supply in sea state 3 conditions, Total Asset Visibility, providing logistics information to
operators, safe knowledgeable weapons handling, anti-fouling coatings and deck coverings,
transportation, re-supply and predictive maintenance actions. (Natter, 2000)
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With this background of dynamic and asymmetric missions or tasks, and the Tyranny of Distance
it is important that we recognize the need to ensure that we can join forces with our allies in
order to meet today s threats as we attempt to prepare for an uncertain future. Figure 1 depicts,
the importance of recognizing that our supply needs may change as our situation changes.

Where is our resupply of Bullets ?

Hey! They re lighting their arrows !!
Can they DO that ?

I think we need a couple of fire extinguishers !!

What are the chances that our prime vendor s just in time
supply will get the fire extinguishers to us in time ?

Fig. 1: The changing environment
Balance — Requirements verses Resources
In order to ensure the maximum availability of material, personnel and equipment required to
meet the current and future threats to global security, the Department of Defense must evaluate
all potential threats and analyze the resources required to neutralize, minimize, or eliminate those
threats. We must also recognize that previous defense strategies may not work in the future. As
an example we can no longer count on our strategic forces to deter a foreign power from a first
strike attack. Likewise, increased use of chemical and biological weapons by military, para
military, and others is an indication of vulnerability which places new demands on governments
to provide protection for the general population. Finally, the increasing complexities of an urban
battleground add to the need for a greater balance of requirements to resources and the essential
availability of real time knowledge to optimize the warfighter s decisions.
Force structure
In order to ensure that the warfighter has the maximum number of options the DOD must have a
well defined, trained and ready force, whose capabilities are understood and can be relied upon
to be available when required. Unfortunately, as resources become more scarce the Force
Structure must become more flexible in order to respond to increased missions. In the U.S. Navy
this has resulted in fewer platforms being built and available, while adding weapons or mission
response capabilities of those platforms. Add to this the challenges of being prepared to meet
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any mission on a moments notice, ensuring increased system reliability, maintenance and support
for current equipment, systems and personnel; there is an increasing need to ensure that we
optimize the resources and remain focused on the mission. While platforms and weapons
systems are needed to meet current and future challenges, we must ensure that these systems are
fully operational when required. This effective balance of current and future force requirements
is challenging when the resource acquisition process is as lengthy and complex as the federal
government s Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS).
Resources
The PPBS process normally focuses on a five year requirements plan. It starts at the activity
level and must go through numerous management layers before the President submits the budget
to congress for review, authorization to spend and appropriation. This lengthy process requires
the DOD to either do without certain capabilities for several years, realign funds from adequately
funded programs, or a combination of the two.
The impacts can be significant when plans are delayed, requirements are changed, or projected
costs are not accurate. In addition, many organizations within the DOD, have their own focus
and do not always share information or collaborate on key initiatives. A major ship repair
function (overhaul) that is deferred from one year to the next, can have an impact to fleet
readiness and capability in a numbers of areas. Such a decision by one accountable organization
can pass additional resource implications to another. When a scheduled overhaul replaces a
major weapons system (e.g. new radar), the system must be tested in an operational environment
and the operators trained on it s effective use. This requires school house training, range
facilities, real world training scenarios, and adequate time to hone the necessary skills to
optimize system performance. It is also unreasonable to assume that every system will perform
exactly as envisioned or that the design was fully functional at time of installation; which would
necessitate a reallocation of resources and potentially impact to deployment patterns. In each
case resources will need to be redirected from other program areas in order to ensure proper
performance.
Recent General Accounting Office (GAO) audits of spare parts cost analysis have indicated that
our projections have not been accurate and that our information systems do not provide an
adequate audit trail to validate spending. Over the period 1994 to 1999 Navy-managed aviation
parts increased at an average annual rate of 12%. Over the same period, when prices of high
volume demand items were reviewed, it was noted that the average annual rates increased by
27% (Zuckerstein et al. 2000). In recent years congress has provided supplemental funding to
meet many of the shortfalls resulting from inaccurate projections. In order to ensure that the
funds were being spent for their intended purposes GAO was asked to review DON accounting
records. The review indicated that there was inadequate information to verify how the increase
in funding had been spent (Overton et al. 2001).
Although funding is required to meet the DOD s goods and services requirements Dollars
don t fix broken systems material and people do. It is important that we turn our attention to
material requirements and the resources necessary to have the right material, in the right place, at
the right time.
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Logistics
I don t know what this logistics thing is that Marshall keeps talking about, but I want some of
it! Admiral Ernie King — 1942
The area of logistics brings together the disciplines of staffing, training, warehousing, inventory
management, transportation, procurement, repair, and maintenance. While most requirements
can be satisfied by financial resources, there may be some instances where all the resources in
the world will not allow actions to be taken within the desired timeframe. Therefore it is
essential that an effective information/knowledge management system be available to meet the
demands of complex logistics requirements.
Inventory Management & Storage
In order to ensure that material is available to the customer, whether in maintenance (a repair
part) or as a consumable (food, fuel, paper towels), warehouse and inventory management
personnel must have a good understanding of future demand. If a ship consumed $546,000 in
fuel during underway operations last month but is going to be inport for the next six months
there is little need to warehouse a large quantity of fuel. Inventory managers and procurement
agents need to know ships operating schedules in order to ensure proper material is available
either from on-board inventory or government/commercial sources. Likewise if the Ships
Engineer is planning to clean the fuel storage tanks, the inventory manager needs to ensure that
he can remove or not replenish fuel out of or into that storage location. The significant challenge
to material availability is a through knowledge of the anticipated demand for that material and
the logistics network s ability to provide that material.
New or repair existing
One of the essential elements in effective inventory management is the ability to evaluate and
predict future requirements. Although prior demand history may provide a good starting point
for the 75% solution, greater predictability is required in order to ensure proper decisions are
made. It is equally important that we have accurate and unbiased information. As previously
stated there are two major categories of material, repair and consumable. There is little
flexibility in obtaining new consumable items, one must go to the manufacturer; but there are
several options available to our modern military forces with respect to repairable items.
Historically the navy has recognized three levels of repair and maintenance; Organizational (O),
Intermediate (I), and Depot (D). When we consider which level of repair/maintenance is
appropriate, we evaluate the performing activities capability to complete the task. The typical
limiting factors are; lack of skill, lack of material, lack of facility, lack of equipment, or lack of
knowledge. In order to repair system components or maintain systems we must understand the
meantime between failure, the length of service of the affected component or system, and the
anticipated replacement/service life. As we will see naval aviation readiness data indicates that
we have not solved the problem.
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Figure 2 highlights the number of different Naval Aviation supply parts that are managed by
government parts item managers. As the left pie indicates 76% of the material is managed by the
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), however it is important to note that the high cost items
required to support naval aviation are Navy managed. The center pie depicts the 164,000 parts
managed by Navy, 75% of those items had zero demand from all Naval sources (Navy, Marine
Corps, and Naval Reserve) while 8,330 items had only one demand. The balance of the Navymanaged items 31,400 had greater than one demand, unfortunately 29% of those items were in
backorder status at the end of the year.

Naval Aviation Material
number of different line items

DLA & DON

680 thousand

DON

164 thousand

DON > 1

31.4 thousand
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Fig. 2: Number of Aviation Line Items managed by DLA (76%) & DON (24%); FY-00 DON
Aviation Material with Zero demand (75%), 1 demand (8%), & >1 demand (17%); and
requisitions filled in FY-00
(71%), & on backorder at year end (29%).
Delivery and Transportation
A recent study by navy inventory managers found that it takes an average of 39.4 days for a
repairable item to be received at the designated repair site. The proposed solution, developed by
a logistics stovepipe organization, without the participation of the fleet customer, will utilize
express air freight services from the commercial contract transportation network. This solution
fails to acknowledge that the customer is extremely mobile, and may have already contracted for
government transportation to move passengers, equipment, or other supplies. We must also
recognize that capabilities which exist today in the private sector may not be available in the
future. The first American victory in the revolutionary war was against an outsourced army,
when George Washington defeated the Hessians at Trenton. Modern Just in Time inventory
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management practices in private sector work best in fairly stable production processes, but tend
to break down when used in a more dynamic environment (Noreen and Garrison 1997).
From 1992 — 1999 we saw flight operations reduced by 30% (Hall et al. 2001) this was in part
because of the lack of funding but more importantly the lack of material. As previously stated
the most important element of the logistics equation is the ability to have the material available
when and where required. This challenge must be met with the effective integration of the entire
logistics process both maintenance and supply. The maintenance organization must be able to
identify when and where maintenance must be performed and the supply process must ensure
that the production/repair, warehouse, and transportation capabilities are available to meet the
demand. In order to be successful we must break down stovepipe processes and ensure that
information and knowledge is available to all appropriate stakeholders.
Disparate information sources
In this environment of increasing threats and limited resources it is essential to bring together
information from the numerous stakeholders and the legacy systems that had evolved out of
developing processes and management information systems, without the benefit of a strategic
focus to bring them all to a common solution. The Defense Reform Initiative Directive #47
(DRID 47) identified the need for the DOD to operate in a shared electronic data environment.
The final report identified the need to effectively integrate knowledge based solutions and the
need for the seamless exchange of information (Hambre - 2000).
This resulted in the Department s focus on the need to move toward an Enterprise Resource
Planning (ERP) solution used by many of the leading global corporations to standardize business
processes, application software, and facilitate a change management process. The cornerstone of
the ERP process was the migration of numerous legacy information systems to standard
applications using common data elements across all business applications. Current estimates are
that the ERP process will take 8-10 years to complete and will cost the Navy in excess of
$1.8Billion.
As figure 3 indicates there are many elements of the supply portion of the logistics process each
with their own link to meaningful information. Should the links break information will be lost
and sub-optimized solutions developed. Figure 4 shows that there are many stovepipe
organizations that do not adequately share information with one another creating many instances
where stakeholders are not coordinating their actions with one another. This ultimately has a
negative impact on the fleet which is responsible for providing trained and ready forces to meet
any possible mission task.
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Fig. 3: Conflicting demands and complex links.
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Fig 4: Isolated communities of practice.
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Solution
The significant problems we face cannot be solved with the same level of thinking that created
them. Albert Einstein
In his paper Information-Centric Decision-Support Systems: A Blueprint for Interoperability ,
Dr Jens Pohl highlights the importance of creating a decision support environment where
computers can focus on the functions that they perform best, and humans can collaborate in the
decision process with the requisite knowledge to optimize the solutions. Truly optimized
decisions can be made once the human computer partnership has been established and
organizations have progressed to an environment of Business Intelligence which brings together
effective, computer-assisted (agent), information management and knowledge building (Pohl 
2001). Figure 5 depicts the need to migrate from data to understanding in order to ensure better
decisions are made.
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Fig. 5: Trail to Better Decisions
Dr. Philip Abraham the Logistics Program Manager for the Office of Naval Research, has
recognized the need to bring various logistics projects and initiatives together for a common
readiness focus. He has asked fleet representatives to participate in design specifications,
program reviews, requirements definition, and integration efforts. There are two decision
support projects that utilize agent based capabilities to provide a collaborative interactive tool to
support fleet operations. The Shipboard Integrated Logistics Support (SILS) brings together
numerous shipboard logistics R&D efforts in order to provide Commanding Officers with a
balanced table top of information for optimized decisions. This project focuses on many of the
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elements of Admiral Natter s Strategic Planning Guidance. Both of these projects have included
key operational personnel in the development of a proof of concept and this participation should
help to facilitate the transition of the projects through the PPBS process to ensure fleet support,
as they migrate to operational status.
Future
Changing requirements challenge the logistics community to ensure that adequate inventories
available when needed. This will necessitate a need to anticipate future requirements, tasking,
capabilities, and sources of supply. Agents provide an excellent opportunity to bring balance to
our information needs and ensure that all stakeholders are working from a common
data/information source. Within the Pacific Fleet there is a need to also be able to collaborate
with our allies and sister services in order to meet anticipated regional threats.
A recent CINCPACFLT Logistics partnership was created to prototype a maintenance, supply,
transportation, and repair process that would allow repairable items to be screened, repaired, and
certified at a local level without the need for costly transportation, long lead time, and expensive
depot overhead and repair. This initiative is expected to not only save repair funds but reduce
the need for high inventory outlay; while increasing material readiness and providing more
meaningful shore duty assignments for qualified military personnel One of the critical success
factors is the effective integration of information and the availability of that information to the
appropriate decision makers.
Figure 6 displays an information network that ties together the key logistics elements of fleet
operations with the capability to focus on the critical information in the decision making process.

Fig.6: Achieving a Balance
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Once this network is in place, collaboration can occur and communities of practice can come
together to support decisions based on related functional information. Figure 7 highlights a
streamlined organization and information network that allows for true collaboration to occur with
the numerous and varied stakeholders.
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Fig.7: Enhancing Communities of Practice
Summary
Changing requirements, an uncertain future and limited resources challenge us to do more with
less. It is more important than ever that we anticipate our future material requirements in order
to ensure that equipment and personnel perform as required. As the U.S. continues to be a global
partner in the world we must maintain strong ties with our allies to maintain free and open access
to global commerce. Likewise our humanitarian interest place additional demands on Naval
Forces. The critical catalyst is meaningful, accurate, and timely information. As we become
exposed to more and more information, intelligent agents can help the decision maker focus on
the information required for a particular decision and prioritize the balance. Failure to manage
information will result in sub-optimized solutions that could also result in loss of valuable
material and personnel assets. Failure is not an option. Figure 8 depicts an optimized decision
support process that brings together the various information sources that are essential to an
optimized decision.
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Fig.8: Proper Assessment results in better decisions and Actions
On November 30, 1942 the U. S. Navy s Task Force 67 made up of four heavy cruisers
(Minneapolis, New Orleans, Pensacola, and Northampton), one light cruiser (Honolulu), and six
destroyers (Fletcher, Perkins, Maury, Drayton, Lamson, and Lardner) steamed through the
Soloman Islands to attack a Japanese resupply force heading for Guadalcanal. The U.S. Forces
were well prepared, a plan had been developed based on lessons learned from previous naval
engagements, and the men embarked were at battle stations.
At 2310 the lead ship (Fletcher) identified a Japanese target using it s new high tech radar and
six minutes later requested permission to fire torpedoes. At 2320 Commander, Task Force 67
granted permission to fire, unfortunately the Japanese force had closed to 7,300 yards, a distance
that would enable their weapons to reach TF-67. Within a minute the U.S. Commander ordered
the heavy guns on his cruisers to open fire, before the torpedoes had a chance to reach their
targets. By daylight TF67 had sunk 4 Japanese DD s, and damaged 2 more, the U.S. had lost
Northampton, and Pensacola, New Orleans, & Minneapolis were heavily damaged. New
Orleans was struck by a Japanese torpedo hitting the forward ammunition compartment and
ripping the bow off at the number two 8 gun mount. The three cruisers were repaired and
returned to action in other naval battles, however the 413 men that lost their lives that night
would not return to fight again.
The advantages of hindsight provide an opportunity to evaluate if better U.S. decisions could
have been made. Although the decision to delay firing on the Japanese force may have had
impact, there were many other factors outside the control of the on scene personnel that played
an even greater role in the outcome. Radar was a new technology that had been deployed to our
fleet and there had not been adequate familiarization with it s capability or reliability. (USS New
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Orleans had Radar installed after the attack at Pearl Harbor) The use of smokeless gun powder
may have provided some advantages but the bright flash that emitted from the gun barrels at
midnight proved to provide an excellent visual bearing for reactive enemy actions. The Japanese
forces did not have the advantage of Radar and relied on visual references and high resolution
optics for their fire control solutions.
However the most critical problem may have been associated with U.S. torpedo development.
Prior to the war the Navy s ordnance bureau had developed a faster, longer range torpedo.
Unfortunately, the entire end-to-end capability of the weapon system was not fully tested prior to
deployment, and critical design flaws in the exploder mechanism resulted in weapon failures. At
the beginning of the war a naval officer from the Bureau of Ordnance visited Professor Albert
Einstein to demonstrate the new technology. Professor Einstein informed him after a brief
review, that the exploder mechanism had a design flaw that would preclude the firing pin from
performing properly. The next day Einstein provided a sketch of a modification that would
allow the firing pin to perform as it should. It is also important to note that the U.S. Submarine
force had been experiencing similar problems with torpedoes malfunctioning. Rear Admiral
Charles Lockwood (COMSUBPAC) in 1943 provided detailed experiments on torpedo
performance to prove the design flaw, unfortunately it was not until 1944, long after the major
and significant naval battles of the Pacific were over, that the problem was corrected. (Crenshaw
—1995)
As future Naval Commanders seek to ensure program balance it is imperative that objectives,
visions, missions, roles, and responsibilities are kept in perspective, we must focus on our
collective missions and never lose sight of the importance we play in support of our National
Security Strategy (Figure 9 pertains).

Fig.9: Keeping things in perspective
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Author s Note: This paper is dedicated to Captain John L. Neff USN (Ret) who served from
December 1941 to June 1972 and received his final honors in May 2001 during the preparation
of this manuscript. For over 26 years he has asked how s the fleet ? . It is this background of
love, devotion, honor, and respect that I acknowledge a man who inspired, directed, and
encouraged me to focus on the fleet. To you Sir, I thank you for your constant presence in my
life and appreciate the sacrifice you made during your naval career. I trust that the lessons
learned from the evening of November 30, 1942 will be used to ensure that the fleet is prepared
to go forward from the sea any time any place.
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